Parental background and educational career: evidence from a cohort study (*)

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Abstract

In this paper we follow a cohort of young people throughout their school career and study the determinants of school choice at different stages of the Italian education system. We use a new and unique cohort study that covers 1700 individuals born in 1982 and 1983 and living in the Novara Province¹; we have information about their school curricula, marks at each compulsory exams, family characteristics and a set of information on how they are satisfied with the more important aspects of their school life and are thus able to analyse the association between family background and school career in Italy. We find that parents education role differs along school career, mother education being more important in later (19 years old) proficiency rather than early one (13 years old).

¹ Funding by Novara Province is gratefully acknowledged.

1. Introduction

In this paper we follow a cohort of young people throughout their school career and study the determinants of school choice and outcomes at key stages of the Italian education system. Parental background's influence on children educational career is likely to be the more significant the earlier decision are taken, and in Italy pupils should decide among different secondary school tracks when they are 13. We use a new and unique cohort study that covers 1700 individuals born in 1982 and 1983 and living in Novara Province; we have information about their school curricula, marks at compulsory exams, family characteristics and a set of information on satisfaction about some relevant aspects of school life.

We begin our analysis presenting a model of educational attainment to overview the determinants of individual school choices. Our analysis then follow individuals along their school career: we start from pupils performance at the exam taken at the age of thirteen and end with university performance. Given that the upper secondary school track is chosen very early by individuals and their families (there are recommendations by the lower secondary teachers about which track to chose but they are not binding), the mark scored at this exam is likely to have a strong effect on the subsequent decisions. As expected, parental education has a great importance on pupils achievement, the father education being the more important determinant.

After compulsory school, pupil should decide whether to stay in education or to enter the labor market. Early leavers are about 6% of the sample. Those who stay-on after compulsory school can choose between a short vocational school or among eight tracks (ranging from general schools to more market oriented vocational schools) of secondary school; Modelling this decision, we find that parental background heavily affects children decision. We then turn to drop-out from secondary school phenomenon, which as expected is related to individual characteristics, school career and outside options.

The university enrolment decision is then addressed. Despite the Italian well known scarcity of tertiary educated people but in line with recent evidence of 1999 reforms² effect, the great majority of the cohort under study enrolled to university. It turns out that while family characteristics loose their direct effect, individual ability and

²In 1999 a reform of University system was approved by Italian Parliament, reducing the length of university and introducing also in Italy the so called 3+2 scheme. For an extensive review of past and present reforms see <u>www.eurydice.com</u>

perceived school and teacher quality play a big role. Among the main determinants of university enrolment, we should acknowledge the type of secondary school attained, which, of course, was strongly correlated with parental characteristics.

Finally, study university performance and find out a greater importance of individual ability (measured as school proficiency at the age of 18) than earlier.

2. The Italian education system

In this section we briefly describe the Italian education system, while a more detailed description could be found elsewhere (see, for example, Brunello et alii, 2005). Figure 1 draws a picture of the current educational system. In primary and lower secondary education, establishment and actual operation are regulated by general provision and applied to the whole country. Exams are normally taken at 14 (esame di scuola media inferiore) age at which the compulsory part of the school career ends. Further education is a matter of individual choice around the age of 14. A good indicator of the child's potential is the mark scored at the final exam which, although evaluation is made on a local basis, is a sort of relative to peer ability test³. Furthermore, lower secondary teacher usually write a global evaluation document and short recommendations about which upper secondary school to choose, but they are not binding. Those continuing education can choose among the four different school tracks: Classico, scientifico and linguistico (general track), artistico (arts), tecnico and professionale (technical and professional track). An alternative to upper secondary education is short vocational training, which falls under the responsibility of Regions and last about three years. There is another leaving exam, usually after five years of upper secondary school (scuola secondaria superiore). This exam (known as esame di maturità) is mostly taken at the age of 19. Many students, however, drop out of school before reaching the final exam which is necessary to enrol in university. Many students, once finished upper secondary, enrol in university. In order to increase efficiency and reduce drop-outs, the university system has been reformed in 1999 and now it has adopted a scheme consisting of two cycles undergraduate (laurea, usually 3 years) and postgraduate studies (2 years of specialist degree and then a three-years doctorate). Other reforms of the whole system, from primary to upper secondary, are currently under debate in the Italian Parliament.

³ This exam is composed by three separate parts: a written composition, a mathematical test and an interview which covers all the subject.



Figure 1 – The Structure of the Italian educational system for this cohort

3. The data

The data set used in this paper is a unique cohort study originate from the SEMEQ (i.e. Economics Department of Novara University) in the Novara Province⁴. In 2004 about 1700 youngsters born in 1982 and 1983 were interviewed, the sample is representative of resident population in the Province of the same age. Detailed information about school career, family background, training and labour market experiences has been collected. The cohort nature of this sample allows us to study for the first time important choices taken during the school career of homogenous individuals who were asked to decide in the same years and region, which guarantees the same economic environment conditions.

As it can be seen by table 1, in the sample about 51 percent of the individuals are born in 1982⁵. Females on average perform better than males: they obtain higher marks at the 13 years exam (*esame di licenzia media*), they tend to attain higher levels of education and to repeat less frequently years of schooling. About one third of the entire

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⁵ This figure reflects the actual enrolment rate of individuals in the cohort under analysis.

population lives in Novara. As regards repetition, in the currently used data-set it is not possible to calculate the average incidence of this phenomenon in the population, because the only available figures regards young people still in school, while, as it is well known, people more likely to repeat tend to drop from formal education and is no more observed in school statistics. According to our data, this is a quite common experience, because, about one third of our sample repeated at least one year during its school career, alongside our analysis we will be able to address the repetition effect both on proficiency and on staying –on decisions.

TABLE 1 AROUND HERE

Our dataset contains full information about parents education, and thus we are able to explore the intergenerational mobility in education. We can see from table 2 that this Province is characterized by a great degree of upward mobility: we highlight those cells in which children reached the same educational level of their parent. Even if only a part of the youngsters enrolled in education will attain any university degree (*laurea or diploma*), it is clear-cut that this generation is out-performing its parents one, because, given parent education, the large majority of children is concentrated in a higher level (right of grey cells). Notwithstanding the existing upper mobility, parental education is still important in determining offspring educational attainment because only one third of children born from low educated parents enrol in tertiary education against the 70/80 percent of children born from highly educated parents.

TABLE 2 AROUND HERE

4. Empirical analysis

To overview the school choices of the cohort under study, we begin our analysis studying educational attainment. As it can be seen in table 1, 16% of our cohort exits school just after compulsory school (we will see in section 4.2 that 6% decide not to continue, while 10% drop out from secondary school), about 6% hold a short vocational diploma, 24% hold a secondary school diploma, while the majority of our cohort (54%) enrolled in university.

We estimate an ordered probit model, in which the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the individual has a compulsory degree, 2 for short vocational education, 3 for secondary school diploma, 4 if she is enrolled in university. Given that investment in education decision are to be taken very early in Italy (i.e. the choice of secondary school trak in taken when child is 14), we use as explanatory variable of educational attainment only variables related to childhood. (children aged 6 to 14) or who could possible not have changed during the years (parents education or region of birth). According to the economic theory, individual or family maximise their utility and the decision to invest in further education depends on whether benefits are higher than costs, both direct as well as indirect (opportunity) (Card, 1999). Individual ability, family characteristics and labor market conditions are the main factors driving individual behaviour. Our dataset contains information which could proxy individual ability (marks at 14 and 18 exams). Family passes to its offspring genetic endowment, effort in nurture as well as economic resources.) and we collected retrospective information about nurture during childhood⁶, the period in which decision about education are taken, (whether the mother worked, who used to help children in doing homework and whether the child attended any kind of children activity) and we can proxy economic resources with parents education which, according to human capital theory, is strictly related to labor earnings. Wage differential due to levels of education acts as incentive to invest in further education, but in our study, we observe a cohort of individual born in a two year span of time in the same Province, and thus they face more or less same labor market condition. So in all the regressions, we put town of residence dimension to control for within Province existing differences in local labour market. Finally, we have past and present information about a risky behaviour, smoking, which can be used as a proxy for individual aversion to risk and help explaining observed differences in investment in education (for the use of smoking behaviour related to investment in education see (Festerer and Winter Ebmer, 2000 and Harmon and Walker, 1995).

TABLE 3 AROUND HERE

As expected, females tend to invest more in education than male. This could be related to the higher female return to years of schooling (see Brunello et alii, 2001) which creates higher incentive for female than for male to invest in further education. Parents education increases the probability to enroll in university, the mother being slightly more important, while family composition (number of sibling) or parents origins do not has a statistically significant effect. Obtaining a higher mark at the 13 years compulsory exam (which means, anything else equal, to be more able) and having attended children activity during childhood increase the probability to attend higher level of education. Anything else equal, not have been helped by no one in doing homework during childhood increases the probability to enroll in university: it could be that only more able children are left alone in doing homework and thus this is again a proxy fro individual ability. Mother working full-time during childhood are those whose children invest more in education: as we will explain in next section, this could be related to an income effect. Finally smokers or past-smokers tend to invest less in education.

4.1 Explaining early educational achievement

The first important test of individual talent in Italy it's the compulsory exam taken at the end of lower secondary education, when pupils are about 13 years old. We begin our empirical analysis from the determinants of early achievement. Economic literature agrees that family influence is stronger in early stages, thus an important family cultural effect is expected. We model the mark scored in the 13 years old exam as a function of both individual and parental characteristics. A local (mainly at class level) commission evaluates pupils according to both individual behaviour and proficiency; it turns out that the mark, even if it is normalized in the same range by the same judgment rules around the whole country, remains a relative (at class level) measure. It ranges from "fair" (*sufficiente*), to "good"(*buono*), to "very good" (*distinto*) and "distinction" (*ottimo*), a naturally ordered rank and so we estimate an ordered probit model. We exclude from this part of the analysis those for which we do not observed the mark scored (about 30% of the sample) and end up with 1198 observations.

Parental characteristics strongly affect pupils performance in early childhood. Haveman and Wolfe (1995) review social science literature on this issue and stress the influence of mother characteristics. In particular, economists put the accent on genetic transmission (indirect influence) together with the quality and quantity of resources (time and wealth) devoted to children development by both parents (direct influence). Sociologists and developmental psychologists contributed to the literature with many different approaches: in all these models, parental and siblings traits, such as motivation, ambition, values and behaviours together with stressful events (divorce, imprisonment, etc.) have strong influence in children development: the "working mother perspective" postulates that if maternal works reduce the level of controls, guidance, and monitoring given to a child, conversely a working mother increases the disposable income offsetting the reduction in child care time and helps to prevent the family from poverty which may have adverse effect on children' development. Given also the positive relationship existing between education and labor market participation of mothers, we expect that the more educated mothers are also more likely to work.

TABLE 4 AROUND HERE

Table 4 shows how mark scored at the exam varies according to some family characteristics during childhood. For example, it can be seen that having attended some organized activities (sports, music, languages etc..) during childhood, increases the probability to score a better mark (more that buono =41% of the sample that attained activities against 20%). The income effect of a working mother seems to offset the lack of guidance due to the absence of the mother and finally both mother and father educational attainment influences child performance in the same way, even if the former seems to be slightly stronger.

TABLE 5 AROUND HERE

The results of the multivariate analysis are in table 5. We present the marginal effects for the probability to score the highest mark computed at the sample means. As it can be seen, females perform better than males and there are no statistically significant differences between the two years of our cohort. The probability to reach the highest grade decreases with the number of siblings and whether there are older siblings. Having attended any kind of children activities (sport, music, dance) during childhood increases the probability to score the highest mark. Also help in doing homework affects the early proficiency, again, "do it by yourself" being the best performing category. As regards parental education, surprisingly we find that father education exerts an influence greater than mother education, which is also mildly statistically significant. To better understand this evidence, we exclude from the regression father education (column 2) and then mother education (column3). Mother education alone (column 2) does not reach the expect level of importance in determining child achievement, while father education maintains more or less the same marginal effects (column3). Assortative mating between parents is quite strong : about 60% of parents have the same level of education, 23% have a father with a higher level of education, the remaining 17% have a mother with a higher level than father. When

assortative mating is strong, a higher correlation between parents educational levels is expected, but this does not seem to be our case: we clearly observe a stronger influence of father education on achievement, which, we believe, is related to the fact that father education determines the socio-economic position of the family in the society and thus has a stronger and clearer effect on children achievement.

In the last columns, we add to the specification also the main activity of the mother when children were from 6 to 13 years old. We find that having a mother working full-time increases children performance, while a mother working part-time decreases it: as already pointed out, the first results suggest an income effect, the latter

4.2 Early leavers

In Novara area we observe about 16 percent of youngsters who just hold a compulsory degree (end schooling at about the age of 14). Among this sub-sample of early leavers, we can distinguish between two different sub-sets: those who decide not to continue and those that continue for some years but do not reach nor the high school diploma nor the short vocational school diploma⁷. The former are about 6% (110 individuals) of the whole sample. According to the economic literature, these are rational individuals who discount future streams of costs and benefits and maximize their utility (mainly wealth based) deciding to abandon school just after mandatory licenzia media. We model their decision as a function of some individuals, while Table A1 in appendix shows the results of the probability for some stylised individuals, while

TABLE 6 AROUND HERE

The number of siblings has a clear influence on the probability to not continue: as the number of siblings increases, the probability to drop after compulsory school increases. This result together with the working condition of the mother (having a working mother increases the probability to continue) points at the presence of an income effect, more than a role model effect. Individual ability proxied by the mark scored at the *licenzia media*, and parents education have the expected sign and size, the former slightly bigger. Previous schooling experience (such as repetition and degree of

⁷ About ?? percent of those holding a short vocational degree enrolled first in high school, then drop and enrolled in a short vocational track

satisfaction with many different aspects of school life) does not play a significant role in this decision and are excluded from the estimations.

4.3: The upper secondary track choice

As already pointed out in section 2, pupils are called to choose the upper secondary school track at the age of 13, relatively early, if compared to 16 in the UK, slightly later if compared with Germany, and thus family characteristics is likely to play an important role (Zimmerman, 2003 and Hanushek and Woessman, 2005). This choice is likely to affect future decisions: for example, about 90% of those holding a general vocation diploma enrol in university, compare to 25% of those holding a professional (one type of vocational school) diploma. According to the prevailing education literature in Italy, the upper secondary school track choice is actually a university versus labor market at the age of 18 choice.

We slightly change the classification of high schools, splitting long vocational (market oriented) track in two: technical high school and professional high school. Those schools, in fact, are quite different, being professional schools more market oriented than technical school (i.e. about one half of those holding a technical diploma enrol in university).

We model this decision using a multinomial logit model and summarize result in stylised individuals, isolating the effect of some covariates. This model is estimated on the sub-sample of those who actually enrolled in upper secondary even if they drop out later on because we wish to model the 13 years old choices. Table 7 shows the results.

TABLE 7 AROUND HERE

As table 7 shows, individual ability is very important in shaping the distribution of pupils among schools, in fact pupils who scored the highest mark have more than double times the probability to go to a general track respect to those who scored the lowest. Parental education has more or less the same importance: having a parents with a tertiary degree more than double the probability to choose a general track. Also town dimension is important and influences this choice in different way: the type of school supply and local labor market characteristics. Living in Novara or in a medium size town (less than 5000 inhabitants) increases the probability to attend a general track.

4.4. Dropping out from secondary school

Some of the individuals (about 10 percent in the whole sample) enrol in upper secondary school but then drop-out and do not reach the diploma. According to the main economic theory, drop-outs rationally decide to study that precise number of years and not to finish high school is the optimal choice for them (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999). But this belief is not commonly accepted: policy makers⁸, teachers and parents often consider this choice as a sort of failure which will negatively affect future life chances.

We treat this decision separately from other and estimate the probability to drop during upper secondary in the sub –sample of those who actually enrolled. Again, in table 8 we report the probability for some stylised individuals, while Table A3 in appendix shows the results of the probit estimation.

TABLE 8 AROUND HERE

As it can be seen, the type of school chosen at the age of 14 is extremely important and thus drop-out probability could perhaps be driven by self-selection in type of school: anything else equal (i.e. ability and family characteristics) different type of secondary school have different probability to drop, from 7% in a liceo to 72% in a professional high school. Individual ability, parents education and attending children activity affect the probability to drop, in fact pupils obtaining the highest mark, having at least a parent with a high school diploma or having attended activities reduce the probability to drop by one quarter. But the greater importance in played by repetition: repeating one or more years almost doubles the probability to drop. Repetition should be used to give *immature* students more time to learn and acquire the same amount of notions as the average students, but this result rather suggests that repetition tend to discourage students and increases the probability to drop.

⁸ That's the cause of the introduction of minimun leaving age. See Oreopulos 2003 for a review of the literature

4.5 Explaining achievement at 18

In this section we model the mark scored at the exam taken at the age of 18 by students at the end of upper secondary school. This exam, once called "*esame di maturità*" has been recently reformed and now consists on a evaluation ranging from 60 to 100 of many aspects of students life, not only on school performance, even if proficiency still play a huge role. It is mainly a school level evaluation, because the evaluation commission is compose by teacher of the school with only an external member. Table 9 showS the OLS estimation results.

TABLE 9 AROUND HERE

We first estimate the marks scored at the age of 19 as a function of the mark scored at the age of 13 (*licenzia media*). As it can be seen in column one, the 13 years old mark are able to explain about one third of the variation observed in the 19 years old mark. We then add individual and family characteristics and find that while mother education increases children proficiency, father education decreases it, exactly the reverse that we have observed in 13 years exam. Being in a private secondary school is not statistically significant, while smoking (or having smoked in the past) have a positive and big influence on the mark scored.

4.6 University enrolment decision

About two third of those who complete upper secondary school enrol in university. We model this decision as a function of some individual as well as family characteristics. The results are in table 10. Almost all the variables have the expected signs and size. In particular, we see that father education is more important than mother one and that attending a private upper secondary school and to repeat one or more year decrease the probability to enrol in university. We add also some variable about the degree of satisfaction (dummy variable equal to one if the satisfaction is very high) about some school aspects and find that they are almost not significant, except peer's one. In general we observed that individual characteristics and past experience became more important then family characteristics if compared at decision at earlier stages.

TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE

5 Concluding remarks

In this paper we follow a cohort of young people throughout their school career and study the determinants of school choice and outcomes at key stages of the Italian education system.

We can conclude that females tend to invest more in education than male and perform better in both the compulsory exams. Parents education has a positive effect on educational attainment, and on children performance, the mother being slightly more important in attainment and later achievement and, surprisingly, the father education being more important in early achievement.

Family composition (number of sibling) has a strong effect in particular on the decision to not continue after lower secondary school.

Individual ability (proxied by the mark at 14 years exam) decreases the probability to stop after compulsory schooling and the probability to drop and increases the probability to attend university. Anything else equal, not have been helped by no one in doing homework during childhood behave exactly as individual ability.

Mother working full-time during childhood are those whose children invest more in education and perform better both in early and in later exams.

Smokers or past-smokers tend to invest less in education, are more likely to drop from high school, to not enroll in university and perform very poorly in both exams.

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	Males	Females	All
Born 1982	51,5	50,5	51,0
Born 1983	48,5	49,5	49,0
Mark scored at the lower sec. exam			
Sufficiente (1)	24,6	15,2	20,0
Buono (2)	23,9	23,8	23,9
Distinto (3)	10,9	15,4	13,1
Ottimo (4)	9,8	17,3	13,5
Not answer	30,8	28,3	29,5
Educational levels			
Compulsory education	21,5	10,3	16,0
Vocational education	6,5	5,3	5,9
High school (upper secondary)	22,8	24,9	23,8
Enrolled in university	49,2	59,5	54,2
Repetition			
Never	60,4	76,3	68,2
One time	20,9	17,1	19,0
More than one time	15,3	4,7	10,1
Not answer	3,4	2,9	3,7
Regional distribution			
Novara	37,7	38,7	38,2
Rest of the province	62,3	61,3	61,8
N	869	831	1700

Table 1: sample means *

Notes: * percentages

Table 2 : Intergenerational mobility in Education.

	Children education				
Mother education	lower secondary (compulsory)	vocational upper secondary	High school	enrolled in university	
primary or no education	38,31	7,96	28,86	24,88	
lower secondary (compulsory)	23,53	8,24	34,12	34,12	
vocational upper secondary	10,49	8,02	24,07	57,41	
High school	6,62	2,86	19,68	70,84	
Tertiary education	1,93	3,38	8,21	86,47	
Father education					
primary or no education	38,37	11,29	33,33	17,2	
lower secondary (compulsory)	23,40	6,98	31,7	37,92	
vocational upper secondary	10,1	6,06	33,33	50,51	
High school	8,81	2,2	19,63	69,36	
Tertiary education	2,61	5,97	10,45	80,97	

Tab. 3: ordered probit estimation of educational attainment: marginal effects at

Independent variables:	Y=prob (enrolled in university)	S.E.
Female	.107	.024
Born 1983	040	.024
Lonely child	047	.039
One Brother	.005	.033
Buono	.196	.031
Distinto	.405	.026
Ottimo	.492	.021
Forgotten mark	.286	.030
mother lower secondary	.045	.039
mother short vocational	.104	.051
mother high school	.245	.041
mother university	.349	.040
Forgotten mother education	004	.086
father lower secondary	.154	.038
father short vocational	.239	.045
father high school	.314	.036
father university	.219	.048
Forgotten father education	.227	.057
attended children activity	.147	.031
homework with parents	093	.031
homework with grandparents	159	.055
homework with siblings	169	.049
homework with others	251	.046
Parents not born in the Province	022	.030
Only one parent born in the Prov.	011	.031
Mother working part-time	.022	.035
Mother working full-time	.058	.029
Smoke now	173	.028
Smoked in the past	045	.035
Dummies town dimension	Yes	-
Nobs	16	95

the sample means

Notes: Dependent variable: 1 =lower secondary,2=short vocational,3=upper secondary, 4=enrolled in university. Reference categories: more than 1 brother, mark equal to sufficiente, mother and father with no education or elementary education, doing homework alone, with both parents born in the region, mother not working during childhood, who does not smoke

	mark at 14 years exam			715 . 1	
	Sufficiente	Buono	Distinto	Ottimo	Total
Children activities					
NO	99	73	27	20	219
NO	45.21	33.33	12.33	9.13	100
VEC	241	333	196	209	979
1ES	24.62	31.01	20.02	21.35	100
Mother employment	when child was 6 to	13			
Engli time a	135	223	141	129	628
ruii uine	21.50	35.51	22.45	20.54	100
Dant times	80	78	25	48	231
Part-unie	34.63	33.77	10.82	20.78	100
Not omployed	110	87	47	40	284
Not employed	38.73	30.63	16.55	14.80	100
Don't Know	15	18	10	12	55
Don't Know	27.27	32.73	18.18	21.82	100
Mother education					
No education or	64	42	32	16	154
primary	41.56	27.27	20.78	10.39	100
Lower secondary	157	108	53	34	352
Lower secondary	44.60	27.27	15.06	9.66	100
Short vocational	26	49	24	33	132
Upper secondary	19.70	37.12	18.18	25.00	100
Upper secondary	72	155	87	92	406
opper secondary	17.73	38.18	21.43	22.66	100
University	7	39	25	51	122
Oniversity	5.74	31.97	20.49	41.80	100
Forgotten mother	14	13	2	3	32
education	43.75	40.63	6.25	9.38	100
Father education					
No education or	60	41	21	7	129
primary	46.51	31.78	16.28	5.43	100
Lower secondary	161	114	59	42	376
Hower secondary	42.82	30.32	15.69	11.17	100
Short vocational	17	24	11	16	68
Upper secondary	25.00	35.29	16.18	23.53	100
Upper secondary	87	152	90	74	403
opper secondary	21.59	37.72	22.33	18.36	100
University	12	61	32	81	186
Chiversity	6.45	32.8	17.2	43.55	100
Forgotten father	3	14	10	9	36
education	8.33	32.89	27.78	25	100

Table 4: Mark scored at 13 years exam according to family characteristics.

Table 5: ordered probit estimation of early achievement: marginal effect at sample

means

	y = Pr(votomedie==4							
Variables	Y=0),135	Y=0	Y=0,143 Y=0,140		Y=0	,132	
v arrables	dy/dx	S:E	dy/dx	S:E	dy/dx	S:E	dy/dx	S:E
female	0,078	0,015	0,073	0,015	0,072	0,015	0,076	0,015
Born 83	-0,018	0,014	-0,022	0,015	-0,009	0,014	-0,016	0,014
# siblings	-0,032	0,009	-0,030	0,010	-0,031	0,009	-0,030	0,009
older sibling	-0,022	0,016	-0,022	0,017	-0,026	0,017	-0,021	0,016
mother lower secondary	-0,090	0,023	-0,067	0,022			-0,098	0,022
mother short vocational	-0,034	0,029	0,054	0,037			-0,045	0,027
mother high school	-0,003	0,029	0,085	0,029			-0,021	0,028
mother university	0,060	0,045	0,250	0,051			0,033	0,042
Forgotten mother education	-0,115	0,017	-0,067	0,034			-0,110	0,018
father lower secondary	0,098	0,035			0,043	0,029	0,110	0,036
father short vocational	0,284	0,071			0,238	0,063	0,299	0,072
father high school	0,180	0,039			0,180	0,034	0,190	0,039
father university	0,331	0,059			0,383	0,050	0,369	0,060
Forgotten father education	0,422	0,088			0,361	0,085	0,421	0,088
attended children activity	0,103	0,014	0,114	0,014	0,096	0,014	0,101	0,013
homework with others	-0,116	0,014	-0,121	0,014	-0,120	0,014	-0,117	0,013
homework with parents	-0,084	0,018	-0,076	0,018	-0,080	0,019	-0,077	0,018
homework with siblings	-0,095	0,018	-0,089	0,020	-0,102	0,017	-0,094	0,017
homework with grandparents	-0,087	0,018	-0,072	0,022	-0,081	0,020	-0,087	0,018
novara*	-0,045	0,018	-0,051	0,018	-0,039	0,018	-0,052	0,018
borgoman*	-0,081	0,038	-0,088	0,040	-0,073	0,045	-0,083	0,037
medium*	-0,019	0,021	-0,026	0,021	-0,022	0,022	-0,021	0,021
medsmall*	-0,066	0,019	-0,071	0,019	-0,066	0,019	-0,070	0,018
Parents not born in the Province	-0,041	0,017	-0,046	0,017	-0,056	0,017	-0,041	0,017
Only one parent born in the Prov.	0,032	0,019	0,031	0,019	0,026	0,019	0,027	0,018
Smoke now	-0,134	0,015	-0,135	0,016	-0,136	0,016	-0,134	0,015
Smoked in the past	-0,107	0,014	-0,102	0,015	-0,117	0,014	-0,105	0,013
Mother working full-time			-	-			0,042	0,017
Mother working part-time			-	-			-0,030	0,020

(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of | dummy variable from 0 to 1 (reference category: mother and father no education or primary, homework alone, small village, mother not employed.

Table 6:	probability to not continue after compulsory school according to some
	individual and family characteristics.

Individual characteristics	Probability to not continue	% change
Type 1 – reference individual Male, born 1983, lonely child who scored the lower mark at the <i>licenzia media</i> , both parents with less than high school, no children activity attended, who lives in a small village and smokes, whit a mother not working.	.56	-
Same as type 1, but with one sibling	.63	+12%
Same as type 1 but with two siblings	.70	+25%
Same as type 1 but whit the highest (*) mark at the <i>licenzia media</i>	.07	-87%
Same as type 1, but whit one parents whit more than high school	.16	-71%
Same as type 1, but with a mother working full-time	.46	-18%
Same as type 1, but with a mother working part-time	.31	-44%
Same as type 1, but who does not smoke	.32	-42%
Same as type 1 but living in Novara town	.41	-27%

(*) distinto or ottimo

 Table 7: the upper secondary school choice probability according to some individual and family characteristics.

Individual characteristics	Probability to enrol in			
	technical	professional	other (*)	general
Type 1 Male, born 1983, lonely child who scored sufficiente at the licenzia media, parents with less than high school, both parent born in the region, who lives in Novara and doesn't smoke	.65	.06	.04	.25
Same as type 1 but who scored buono at the licenzia media	.67	.12	.06	.15
Same as type 1 but who scored ottimo or distinto at the licenzia media	.35	.01	.02	.62
Same as type 1 but with at least one parent with high school diploma	.50	.04	.03	.43
Same as type 1 but with at least one parent with a university degree	.32	.05	.03	.60
Same as type 1 but living in Borgomanero	.76	.04	.03	.17
Same as type 1 but living in a medium size town	.58	.15	.05	.22
Same as type 1 but living in a medium-small size town	.87	.02	.01	.10
Same as type 1 but living in a small size town	.74	.13	.02	.11

(*) arts and humanities. Full results in table A2 in the appendix.

Table 8:	probability to drop during upper secondary school according to some
	individual and family characteristics and to school career.

Individual characteristics	Probability to drop	% change
Type 1 – reference individual Male, born 1983, lonely child who scored the lower mark at the <i>licenzia media</i> , both parents with less than high school, no children activity attended, who lives in a small village and smokes, who enrolled in a technical high school, has never repeated a year and is not satisfied by her teachers.	.43	
Same as type 1, but who enrolled in a professional high school	.72	+67%
Same as type 1, but who enrolled in a general high school (<i>liceo</i>)	.07	-83%
Same as type 1 but whit the highest (*) mark at the <i>licenzia media</i>	.32	-25%
Same as type 1, but whit one parents whit more than high school	.29	-32%
Same as type 1, who attended children activity during childhood	.28	-35%
Same as type 1, but repeated at least one years	.83	+93%
Same as type 1, but who does not smoke	.21	-51%
Same as type 1 but satisfied enough by her teacher	.29	-32%
Same as type 1 but satisfied very much by her teacher	.19	-58%

(*) distinto or ottimo

Dependent variable: mark at 19 years exam (range from 60 to 100)				
	COeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Buono	4.14	.93	2.27	1.02
Distinto	11.00	1.11	8.73	1.16
Ottimo	21.6	.94	17.71	1.15
Forgotten mark	7.39	.96	5.29	1.05
Repeated 1 year			-5.02	.79
Repeated 2 years			-4.22	1.44
Professional HS			-1.79	1.23
Art and Humanities			2.11	.95
General school			36	.78
Private school			.18	.98
smoke			-3.41	.68
Smoked in the past			-2.43	.82
Born 83			39	.59
female			1.01	.39
# sib			.56	.39
Mother lower sec.			.27	1.31
Mother short voc.			4.84	1.47
Mother high school			1.95	1.37
Mother University			6.05	1.64
Forgotten Mother edu.			5.07	2.73
Father lower sec.			.01	1.41
Father short voc			11	1.97
Father high school			-3.05	1.46
Father University			-3.96	1.65
Forgotten father edu			88	2.26
Activity			1.26	.90
Parents born in the Province			2.61	.77
Only one parent born in the Prov.			.88	.84
Mother working full-time			.22	.73
Mother working part-time			1.92	.90
Town dimension dummies			Yes	
Constant	69.67	.73	69.56	1.82
R2	0.30	1	.039	1217

Table 9: OLS estimation of the mark scored at the exam.

Notes: in the constant: technical school, parents with no education or primary, both parent not born in the province

Dependent variable: enrolled into university			
*	dy/dx	SE	
Buono	.001	.039	
Distinto	.118	.032	
Ottimo	.167	.034	
Forgotten mark	.079	.037	
Mark at 19years exam	.0069	.0019	
Repeated 1 year	237	.046	
Repeated 2 years	-079	.065	
Professional HS	071	.053	
Art and Humanities	.063	.029	
General school	.217	.028	
Private school	10	.05	
smoke			
Smoked in the past			
Born 83	02	.02	
female	006	.026	
# sib	.033	.16	
Mother lower sec.	066	.062	
Mother short voc.	052	.078	
Mother high school	006	.059	
Mother University	.117	.059	
Forgotten Mother edu.	.155	.027	
Father lower sec.	.089	.051	
Father short voc	.108	.043	
Father high school	.215	.049	
Father University	.155	.042	
Forgotten father edu	.146	.032	
Activity	.052	.038	
Very satisfied by school	012	.044	
Very satisfied by teacher	.002	.031	
.Very satisfied by peer	.075	.027	
Mother working full-time	.09	.032	
Mother working part-time	.070	.032	
Town dimension dummies	Yes		
Nobs	1217		
PseudoR2	0.37		

Table 10: Probit estimate of the enrolment in university decision. Marginal effect

APPENDIX

Table 1: probit estimates of the probability to not continue after compulsory school (without enrolling in a upper secondary school): marginal effects

Iteration Iteration Iteration Iteration Iteration Iteration Iteration	0: log lik 1: log lik 2: log lik 3: log lik 4: log lik 5: log lik 6: log lik	telihood = -3 telihood = -2 telihood = -2 telihood = -2 telihood = -2 telihood = -2 telihood = -2	95.47297 93.83465 76.96603 73.29104 72.86484 72.84888 72.84883				
Probit est Log likeli	imates hood = -272.	84883			Numb LR c Prob Pseu	er of obs hi2(15) > chi2 do R2	= 1680 = 245.25 = 0.0000 = 0.3101
siferma	dF/dx	Std. Err.	Z	P> z	x-bar	[95%	C.I.]
<pre>female* nato83* nsib buono * dist-ott* dont kno* par. with high sch* activity* novara* borgoman* borgoman* medsmall* smoke* mothfull* +</pre>	0021931 .0040772 .0051361 0029323 0288089 011808 011808 01441118 0268812 0154637 0096092 0051472 .0111092 006817 0119314	.0034775 .003631 .0021669 .0038145 .0067682 .0045745 .0112654 .0100542 .0056901 .0062013 .0039267 .004003 .0051398 .004319 .0043783	-0.64 1.20 3.25 -0.74 -4.00 -3.29 -6.82 -4.80 -3.91 -0.15 -2.69 -1.15 2.97 -1.81 -3.38	0.519 0.232 0.001 0.458 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.882 0.007 0.250 0.003 0.070 0.001	.48869 .48869 1.07321 .23631 .266667 .295238 .54881 .813095 .386905 .066071 .157738 .12381 .408333 .514286 .195833	009009 003039 .000889 010409 042074 020774 066192 046587 026616 013106 017305 012993 .001035 015282 020513	.004623 .011194 .009383 .004544 015544 002842 007175 004311 .011203 001913 .002698 .021183 .001648 00335
obs. P pred. P	.0630952 .0103282	(at x-bar)					

(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0

table2: moltinomial logit regression for secondary school track choice.

Multinomial log	Number LR chi Prob >	c of obs 2(51) ≻ chi2	= = =	1273 613.73 0.0000			
Log likelihood = -1259.6528				Pseudo	> R2	=	0.1959
high school	Coef.	Std. Err.	Z	₽> z	[95% C	onf.	Interval]
technical schoo	1						
buono	.589858	.3112603	1.90	0.058	0202	009	1.199917
dist-ottimo	2.722611	.5267296	5.17	0.000	1.69	024	3.754982
mark unknown	.1175796	.3229698	0.36	0.716	5154	296	.7505887
female	-1.105575	.2313282	-4.78	0.000	-1.55	897	6521804
born83	.4350471	.2300166	1.89	0.059	0157	772	.8858714
one par secon	.2462655	.2478993	0.99	0.321	2396	081	.7321391
one par terti	4239531	.373919	-1.13	0.257	-1.156	821	.3089146

nsib mother full mother part both par hor one par hor novara	.1455109 3750597 6978905 .1505896 1964834 .5633701	.1367043 .2882119 .3185425 .2973216 .3019315 .2953979	1.06 -1.30 -2.19 0.51 -0.65 1.91	0.287 0.193 0.028 0.613 0.515 0.057	1224245 9399446 -1.322222 43215 7882583 0155992	.4134464 .1898253 0735587 .7333292 .3952915 1.142339
borgoman medium medsmall smoke _cons	1.259746 4115201 1.964191 .8363971 .5754159	.5519552 .3459084 .4781807 .2516768 .4560299	2.28 -1.19 4.11 3.32 1.26	0.022 0.234 0.000 0.001 0.207	.1779335 -1.089488 1.026974 .3431196 3183863	2.341558 .266448 2.901408 1.329675 1.469218
arts and humar buono dist-ottimo	0753513 2.306623	.3490684 .5516681	0.22 4.18	0.829 0.000	6088102 1.225373	.7595128 3.387873
mark unknown female born83	0903987 .7256611 .2111	.3687276 .2740701 .2562648	-0.25 2.65 0.82	0.806 0.008 0.410	8130915 .1884936 2911698	.6322942 1.262829 .7133698
one par terti nsib mother full	.3342802 .131881 .1301744 .7859113	.2/30/81 .3945256 .1559579 .3429582	0.33 0.83 2.29	0.228 0.738 0.404 0.022	200431 641375 1754974 .1137256	.9051369 .4358463 1.458097
mother part both par hor one par hor	.4421626 0215801 6740602	.3773349 .3255663 .3414637	1.17 -0.07 -1.97	0.241 0.947 0.048	2974002 6596784 -1.343317	1.181725 .6165182 0048035
novara borgoman medium	1.284077 1.552094 .6958443	.3386225 .6362821 .3895504	3.79 2.44 1.79	0.000 0.015 0.074	.6203891 .3050037 0676606	1.947765 2.799184 1.459349
medsmall smoke _cons	.7087573 -2.147252	.5541306 .2764297 .545536	2.39 2.56 -3.94	0.017 0.010 0.000	.166965 -3.216483	2.40924 1.25055 -1.078022
general track	I					
buono dist-ottimo mark unknown	1.121068 4.767846 1.658705	.3812736 .5616719 .3800174	2.94 8.49 4.36	0.003	.3737852 3.66699 .9138848	1.86835 5.868703 2.403526
born 83 one par secon one par terti	4397143 .3881693 1.02962 1.14683	.2381336 .2624146 .3515533	1.62 1.63 3.92 3.26	0.103 0.000 0.001	078564 .5152964 .4577985	.8549025 1.543943 1.835862
nsib mother full mother part	0268198 4287857 9248628	.1436456 .2978051 .3390805	-0.19 -1.44 -2.73	0.852 0.150 0.006	30836 -1.012473 -1.589448	.2547205 .1549015 2602772
both par hor one par hor novara	.5807947 0745398 1.547362	.3069636 .3181352 .3090778 5583879	1.89 -0.23 5.01	0.058 0.815 0.000	0208428 6980734 .9415811	1.182432 .5489938 2.153144 2.81903
medium medsmall smoke	.5578816 1.666822 .8236341	.3604084 .5033354 .2611012	1.55 3.31 3.15	0.002 0.122 0.001 0.002	1485059 .6803023 .3118852	2.61903 1.264269 2.653341 1.335383
_cons	-2.265864	.5223068	-4.34	0.000	-3.289566	-1.242161

(Outcome **professional track** is the comparison group)

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Table A3: probit estimates of the probability to drop during upper secondary school (after enrolling in a upper secondary school): marginal effects

. dprobit dropout female nato83 nsib votolme2-votolme3 nonsavotolme isttec istpro liceo ungendip > attivita novara borgoma/* > */ medium medsmall fuma bocciato m_soddins ab_soddins mammafull mammapart if siferma!=1 Iteration 0: log likelihood = -510.80115 Iteration 0: log likelihood = -510.80115 Iteration 1: log likelihood = -300.63265 Iteration 2: log likelihood = -273.54382 Iteration 3: log likelihood = -267.87897 Iteration 4: log likelihood = -267.20903 Iteration 5: log likelihood = -267.18826 Iteration 6: log likelihood = -267.18822 Probit estimates Number of obs = 1574 LR chi2(21) = 487.23 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Log likelihood = -267.18822

dropout	dF/dx	Std. Err.	Z	₽> z	x-bar	[95%	C.I.]
female*	0113732	.0056473	-2.43	0.015	.495553	022442	000305
born83*	0067366	.0045946	-1.57	0.117	.48094	015742	.002269
nsib	0000233	.0027672	-0.01	0.993	1.05083	005447	.0054
buono *	0122087	.0049965	-2.79	0.005	.232529	022002	002416
dist-ott*	0089216	.0068144	-1.25	0.210	.28399	022278	.004434
not know*	0162771	.0060496	-3.25	0.001	.298602	028134	00442
technical*	.034328	.0139848	3.98	0.000	.330368	.006918	.061738
professional*	.1718491	.0508293	7.32	0.000	.117535	.072226	.271473
general*	0166563	.0075045	-1.69	0.092	.338628	031365	001948
par. high school*	0143604	.0064786	-2.71	0.007	.581321	027058	001663
activity*	0183743	.0094475	-2.69	0.007	.831004	036891	.000143
novara*	0088139	.0057123	-1.58	0.114	.398348	02001	.002382
borgoman*	.0083789	.0152797	0.66	0.512	.064803	021569	.038327
medium*	.0049596	.0077185	0.71	0.476	.158831	010168	.020088
medsmall*	.0067174	.0093992	0.83	0.406	.123253	011705	.025139
smoke *	.0260721	.0087151	4.70	0.000	.395807	.008991	.043153
repeated*	.0715211	.0183786	7.76	0.000	.280813	.0355	.107542
very sat.teache*	0171809	.0058526	-3.89	0.000	.235705	028652	00571
not very s teach*	0139988	.0067434	-2.78	0.005	.530496	027216	000782
mothfull*	0050198	.0056999	-0.91	0.365	.524778	016192	.006152
mothpart*	0015329	.0055688	-0.27	0.790	.202033	012447	.009382
obs. P	.0997459						
pred. P	.0133181	(at x-bar)					

(*) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1

z and P>|z| are the test of the underlying coefficient being 0