

## **Part-time workers and incentives: a question of time.**

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### **Abstract**

Part-time workers appear to be as intrinsically motivated as full-time workers and appear to appreciate job stability as much as do full-time workers. We argue, however, that part-time workers can be regarded as time constrained workers, in that they experience competing claims on their time from labor and non-labor market activities. Part-time workers rate leisure higher than full-time workers and likewise experience higher pressure than full-time workers, in that work does not leave them enough time for care activities and friends.

Insomuch firms' incentive schemes (based on career and training) lies additional claims on workers' time, part-time workers may be less responsive to firms' incentive schemes than full-time workers. When the part-time workers' lukewarm response to firms' incentive scheme is interpreted as a signal of low motivation, firms would restrict their investments to full-time workers. Then, part-time workers would forego training and career opportunities. It follows that part-time employment spells will leave a scar.

Finally, part-time workers appear to be very responsive to incentives that increase their control over their time: flexible working time could be a very effective incentive to elicit consummate effort from part-time workers (and to raise the returns to firms' investments in them).

## 1. Introduction

The Netherlands has been dubbed “the only part-time economy” (Freeman 1998). This nickname reflects the popularity of part-time jobs particularly among working women. Part-time jobs have increased the degree of flexibility in the labor market and have greatly helped women to reconcile labor market participation with their tasks within the household. In fact, while part-time employment is still rather uncommon among men, it has almost become the norm for women.<sup>1</sup> This difference is usually ascribed to gender differences in labor force participation and in human capital accumulation that can be traced back to the role of women within households (Goldin 1997).<sup>2</sup> However, over time, society’s attitude toward female labor force participation has changed. Working women are no longer frowned upon and, in addition, the increasing number of divorces and the increasing number of children born to single mothers have increased women’s dependency on their own ability to earn income (regardless of their attitudes toward work).

Moreover, firms are also positive about part-time work because the possibility of contracting workers for few hours only makes it possible to adjust the workforce to predictable peaks in demand (Buddelmeyer *et al.* 2005).

Furthermore, doubts on the desirability of part-time jobs are silenced by the fact that part-time workers are usually found to be satisfied with their part-time status. Part-time is thus generally understood to be in line with workers’ preferences, despite part-time workers receiving less training, facing lower promotion probabilities, and earning lower hourly wages than their full-time colleagues.

This seems to indicate that part-time workers are able to derive satisfaction from activities outside the labor market.<sup>3</sup> However, the commitment of part-time workers to activities outside the labor market may imply that employers would find them harder to motivate than full-time employees. Consequently, firms providing incentives by means of wages, promotions, and training may find these instruments to be less effective in motivating part-time workers.

The purpose of the present study is to examine whether the desire to work part-time is associated with a reduced interest for the job sphere. We will do so by analyzing data on self-reported work centrality and desired job attributes collected in The Netherlands in 2001 (Van Hooft *et al.*, 2005).

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<sup>1</sup> Men and women fare differently in the labor market. Glass ceilings prevent women from advancing within organizations (Albrecht *et al.* 2003), sticky floors imply that the wage increase associated with promotions is lower for women than for men (Booth *et al.* 2003), and women’s ability to leverage on their outside option is limited by the lower return from search experienced by women (Keith and McWilliams 1999, Royalty 1998). Women are also found to be less inclined to (wage) negotiations than men (Babcock and Laschever 2003).

<sup>2</sup> The changes of the gender wage gap over time have been extensively analyzed (Blau and Kahn 1997, 2003, 2004).

<sup>3</sup> Women’s attitudes toward labor force participation are becoming more diversified over time. That is, firms could come across very different types of women; women who have fully internalized feminine stereotypes (homemakers who would consider work less rewarding) and women who are relatively androgynous in their preferences (who would regard work as very important and rewarding). Research shows that US women’s conditions have changed dramatically: Women’s labor force participation (and men’s attitudes toward it) has improved, Equal Opportunity practices have been introduced, the number of divorces has increased, and the number of children born to single mothers has increased as well. Moreover, gender roles have also evolved. Women in commercial jobs tend to show fewer and fewer feminine stereotypes; on the contrary, men tend to show an increasing number of male stereotypes (such as the breadwinner). Hence, women tend to be more diverse in their work-related attitudes than do men. Some women would retain the “homemaker” stereotype while others would become more similar to men. The spectrum of women’s preferences has thus widened (Konrad *et al.* 2000).

The data show that individuals with a strong preference for part-time jobs are characterized by a strong preference for leisure time, and perceive that having a job leave them with too little time for care and leisure activities. Finally, we find that part-time workers place more emphasis on control over their time than full-time workers.

All in all, our findings appear to support the notion to “place service above self” could put a strain on time constrained part-time workers. Consequently, individuals who prefer to work part-time may seem to have a weaker commitment to their work sphere (and they may not be willing to reciprocate firms’ investments).

We argue that part-time workers are time constrained but otherwise equally motivated as full-time workers (Fuchs Epstein and Kalleberg 2004). However, if firms’ incentive schemes (career and training) put additional claims on workers’ time, time constrained part-time worker will respond to them less well than full time workers. Inasmuch firms use this information to allocate their investments among their workforce part-time workers would forego training and career opportunities. Consequently, part-time employment spells will leave scars.

The paper is organized as follows: the second section presents the theoretical background, the third section describes the data, the fourth section illustrates the results, and the fifth section finally concludes.

## **2. Part-time work: what consequences?**

Part-time jobs may coexist along full-time workers within the same firm because firms can make use of the flexibility allowed by this form of employment. However, firms are found to invest less in part-time workers than in full-time ones (Fuchs Epstein *et al.* 1999).<sup>4</sup> In fact, part-time workers appear to incur a part-time wage penalty, i.e. they earn less than an otherwise equal full-time worker (Manning and Petrongolo 2005), and the incidence of promotions is lower among part-time workers than among full-time workers (Green and Ferber 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, Russo and Hassink 2005).

Standard economic reasoning suggests that the number of hours supplied to the labor market, varies inversely with the value of time spent in non labor market activities.<sup>5</sup> This is because non labor market activities - that span from leisure to important and non-leisure activities such as taking care of children, parents, and people in need - can be very (intrinsically)<sup>6</sup> rewarding activities.<sup>7</sup>

Sometimes, however, workers would perceive labor market and non labor market activities as rival: laying competing claims on workers’ time. In such circumstances workers will have to make choices, either reduce the time spent on non labor market activities or reduce the number of hours allocated to labor market activities.<sup>8</sup> The actual decision would depend on income, preferences, and the degree of compliance to gender roles.

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<sup>4</sup> If part-time workers perform only part of the tasks of a fulltime worker they could receive training just as frequently as their fulltime colleagues, the content of the training would be limited to the smaller set of tasks performed by part-time workers. Likewise, part-time workers could be promoted just as frequently as their fulltime colleagues if the wage increase could be adjusted to match the number of hours. Issues relative to availability and coordination may weaken this argument, however.

<sup>5</sup> Notice that the reduction in the number of hours allocated to work activities may be temporary.

<sup>6</sup> In addition, roles may prompt people to attend care activities in relation to contingencies; as these subside individuals may revert to their preferred activities.

<sup>7</sup> Well off individuals placing a low weight on the disutility of work may decide to purchase these services from the market.

<sup>8</sup> There is an additional solution: to marketize the less preferred activity, i.e. to hire someone to perform the less preferred tasks.

In particular, workers may decide to limit their labor market activities by reducing their working hours. This behavior, however, would have further implications for workers' career if the number of hours worked were to bear (or were believed to bear) on other traits that are relevant for workers' productivity, namely: work attitudes, commitment, reciprocity, and intrinsic motivation.<sup>9</sup> These personal traits have an economic value for the firm because their presence may decrease the negative effects of moral hazard on the returns to firms' investments in specific human capital (Leuven *et al.* 2002).<sup>10</sup>

In fact, the high opportunity cost of work may be accompanied by a high level of commitment to non labor market activities that might crowd out commitment to labor market activities (commitment to the profession or to the firm). Commitment – the will to persist in a course of action – is a key motivational element (Burke and Reitzes 1991). In general, a committed workforce<sup>11</sup> would also be a motivated workforce. A recent meta-analysis of the psychological literature in this area indeed shows a positive relationship between employee commitment and outcomes such as job performance and employee turnover (Cooper-Hakim and Chockalingam 2005, Harter *et al.* 2002).

In addition, part-time workers - time constrained by their commitment to non labor market activities - may respond less well to firms' incentive schemes, if these were to bear on working hours.

In general, incentives must be adopted because effort is not contractible, workers' behavior is not readily observable, and monitoring is very costly and often opposed by workers. Agency theory posits that in the presence of moral hazard firms may use incentives to induce appropriate behavior (Prendergast 1998, 1999, Salaniè 1997). Typically, incentives include wages (or wage contracts), promotion opportunities, and sometimes training (Gibbons and Waldman 1999, Malcomson 1999).<sup>12</sup>

Incentive schemes must be based on observable variables: the output (what has been produced) or the input (the number of hours worked). When output measurement is particularly complicated incentives must be based on inputs and, as such, they are likely to affect the time input: working hours. Time constrained workers would respond particularly badly to career incentives if promotions and training decision are based on (long) working hours as suggested by the rat-race models (Booth *et al.* 2003, Landers *et al.* 1996). Part-time workers would be difficult to motivate with these instruments and since motivation is a key determinant of investments' payoff, firms may be reluctant to invest in part-time workers.

However, the number of hours worked is, at best, a partial measure of motivation. Working hours may be regarded as the extensive margin of motivation. Motivation,

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<sup>9</sup> In fact, economists understand motivation in terms of working hours, a motivated worker is someone who works long hours. A positive correlation between the number of hours worked and workers' ability, which seems to be implied by the rat-race-like models, may not be warranted for Dutch women 70% of whom work on a part-time basis.

<sup>10</sup> In long term employment relationships characterized by incomplete information about workers' willingness to engage in labor market activities, firms that usually invest in their workforce, to protect the returns of the investments, would like to find ways to screen workers characterized by a low motivation and low propensity to reciprocate the investment by means of consummate effort. It is sufficient that firms believe work centrality to be correlated with workers' inclination to reciprocate or workers' commitment.

<sup>11</sup> Workers could be committed to many different entities: to work in general, to their firm, to their occupation, or to their teammates.

<sup>12</sup> Training and investments in the workforce can also be used to motivate workers if workers regard them as a gift that triggers a gift exchange (Akerlof 1982). Moreover, firms invest a considerable amount of time and resources in other activities, such as performance evaluation, giving feedback, empowering workers, and delegating tasks.

however, has also an intensive margin, namely the level of engagement - with thoroughness and seriousness - in a given activity (Harter *et al.* 2002).<sup>13</sup>

We argue that part-time workers may very well be intrinsically motivated and may therefore respond to a different set of incentives than full-time workers, namely incentives that enhance their control of time (working hours) and let them ease the time constraint they face.<sup>14</sup>

This is an important issue, one that may have profound implication for (part-time) workers access to training and to career paths.

In the next section, we will investigate to what extent part-time workers' preferences and attitudes differ from those of full-time workers.

### 3. The Data

The data set is a sample of 1172 individuals (of which 47% are women), which can be considered as representative for the Dutch population (Van Hooft *et al.* 2005). The data were collected with structured questionnaires that were administered electronically. The questionnaire consisted of items about the centrality of work, desired job attributes, and preference for part-time or full-time employment. Here we describe the features of the data that are relevant to the analysis; the interested reader can find a more detailed data description in Van Hooft *et al.* (2005). About 82% of the respondents were employed at the moment of the data collection. Of these, 61% were in full-time employment (more than 34 hours per week), 30% held a long part-time job (fewer than 35 hours but working 12 hours or more), and 9% held a small part-time job (fewer than 12 hours per week). Only 5% of the respondents in full-time employment would prefer a part-time job, while about 68% (62%) of those holding a long (small) part-time job would prefer a part-time job.

There is a striking gender difference: 81% of the individuals preferring part-time employment were women. Only 12% of the men (either employed or not) had a preference for part-time employment, while about 57% of the women would like a part-time job (the length of the desired part-time job was not specified). The preference for part-time employment was stronger among those individuals without paid employment (57%) than among the respondents with a paid job (28%). However, 68% of the individuals preferring part-time jobs were in fact employed.

Next, preferences and work-related attitudes differed between workers wanting to work part-time and full-time. Table 1 shows a comparison of the importance attached to aspects of life between individuals preferring full-time jobs and individuals preferring part-time jobs. The table shows that individuals preferring full-time jobs attached more importance to availability of sufficient income, status, and having responsibilities, and less importance to importance to leisure time relative to individuals who prefer part-time employment. However, the value of having a good work-life balance did not differ between individuals preferring part-time or full-time jobs.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.

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<sup>13</sup> Engagement is considered a sign of intrinsic motivation in studies on student learning.

<sup>14</sup> Plausibly, the answers to these questions depend on the reason that led workers to opt for part-time employment and on whether their decision is permanent or temporary. We will not delve on this issue here because we don't have the means to distinguish between temporary and permanent part-time choices. However, insomuch the preference for leisure is a stable personal trait it would lead to long part-time work spells. In addition, if the decision to work part-time is related to the fertility cycle (or to a relative's illness) the ensuing part-time work spell will not be brief. Consequently, in what follows we will implicitly treat part-time as if it were a permanent choice.

The second aspect that we consider is the extent to which individuals preferring full-time versus part-time jobs differed in the perceived instrumentality of having a job in reaching specific goals. The average scores on these items are shown in Table 2.

#### TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Individuals who want to work full-time perceive work as more instrumental to achieve sufficient income, status, order and regularity in life, responsibilities, security, and a sense of usefulness as compared to individuals wanting to work part-time. Thus, for individuals who would want to work full-time, work-related aspects represent important goals in life and having a job is perceived to be instrumental for reaching these goals.

Next, we turn to the evaluation of a series of job attributes. Table 3 presents the average scores attached to several job attributes, broken down by desire to work part-time versus full-time.

#### TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Interestingly, job security, having a stimulating and challenging job, training provision, benefits, wage, and career opportunities score significantly higher among individuals with a preference for full-time employment than among individuals with preference for part-time employment. In other words, individuals who prefer to work part-time are less sensitive to the means that firms generally use to provide incentives. This result is in agreement with the low incidence of promotions among part-time workers.

On the other hand, the possibility to take days off, firms' location (i.e., commuting time), and the opportunity to work in the preferred part of the day are all items that score higher among workers who would want to work part-time relative to individuals who want to work full-time.

Next, we turn to the analysis of differences in work centrality between individuals with a preference for full-time work and those preferring part-time work. The results are presented in Table 4.

#### TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Panel (a) shows that individuals with a preference for part-time jobs are as satisfied with their lives as individuals preferring to work full-time, despite the former lower ability to make ends meet.

Moreover, consistently with the results in Table 2, work is less central for individuals preferring part-time employment compared to individuals preferring full-time employment. This pattern of results has also been found to characterize the difference between part-time and full-time workers in the US (Thorsteinson 2003).

Panel (b) shows the scores on the specific items that make up the general work centrality score. Individuals who prefer part-time employment experience working as less satisfying, less important in giving sense to life, and as a less important aspect of life relative to workers who prefer full-time employment. In other words, individuals who prefer part-time employment derive satisfaction or a sense of purposefulness from activities other than work.

Part-time workers score lower than full-time workers on items that characterize work as an absorbing state and they score not different from full-time workers on the other items.

Why is work less central for individuals who prefer part-time employment relative to those who prefer to work full-time? Table 5 suggests that the answer may relate to these individuals' role outside the labor market.

Individuals who prefer to work part-time perceive having a job as a source of pressure and rigidity to a greater extent as people who prefer to work full-time. Furthermore, people with a part-time preference experience more problems with time related items as indicated by their higher scores on the items “too little time for friends”, “too little time for care”, and “too little time for household work”. In addition, the lack of childcare facilities and the commuting time were more often experienced as problems by individuals who prefer part-time employment than by those who prefer full-time employment.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

The relationship between the preference to work part-time and work centrality is suggestive. However, these are aggregated data and the relationship found could be confounded by the interplay of other variables, i.e. the interrelatedness of the desire to work part-time with the gender. Therefore, we put our conjecture to the test of a multivariate analysis.

#### 4. Empirical Analysis

In the empirical analysis we take the point of view of the firm, observing workers’ preferences for hours of work and inferring about workers’ interests and preferences (and commitments). The analysis aims at identifying systematic differences between part-time and full-time workers on four related groups of items. First, we will investigate whether part-time and full-time workers differ as far as life and job satisfaction and work centrality are concerned. Job satisfaction and the propensity to quit are important worker characteristics in that they affect the returns to investments in firm specific human capital (Akerlof *et al.* 1988). Second, we will analyze in what respects the level of work centrality differs between part-time and full-time workers. Third, we will turn to the differences between part-time and full-time workers in the preferences for leisure and the importance attributed to non-labor market activities. Fourth, we will investigate in what respect part-time and full-time workers differ with respect preferred job characteristics.<sup>15</sup>

To measure the degree of centrality of work in individuals’ lives we use the construct “work centrality”. The work centrality index is obtained as a linear combination of the six work centrality items presented in Table 4, Panel (b) normalized to range from 1 (very little centrality) to 5 (very high centrality). Moreover, because we are primarily interested in differences between part-time and full-time workers we will restrict the analysis to employed individuals only (833 cases, of which 67% holds a voluntary full-time job, 20% holds a voluntary part-time job, 10% holds an involuntary part-time, and 3% holds an involuntary full-time job). The results are presented in Table 6, panel a.<sup>16</sup>

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

Part-time and full-time workers experience the same degree of satisfaction with their lives, only involuntary full-time workers do experience a lower level of satisfaction compared to voluntary full-time workers. On the contrary, work appears to be less central in part-time workers’ lives than in full-time workers’ ones. Despite the low work centrality, part-time

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<sup>15</sup> The nature of the variables commands the use of ordered probit regression models. We have estimated all models on employed individuals working more than 12 hours a week (this is the definition of employment adopted by Statistics Netherlands). In this section we will report on the effect of hours of work only. The full set of results can be found in the appendix. The estimated thresholds that serve to estimate the probability that an individual would give the answer one to five will not be shown to save on space.

<sup>16</sup> We report on the coefficients on the selected variables, all the controls are included.

workers appear to be as satisfied with their job as voluntary full-time workers. Furthermore, only involuntary full-time workers are somewhat more likely to quit than voluntary full-time workers, so the adjustment of the working hours may involve a job change (Altonji and Paxson 1988, 1992, Manning and Petrongolo 2005).

Table 6, panel b shows in what respect part-time and full-time differs on different dimensions of work centrality.

Voluntary part-time workers score lower than voluntary full-time workers on the dimensions of work centrality that characterize work as an absorbing state: job is a source of satisfaction, work gives meaning to life, work is an important aspect of life. However, part-time and full-time workers are by no means different on the remaining three dimensions of work centrality: if they had enough money they would still want to work, work is more than money, and they equally like to talk about job related arguments. In other words, part-time and full-time workers tend to show an equal level of interest in their work, personal interest in a given task is a key motivational element, especially as far as intrinsic motivation is concerned. From this point of view we suggest that voluntary part-time and full-time workers may display a similar level of intrinsic motivation (as far as work is concerned).

Next, - in Table 6, panel c - we turn to the evaluation of time and the importance of activities external to the labor market.

Voluntary part-time workers, as expected, score higher than voluntary full-time workers on the importance attributed to leisure and involuntary full-time workers even more so. Involuntary full-time workers experience a higher level of conflict between having a job and time for care activities and time with friends than voluntary part-time workers (Fuchs Epstein and Kalleberg 2004). However, voluntary part-time workers appear to experience a lower level of conflict between the job they hold and non-labor market activities. In addition, everybody seems to associate work to a too tight daily schedule but voluntary full-time workers. We interpret these results to indicate that part-time workers experience a low level of control over their time during the day. A too rigid working time may decrease the sense of control over their action and decrease the degree of intrinsic motivation in part-time workers (Benabou and Tirole 2003, Deci *et al.* 1999a, 1999b, Eisenberger *et al.* 1999).

All in all, it may very well be the case that workers wanting to work part-time are time constrained but otherwise intrinsically motivated workers.

Finally, in Table 7, we turn to the importance attributed to job characteristics.

#### TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

Involuntary full-time workers find pay, and training less important job characteristics than voluntary full-time workers. Similarly, voluntary part-time workers rate career and training (but not pay) as less important compared to voluntary full-time workers. Inasmuch these reflect pure preferences, voluntary part-time workers would be less responsive to work incentives based on career and training (but not pay) than full-time workers. This does not mean that part-time workers are hard to motivate. In fact, they evaluate the possibility to work on interesting tasks, to deploy their knowledge and abilities, and self-develop no differently than their full-time colleagues. Inasmuch these characteristics reflect their degree of intrinsic motivation voluntary (and involuntary) part-time workers do not appear to be less motivated than voluntary full-time workers.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, part-time workers appear to be responsive to

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<sup>17</sup> To test the robustness of our results we have run the analysis on the whole sample (1172 workers, including unemployed individuals and individuals out of the labor force) and obtained the same results. The complete set of results is not shown here but can be obtained from the authors upon request.



flexibility in the working time.<sup>18</sup> In fact, both voluntary part-time and involuntary full-time workers assign more importance to flexible working times than voluntary full-time workers. Again we interpret this answer as a desire of control over the decision on when to perform work-related tasks. Control over an action, self determination, is a key ingredient of intrinsic motivation.

## 4.2. Discussion

The question why individuals who prefer part-time employment may be less sensitive to job attributes like training opportunities, and career possibility is not straightforward. On the one hand the low interest for career and training opportunities could genuinely reflect individuals' preferences. On the other hand, the causality may run the other way around. In fact, if employers were to offer part-time workers worse working conditions (i.e., no fringe benefits, no training, low wage, no career opportunities etc.) than their full-time colleagues, the former, to protect their self-worth and to deal with feelings of perceived unfairness, would lower the importance attributed to such items. This behavior would be the result of "cognitive dissonance", that is, people always try to have consonance in their attitudes (what they deem important) and their situation (what they have). When the situation cannot be changed easily, people change their attitudes or psychological meaning of things in order to cope with the situation.<sup>19</sup> The issue is a difficult one and we do not pretend we can solve it here.

Rather, we suggest that the low interest of part-time workers for career and training opportunities may reflect, to a certain extent, workers' preferences for time (Fuchs Epstein and Kalleberg 2004). Time constrained part-time workers - characterized by a high opportunity cost of work - would not respond well to extrinsic rewards if these involved long working hours, as it is the case for promotions and training (Booth *et al.* 2003, Landers *et al.* 1996). In fact, workers holding a full-time job but wanting to work part-time displayed an evaluation of leisure time twice as high as voluntary part-time workers (who in turn attach more importance to leisure time as compared to voluntary full-time workers).

Part-time workers' weak compliance with firms' incentive schemes may induce firms to be reluctant to invest in part-time workers. Hence part-time workers would be less likely to progress in internal labor markets than their full-time colleagues. The effect of foregone training and career opportunities would be felt also once workers return to a full-time schedule. Part-time employment spells may thus leave scars.

However, part-time workers seems to be rather responsive to incentives that increase their control on their working time (flexibility). In addition, part-time workers appear to be as internally motivated as full-time workers. Further, part-time workers deem job stability as important as do full-time workers and their intention to quit is no higher than that of full-time workers. We therefore conclude that there are the conditions to invest in part-time workers too, firms would succeed in motivating these workers – leveraging on their intrinsic motivation - by using elements that enhance their control on their working time.

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<sup>18</sup> Because of the high percentage of women among those preferring part-time jobs we also report the estimated gender effects. After controlling for the number of hours worked women score higher than men on the work centrality index and on all its six items. Moreover, women value career (training) opportunities less (more) than do men. In addition, women give more importance to the opportunity to perform interesting tasks and to deploy their knowledge and abilities than do men.

<sup>19</sup> This process takes place over time. Because women tend to remain in part-time employment for longer spells of time than their male colleagues and because the time span spent in temporary employment does not appreciably differ between sexes, "cognitive dissonance" may help explaining why women are more satisfied than men in part-time employment while they are just as equally dissatisfied as men while in temporary employment (Petrongolo 2004).

## 5. Conclusions

This paper explores the differences between part-time and full-time workers on items such as attitudes toward work, monetary rewards, promotion and training opportunities, and the importance of a job in achieving life goals.

The results presented in the descriptive analysis suggests that workers who desire to work part-time tend to find the job less instrumental to achieve their life goals, tend to find the job less important for their sense of being useful, and tend to find that having a job conflicts with care and households tasks. They also find that work is less instrumental for their satisfaction and sense of their lives as compared to workers who want a full-time job. In addition, individuals who would like to work part-time reported work as a less important aspect of life than their colleagues preferring to work full-time. All this suggests that workers who desire part-time employment present divided interests; they are committed to at least two causes, their job and other activities outside the labor market.

The multivariate analyses show that voluntary part-time workers are as satisfied with their job and their lives as full-time workers. This is not true for involuntary full-time workers who are characterized by a lower level of life satisfaction and a higher propensity to quit than voluntary full-time workers. Voluntary part-time workers are found to assign to work a less central role in their lives (compared to voluntary full-time workers), this is the result of a lower score on the items of the work centrality index that picture work as an absorbing state. On the remaining items voluntary part-time workers score no differently than voluntary full-time workers. In other words, apart for the presence of rival activities, part-time workers appear to be as motivated to work as full-time workers. Voluntary part-time workers appear to have interests outside the labor market that lay competing claims on their time, namely: leisure, care and friends. Moreover, part-time workers and involuntary full-time workers appear to be time constrained workers and as such they are particularly sensitive to "convenient" working day arrangements, when to work and for how long.

Our analysis suggests that part-time workers - who are just as intrinsically motivated as their full-time colleagues - may be very responsive to firms' incentive schemes aiming at enhancing (part-time) workers' control on their working time.

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Table 1: Importance of aspects of life (scale 1 to 5)

|  | Preference for Part-Time |      | T-test Score |
|--|--------------------------|------|--------------|
|  | No                       | Yes  |              |
| Having Enough Money                          | 3.44                     | 3.28 | 3.42         |
| Having the Feeling to Be Useful              | 3.88                     | 3.92 | -0.66        |
| Social Contacts                              | 3.89                     | 3.98 | -1.67        |
| Respect                                      | 3.86                     | 3.88 | -0.34        |
| Sense of Security                            | 3.77                     | 3.81 | -0.81        |
| Having Order and Regularity in Life          | 3.29                     | 3.29 | -0.01        |
| Variation                                    | 3.75                     | 3.65 | 1.89         |
| Having Tasks that Match Knowledge and Skills | 3.88                     | 3.85 | 0.67         |
| Being Able to Grow and Develop               | 3.9                      | 3.83 | 1.43         |
| Status                                       | 2.54                     | 2.25 | 5.07         |
| Work-Life Balance                            | 3.9                      | 3.92 | 0.46         |
| Having Responsibilities                      | 3.57                     | 3.44 | 2.42         |
| Having Enough Leisure Time                   | 3.96                     | 4.07 | -2.13        |
| Number of cases                              | 1172                     | 782  | 390          |

Table 2: The importance of having a job in reaching life goals (scale 1 to 5)

|  | No                  | Yes  | T-test Score |
|--|---------------------|------|--------------|
|  | Having Enough Money | 3.93 | 3.70         |
| Having the Feeling to Be Useful              | 3.65                | 3.52 | 2.35         |
| Social Contacts                              | 3.54                | 3.49 | 0.93         |
| Respect                                      | 3.63                | 3.60 | 0.57         |
| Sense of Security                            | 3.70                | 3.53 | 3.16         |
| Having Order and Regularity in Life          | 3.46                | 3.33 | 2.32         |
| Variation                                    | 3.32                | 3.36 | -0.70        |
| Having Tasks that Match Knowledge and Skills | 3.74                | 3.64 | 1.78         |
| Being Able to Grow and Develop               | 3.68                | 3.59 | 1.55         |
| Status                                       | 2.90                | 2.64 | 4.02         |
| Work-Life Balance                            | 2.93                | 2.90 | 0.38         |
| Having Responsibilities                      | 3.54                | 3.40 | 2.61         |
| Having Enough Leisure Time                   | 2.60                | 2.66 | 0.09         |

Table 3: Importance of job attributes (scale 1 to 5)

|  | No   | Yes  | T-test Score |
|--|------|------|--------------|
| Wage   | 4.08 | 3.88 | 3.89         |
| Fringe Benefits                                | 4.04 | 3.92 | 2.75         |
| Career Possibilities                           | 3.81 | 3.36 | 8.28         |
| Job Security                                   | 3.89 | 3.67 | 4.01         |
| Working Conditions                             | 4.08 | 4.08 | 0.05         |
| Favourable Working Time                        | 3.73 | 4.17 | -8.35        |
| Firms' Location                                | 3.70 | 3.90 | -3.63        |
| Holidays (and days off)                        | 3.82 | 3.99 | -3.38        |
| Possibility to Work with Colleagues            | 3.64 | 3.67 | -0.65        |
| Firm's Reputation                              | 3.67 | 3.58 | 1.66         |
| Training Provision                             | 3.63 | 3.42 | 3.90         |
| Stimulating and Challenging Job                | 4.11 | 3.90 | 4.75         |
| Selection Process                              | 3.26 | 3.24 | 0.45         |
| Demographic Composition of the Workforce       | 2.91 | 2.97 | -1.09        |
| Childcare Provision                            | 2.33 | 2.72 | -5.06        |
| Equal Opportunities (for Minorities)           | 2.64 | 2.81 | -2.75        |
| Opportunity to Use Own Skills and Abilities    | 4.11 | 4.03 | 2.16         |
| Good Relationship With Colleagues and Managers | 3.93 | 4.01 | -1.70        |

Table 4: General level of satisfaction (Panel a) and work centrality (Panel b). Scale 1 to 5.

Panel (a)

|                              | No   | Yes  | T-test Score |
|------------------------------|------|------|--------------|
| No problem to make ends meet | 3.78 | 3.64 | 2.40         |
| Satisfied with one's life    | 3.91 | 3.87 | 0.91         |
| Work centrality              | 3.56 | 3.41 | 3.81         |

Panel (b)

|   | No   | Yes  | T-test Score |
|---|------|------|--------------|
| Work is an important part of life   | 3.82 | 3.57 | 4.80         |
| Having a job is a source of satisfaction in one's life                        | 3.64 | 3.33 | 5.75         |
| Work gives a meaning to one's life  | 3.30 | 3.09 | 3.73         |
| If I had enough money for the rest of my life, I would still want to have job | 3.33 | 3.32 | 0.21         |
| I enjoy talking about work to others  | 3.44 | 3.40 | 0.89         |
| Work means more to me than just money   | 3.80 | 3.75 | 0.94         |

Table 5: Negative side effects from holding a job (Panel a) and work related problems (Panel b)

| Panel a   | No | Yes  | T-test Score |       |
|---|----|------|--------------|-------|
| Too little time for care                            |    | 2.71 | 3.14         | -6.80 |
| Day too tightly organized                           |    | 2.41 | 2.74         | -5.24 |
| Not enough increase in income (relative to no job)  |    | 2.58 | 2.65         | -0.91 |
| Too little time for friends                         |    | 2.87 | 2.99         | -1.89 |
| Too little time for household work                  |    | 2.71 | 2.94         | -3.83 |
| Loss of one's independence                          |    | 2.68 | 2.82         | -2.02 |
| Too repetitive                                      |    | 2.71 | 2.68         | 0.40  |
| Having to spend time with people you might not like |    | 2.58 | 2.55         | 0.42  |
| Too much pressure and stress                        |    | 2.52 | 2.75         | -3.81 |
| Having to obey orders of others                     |    | 2.12 | 2.15         | -0.54 |
| Panel b   | No | Yes  | T-test Score |       |
| Lack of Childcare                                   |    | 1.43 | 1.99         | -8.37 |
| Transportation (commuting)                          |    | 1.58 | 1.80         | -3.51 |
| Dutch language                                      |    | 1.07 | 1.05         | 1.28  |
| Discrimination                                      |    | 1.27 | 1.25         | 0.29  |
| Having to do tasks beneath one's level              |    | 2.26 | 2.12         | 1.98  |

Table 6: Ordered probit models, all controls included, employed individuals only, 833 cases (\*: significant at 10%, \*\*: significant at 5%).

**Panel a**

|                          | life satisfaction | work centrality   | job satisfaction | intention to quit |
|--------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Employment Status</b> |                   |                   |                  |                   |
| involuntary part-time    | -0.10<br>(0.15)   | -0.19<br>(0.15)   | -0.14<br>(0.14)  | 0.09<br>(0.14)    |
| involuntary fulltime     | -0.51<br>(0.22)** | -0.06<br>(0.21)   | -0.21<br>(0.25)  | 0.36<br>(0.22)*   |
| voluntary part-time      | -0.08<br>(0.15)   | -0.33<br>(0.14)** | -0.10<br>(0.13)  | 0.06<br>(0.13)    |

**Panel b**

|                          | important aspect of life | work source of satisfaction | gives meaning to life | more than money | enough money still work | like to talk about work |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Employment Status</b> |                          |                             |                       |                 |                         |                         |
| involuntary part-time    | -0.33<br>(0.16)**        | -0.25<br>(0.15)*            | -0.18<br>(0.15)       | -0.10<br>(0.14) | -0.15<br>(0.14)         | 0.07<br>(0.14)          |
| involuntary fulltime     | -0.30<br>(0.23)          | -0.29<br>(0.25)             | -0.15<br>(0.23)       | -0.03<br>(0.18) | -0.07<br>(0.22)         | 0.10<br>(0.21)          |
| voluntary part-time      | -0.45<br>(0.14)**        | -0.56<br>(0.12)**           | -0.38<br>(0.13)**     | -0.07<br>(0.15) | -0.11<br>(0.14)         | -0.12<br>(0.14)         |

**Panel c**

|                          | importance of leisure | Work leaves too little time for |                  |                 | too rigid daily schedule |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|
|                          |                       | care                            | friends          | household tasks |                          |
| <b>Employment Status</b> |                       |                                 |                  |                 |                          |
| involuntary part-time    | 0.15<br>(0.14)        | 0.08<br>(0.15)                  | 0.19<br>(0.13)   | 0.06<br>(0.13)  | 0.31<br>(0.14)**         |
| involuntary fulltime     | 0.72<br>(0.23)**      | 0.51<br>(0.23)*                 | 0.49<br>(0.20)** | 0.21<br>(0.18)  | 0.39<br>(0.21)*          |
| voluntary part-time      | 0.32<br>(0.13)**      | 0.19<br>(0.12)                  | 0.01<br>(0.12)   | 0.01<br>(0.13)  | 0.32<br>(0.12)**         |

Reference group: voluntary full-time



Table 7: Ordered probit models, all controls included, employed individuals only, 833 cases (\*: significant at 10%, \*\*: significant at 5%).

|                          | wage             | career            | training          | security        | convenient<br>working<br>time | interest        | use<br>knowledge<br>abilities | self<br>development |
|--------------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|
| <b>Employment Status</b> |                  |                   |                   |                 |                               |                 |                               |                     |
| involuntary part-time    | -0.26<br>(0.14)* | 0.07<br>(0.14)    | -0.12<br>(0.14)   | -0.05<br>(0.13) | 0.36<br>(0.15)**              | 0.05<br>(0.14)  | -0.14<br>(0.15)               | -0.12<br>(0.15)     |
| involuntary fulltime     | -0.36<br>(0.22)* | -0.19<br>(0.24)   | -0.40<br>(0.22)*  | -0.38<br>(0.26) | 0.58<br>(0.27)**              | -0.04<br>(0.26) | 0.12<br>(0.24)                | 0.07<br>(0.24)      |
| voluntary part-time      | -0.06<br>(0.14)  | -0.28<br>(0.13)** | -0.25<br>(0.12)** | -0.10<br>(0.13) | 0.81<br>(0.14)**              | -0.15<br>(0.14) | -0.07<br>(0.14)               | -0.22<br>(0.14)     |

Reference group: voluntary full-time

## Appendix: The Data

|                           |  |
|---------------------------|--|
| wants part-time:          | dummy variable, 1: individual would like to work part-time                             |
| permanent:                | dummy variable, 1: individual holds a permanent job                                    |
| temporary:                | dummy variable, 1: individual holds a temporary job                                    |
| self employed:            | dummy variable, 1: individual is self employed   |
| unemployed:               | dummy variable, 1: individual is unemployed  |
| out of the labor force:   | dummy variable, 1: individual is out of the labor force (students...)                  |
| full-time:                | dummy variable, 1: individual works more than 35 hours per week                        |
| part-time:                | dummy variable, 1: individual works between 12 and 35 hours per week                   |
| small part-time:          | dummy variable, 1: individual works fewer than 12 hours per week                       |
| jobless:                  | dummy variable, 1: individual works zero hours per week                                |
| high:                     | dummy variable, 1: individual holds an university degree or comparable                 |
| medium:                   | dummy variable, 1: individual holds a secondary school diploma (general or vocational) |
| low:                      | dummy variable, 1: individual holds a primary school diploma (general or vocational)   |
| gender:                   | dummy variable, 1: woman   |
| age:                      | individual's age (in years)  |
| shorter than 1 month:     | dummy variable, 1: tenure on present job shorter than 1 month                          |
| 1 – 2 months:             | dummy variable, 1: tenure on present job between 1 and 2 months                        |
| 2 – 6 months:             | dummy variable, 1: tenure on present job between 2 and 6 months                        |
| 6 months 1 year:          | dummy variable, 1: tenure on present job between 6 months and 1 year                   |
| 1 – 2 years:              | dummy variable, 1: tenure on present job between 1 and 2 years                         |
| 2 – 5 years:              | dummy variable, 1: tenure on present job between 2 and 5 years                         |
| 5 – 10 years:             | dummy variable, 1: tenure on present job between 5 and 10 years                        |
| longer than 10 years:     | dummy variable, 1: tenure on present job longer than 10 years                          |
| never unemployed:         | dummy variable, 1: individual never been unemployed                                    |
| shorter than 1 month:     | dummy variable, 1: individual unemployed for less than 1 month                         |
| 1 – 2 months:             | dummy variable, 1: individual unemployed between 1 and 2 months                        |
| 2 – 6 months:             | dummy variable, 1: individual unemployed between 2 and 6 months                        |
| 6 months 1 year:          | dummy variable, 1: individual unemployed between 6 months and 1 year                   |
| 1 – 2 years:              | dummy variable, 1: individual unemployed between 1 and 2 years                         |
| 2 – 5 years:              | dummy variable, 1: individual unemployed between 2 and 5 years                         |
| longer than 5 years:      | dummy variable, 1: individual unemployed longer than 5 years                           |
| head:                     | dummy variable, 1: individual is head of the household                                 |
| spouse:                   | dummy variable, 1: individual is spouse of the head of the household                   |
| partner:                  | dummy variable, 1: individual is (non married) spouse of the head of the household     |
| child:                    | dummy variable, 1: individual is the child of the head of the household                |
| partner in the household: | dummy variable, 1: partner present in the household                                    |
| breadwinner:              | dummy variable, 1: individual is the breadwinner in the household                      |
| children:                 | dummy variable, 1: children are present in the household                               |
| urban type:               | dummy variable, 1: individual reports to be an urban type much or very much            |

Table A1: Descriptive statistics

|                           | Mean  | Standard Deviation |
|---------------------------|-------|--------------------|
| wants part-time           | 0.33  | 0.47               |
| permanent                 | 0.66  | 0.48               |
| temporary                 | 0.10  | 0.30               |
| self employed             | 0.04  | 0.21               |
| unemployed                | 0.07  | 0.26               |
| out of the labor force    | 0.12  | 0.33               |
| full-time                 | 0.51  | 0.50               |
| part-time                 | 0.24  | 0.42               |
| small part-time           | 0.07  | 0.25               |
| jobless                   | 0.18  | 0.39               |
| high education            | 0.39  | 0.49               |
| medium education          | 0.43  | 0.50               |
| low education             | 0.18  | 0.39               |
| <b>Unemployment</b>       |       |                    |
| never                     | 0.52  | 0.50               |
| less 1 month              | 0.08  | 0.26               |
| 1 - 2 months              | 0.07  | 0.26               |
| 2 - 6 months              | 0.09  | 0.29               |
| 6 months 1 year           | 0.07  | 0.26               |
| 1 - 2 years               | 0.05  | 0.22               |
| 2 - 5 years               | 0.06  | 0.23               |
| more than 5 years         | 0.06  | 0.24               |
| women                     | 0.47  | 0.50               |
| age                       | 38.17 | 11.23              |
| <b>Tenure</b>             |       |                    |
| less 1 month              | 0.02  | 0.14               |
| 1 - 2 months              | 0.03  | 0.16               |
| 2 - 6 months              | 0.07  | 0.26               |
| 6 months 1 year           | 0.08  | 0.27               |
| 1 - 2 years               | 0.14  | 0.35               |
| 2 - 5 years               | 0.24  | 0.42               |
| 5 - 10 years              | 0.14  | 0.35               |
| more than 10 years        | 0.29  | 0.45               |
| household head            | 0.63  | 0.48               |
| spouse                    | 0.24  | 0.43               |
| partner                   | 0.05  | 0.21               |
| child                     | 0.08  | 0.28               |
| partner in the household  | 0.78  | 0.42               |
| breadwinner               | 0.62  | 0.49               |
| children in the household | 0.42  | 0.49               |
| urban type                | 0.40  | 0.49               |

Table A2: Ordered probit models, employed individuals only, 833 cases (\*: significant at 10%, \*\*: significant at 5%).

|                              | life<br>satisfaction | work<br>centrality | job<br>satisfaction | intention<br>to quit |
|------------------------------|----------------------|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| <b>Employment Status</b>     |                      |                    |                     |                      |
| involuntary part-time        | -0.10<br>(0.15)      | -0.19<br>(0.15)    | -0.14<br>(0.14)     | 0.09<br>(0.14)       |
| involuntary fulltime         | -0.51<br>(0.22)**    | -0.06<br>(0.21)    | -0.21<br>(0.25)     | 0.36<br>(0.22)*      |
| voluntary part-time          | -0.08<br>(0.15)      | -0.33<br>(0.14)**  | -0.10<br>(0.13)     | 0.06<br>(0.13)       |
| <b>Labor Market Position</b> |                      |                    |                     |                      |
| temporary                    | -0.11<br>(0.16)      | -0.27<br>(0.14)    | -0.06<br>(0.13)     | 0.37<br>(0.14)**     |
| <b>Unemployment</b>          |                      |                    |                     |                      |
| < 1 month                    | -0.19<br>(0.16)      | 0.11<br>(0.12)     | 0.18<br>(0.15)      | -0.17<br>(0.14)      |
| 1 ≤ month < 2                | -0.29<br>(0.16)      | -0.14<br>(0.13)    | -0.04<br>(0.16)     | 0.01<br>(0.15)       |
| 2 ≤ months < 6               | -0.40<br>(0.13)**    | 0.12<br>(0.14)     | 0.09<br>(0.12)      | -0.15<br>(0.12)      |
| 0.5 ≤ year < 1               | -0.34<br>(0.16)*     | -0.37<br>(0.16)*   | -0.08<br>(0.15)     | -0.27<br>(0.16)      |
| 1 ≤ years < 2                | -0.69<br>(0.21)**    | -0.21<br>(0.23)    | -0.30<br>(0.18)     | 0.01<br>(0.17)       |
| 2 ≤ years < 5                | -0.45<br>(0.22)*     | -0.24<br>(0.23)    | -0.47<br>(0.20)*    | 0.18<br>(0.20)       |
| 5 ≤ years                    | -0.62<br>(0.21)**    | -0.19<br>(0.22)    | -0.09<br>(0.22)     | 0.19<br>(0.21)       |
| <b>Educational Level</b>     |                      |                    |                     |                      |
| low                          | 0.30<br>(0.13)*      | 0.10<br>(0.12)     | 0.22<br>(0.13)      | -0.09<br>(0.13)      |
| high                         | 0.14<br>(0.09)       | 0.29<br>(0.09)**   | 0.23<br>(0.09)**    | -0.01<br>(0.09)      |
| <b>Gender</b>                |                      |                    |                     |                      |
| woman                        | -0.03<br>(0.11)      | 0.45<br>(0.11)**   | -0.10<br>(0.10)     | -0.02<br>(0.10)      |
| <b>Age Group</b>             |                      |                    |                     |                      |
| 20 < age ≤ 25                | 0.35<br>(0.48)       | -0.34<br>(0.38)    | 0.43<br>(0.38)      | -0.55<br>(0.41)      |
| 25 < age ≤ 30                | 0.51<br>(0.49)       | -0.31<br>(0.42)    | 0.28<br>(0.40)      | -0.50<br>(0.43)      |
| 30 < age ≤ 35                | 0.50<br>(0.49)       | -0.15<br>(0.41)    | 0.36<br>(0.40)      | -0.63<br>(0.42)      |
| 35 < age ≤ 40                | 0.37<br>(0.50)       | -0.09<br>(0.43)    | 0.40<br>(0.41)      | -0.68<br>(0.44)      |
| 40 < age ≤ 45                | 0.30<br>(0.52)       | 0.07<br>(0.45)     | 0.34<br>(0.41)      | -0.68<br>(0.44)      |
| 45 < age ≤ 50                | 0.26<br>(0.51)       | -0.27<br>(0.43)    | 0.18<br>(0.41)      | -0.82<br>(0.44)      |
| 50 < age ≤ 55                | 0.28<br>(0.51)       | -0.22<br>(0.43)    | 0.51<br>(0.42)      | -1.03<br>(0.45)*     |
| 55 < age                     | 0.51<br>(0.58)       | -0.21<br>(0.45)    | 0.73<br>(0.47)      | -0.87<br>(0.49)      |

|                                  |                 |                 |                  |                   |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|-------------------|
| <b>Tenure</b>                    |                 |                 |                  |                   |
| 1 - 2 months                     | 0.83<br>(0.43)  | 0.25<br>(0.40)  | 0.39<br>(0.35)   | -0.07<br>(0.33)   |
| 2 - 6 months                     | 0.10<br>(0.33)  | 0.36<br>(0.35)  | 0.02<br>(0.29)   | 0.39<br>(0.28)    |
| 6 months - 1 year                | 0.35<br>(0.34)  | 0.66<br>(0.36)  | 0.15<br>(0.29)   | 0.09<br>(0.27)    |
| 1 - 2 years                      | 0.26<br>(0.32)  | 0.57<br>(0.34)  | -0.11<br>(0.25)  | 0.42<br>(0.25)    |
| 2 - 5 years                      | 0.13<br>(0.32)  | 0.43<br>(0.33)  | -0.11<br>(0.24)  | 0.46<br>(0.24)    |
| 5 - 10 years                     | 0.47<br>(0.33)  | 0.57<br>(0.35)  | -0.13<br>(0.26)  | 0.46<br>(0.26)    |
| > 10 years                       | 0.35<br>(0.32)  | 0.27<br>(0.34)  | -0.04<br>(0.25)  | 0.26<br>(0.25)    |
| <b>Position in the Household</b> |                 |                 |                  |                   |
| head                             | -0.39<br>(0.23) | 0.11<br>(0.23)  | -0.53<br>(0.22)* | 0.51<br>(0.21)*   |
| spouse                           | -0.14<br>(0.22) | 0.05<br>(0.21)  | -0.26<br>(0.19)  | 0.10<br>(0.19)    |
| child                            | -0.51<br>(0.38) | -0.12<br>(0.34) | -0.67<br>(0.29)* | 0.44<br>(0.32)    |
| spouse in the household          | 0.14<br>(0.14)  | 0.04<br>(0.13)  | -0.01<br>(0.12)  | -0.14<br>(0.12)   |
| breadwinner                      | -0.12<br>(0.18) | 0.04<br>(0.17)  | -0.01<br>(0.19)  | -0.23<br>(0.17)   |
| children                         | 0.05<br>(0.11)  | -0.04<br>(0.11) | 0.12<br>(0.11)   | -0.01<br>(0.11)   |
| city type                        | 0.02<br>(0.09)  | -0.05<br>(0.09) | 0.04<br>(0.08)   | -0.27<br>(0.08)** |
| <b>Province (11 dummies)</b>     | Yes             | Yes             | Yes              | Yes               |

Wald Chi 2 test                      91.29\*\*      101.54\*\*      65.14\*\*      117.89\*\*

The reference group of the variables is given in parenthesis: Employment Status (voluntary full-time), Labor Market Position (permanent), Unemployment (never), Educational Level (medium), Gender (man) Age (20 or younger), Tenure (less than 1 month), Position in the Household (not married), Spouse in the Household (no spouse in the household), breadwinner (not bread winner), children (does not have children), city type (does not want to live in city), Province (Limburg)

Table A3: Ordered probit models, employed individuals only, 833 cases (\*: significant at 10%, \*\*: significant at 5%).

|                              | work                           |                           |                             |                       | enough              | like to            |
|------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
|                              | important<br>aspect of<br>life | source of<br>satisfaction | gives<br>meaning to<br>life | more<br>than<br>money | money still<br>work | talk about<br>work |
| <b>Employment Status</b>     |                                |                           |                             |                       |                     |                    |
| involuntary part-time        | -0.33<br>(0.16)**              | -0.25<br>(0.15)*          | -0.18<br>(0.15)             | -0.10<br>(0.14)       | -0.15<br>(0.14)     | 0.07<br>(0.14)     |
| involuntary fulltime         | -0.30<br>(0.23)                | -0.29<br>(0.25)           | -0.15<br>(0.23)             | -0.03<br>(0.18)       | -0.07<br>(0.22)     | 0.10<br>(0.21)     |
| voluntary part-time          | -0.45<br>(0.14)**              | -0.56<br>(0.12)**         | -0.38<br>(0.13)**           | -0.07<br>(0.15)       | -0.11<br>(0.14)     | -0.12<br>(0.14)    |
| <b>Labor Market Position</b> |                                |                           |                             |                       |                     |                    |
| temporary                    | -0.42<br>(0.14)**              | -0.27<br>(0.14)           | -0.19<br>(0.14)             | -0.06<br>(0.15)       | -0.15<br>(0.15)     | -0.12<br>(0.14)    |
| <b>Unemployment</b>          |                                |                           |                             |                       |                     |                    |
| < 1 month                    | 0.13<br>(0.15)                 | 0.12<br>(0.13)            | 0.13<br>(0.14)              | 0.19<br>(0.13)        | 0.22<br>(0.13)      | 0.11<br>(0.13)     |
| 1 ≤ month < 2                | -0.12<br>(0.15)                | -0.24<br>(0.13)           | -0.25<br>(0.14)             | 0.25<br>(0.14)        | 0.03<br>(0.17)      | 0.07<br>(0.14)     |
| 2 ≤ months < 6               | 0.10<br>(0.15)                 | -0.02<br>(0.13)           | 0.01<br>(0.12)              | -0.12<br>(0.14)       | 0.19<br>(0.12)      | 0.10<br>(0.14)     |
| 0.5 ≤ year < 1               | -0.53<br>(0.15)**              | -0.45<br>(0.15)**         | -0.25<br>(0.15)             | -0.30<br>(0.16)       | -0.20<br>(0.14)     | -0.17<br>(0.15)    |
| 1 ≤ years < 2                | -0.32<br>(0.20)                | -0.21<br>(0.19)           | -0.09<br>(0.21)             | 0.05<br>(0.22)        | -0.01<br>(0.18)     | -0.17<br>(0.17)    |
| 2 ≤ years < 5                | -0.08<br>(0.22)                | -0.49<br>(0.23)*          | -0.23<br>(0.24)             | -0.22<br>(0.24)       | 0.25<br>(0.23)      | -0.36<br>(0.23)    |
| 5 ≤ years                    | -0.20<br>(0.24)                | -0.33<br>(0.20)           | -0.35<br>(0.21)             | -0.16<br>(0.23)       | 0.12<br>(0.19)      | -0.14<br>(0.23)    |
| <b>Educational Level</b>     |                                |                           |                             |                       |                     |                    |
| low                          | 0.08<br>(0.14)                 | 0.20<br>(0.13)            | 0.35<br>(0.12)**            | -0.04<br>(0.12)       | -0.10<br>(0.12)     | 0.05<br>(0.13)     |
| high                         | 0.22<br>(0.09)*                | 0.26<br>(0.09)**          | 0.13<br>(0.09)              | 0.30<br>(0.09)**      | 0.22<br>(0.09)*     | 0.22<br>(0.09)*    |
| <b>Gender</b>                |                                |                           |                             |                       |                     |                    |
| woman                        | 0.24<br>(0.11)**               | 0.24<br>(0.10)**          | 0.27<br>(0.10)**            | 0.34<br>(0.11)**      | 0.38<br>(0.10)**    | 0.29<br>(0.10)**   |
| <b>Age Group</b>             |                                |                           |                             |                       |                     |                    |
| 20 < age ≤ 25                | -0.07<br>(0.46)                | 0.00<br>(0.46)            | -0.16<br>(0.42)             | 0.07<br>(0.39)        | -0.44<br>(0.35)     | -0.18<br>(0.43)    |
| 25 < age ≤ 30                | -0.15<br>(0.48)                | 0.24<br>(0.49)            | -0.09<br>(0.43)             | 0.23<br>(0.40)        | -0.29<br>(0.37)     | -0.18<br>(0.45)    |
| 30 < age ≤ 35                | -0.21<br>(0.48)                | 0.30<br>(0.49)            | 0.11<br>(0.42)              | 0.51<br>(0.40)        | -0.33<br>(0.37)     | -0.15<br>(0.45)    |
| 35 < age ≤ 40                | -0.09<br>(0.49)                | 0.29<br>(0.49)            | 0.28<br>(0.43)              | 0.33<br>(0.42)        | -0.32<br>(0.38)     | -0.11<br>(0.46)    |
| 40 < age ≤ 45                | 0.05<br>(0.49)                 | 0.40<br>(0.51)            | 0.39<br>(0.45)              | 0.47<br>(0.43)        | -0.40<br>(0.39)     | -0.06<br>(0.46)    |
| 45 < age ≤ 50                | -0.22<br>(0.49)                | 0.05<br>(0.49)            | 0.29<br>(0.43)              | 0.17<br>(0.43)        | -0.70<br>(0.39)     | -0.20<br>(0.46)    |
| 50 < age ≤ 55                | -0.18<br>(0.49)                | 0.21<br>(0.50)            | 0.40<br>(0.44)              | 0.18<br>(0.42)        | -0.78<br>(0.38)*    | -0.14<br>(0.46)    |
| 55 < age                     | -0.16<br>(0.53)                | 0.41<br>(0.55)            | 0.36<br>(0.50)              | 0.50<br>(0.45)        | -0.90<br>(0.42)*    | 0.08<br>(0.53)     |

|                   |                  |                 |                 |                 |                 |                |
|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|
| <b>Tenure</b>     |                  |                 |                 |                 |                 |                |
| 1 - 2 months      | 0.29<br>(0.37)   | 0.10<br>(0.37)  | -0.17<br>(0.42) | 0.98<br>(0.42)* | 0.40<br>(0.39)  | 0.24<br>(0.39) |
| 2 - 6 months      | 0.71<br>(0.30)*  | 0.56<br>(0.34)  | -0.03<br>(0.31) | 0.61<br>(0.39)  | 0.46<br>(0.34)  | 0.40<br>(0.34) |
| 6 months - 1 year | 0.89<br>(0.33)** | 0.82<br>(0.33)* | 0.30<br>(0.33)  | 0.58<br>(0.40)  | 0.85<br>(0.34)* | 0.10<br>(0.33) |
| 1 - 2 years       | 0.81<br>(0.29)** | 0.40<br>(0.31)  | 0.28<br>(0.30)  | 0.49<br>(0.38)  | 0.60<br>(0.32)  | 0.54<br>(0.31) |
| 2 - 5 years       | 0.81<br>(0.28)** | 0.28<br>(0.31)  | 0.14<br>(0.29)  | 0.61<br>(0.38)  | 0.56<br>(0.31)  | 0.27<br>(0.32) |
| 5 - 10 years      | 0.79<br>(0.30)** | 0.47<br>(0.32)  | 0.21<br>(0.30)  | 0.74<br>(0.39)  | 0.54<br>(0.33)  | 0.37<br>(0.33) |
| > 10 years        | 0.65<br>(0.29)*  | 0.30<br>(0.31)  | 0.11<br>(0.30)  | 0.38<br>(0.38)  | 0.47<br>(0.32)  | 0.18<br>(0.32) |

|                                  |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| <b>Position in the Household</b> |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| head                             | -0.18<br>(0.21) | 0.19<br>(0.25)  | -0.33<br>(0.22) | -0.20<br>(0.23) | 0.05<br>(0.26)  | 0.09<br>(0.24)  |
| spouse                           | 0.12<br>(0.21)  | 0.27<br>(0.19)  | -0.15<br>(0.17) | 0.05<br>(0.21)  | 0.03<br>(0.22)  | -0.02<br>(0.24) |
| child                            | -0.05<br>(0.31) | 0.08<br>(0.34)  | 0.04<br>(0.30)  | -0.11<br>(0.35) | -0.05<br>(0.32) | 0.02<br>(0.32)  |
| spouse in the household          | 0.06<br>(0.13)  | -0.02<br>(0.12) | 0.01<br>(0.12)  | 0.02<br>(0.12)  | 0.02<br>(0.13)  | 0.03<br>(0.12)  |
| breadwinner                      | 0.21<br>(0.18)  | -0.26<br>(0.20) | 0.32<br>(0.18)  | 0.30<br>(0.19)  | 0.04<br>(0.20)  | -0.10<br>(0.17) |
| children                         | -0.12<br>(0.12) | 0.05<br>(0.10)  | -0.03<br>(0.11) | -0.09<br>(0.11) | 0.10<br>(0.11)  | 0.15<br>(0.12)  |
| city type                        | 0.03<br>(0.09)  | -0.08<br>(0.09) | -0.02<br>(0.09) | -0.02<br>(0.09) | -0.09<br>(0.09) | -0.16<br>(0.09) |
| <b>Province (11 dummies)</b>     | Yes             | Yes             | Yes             | Yes             | Yes             | Yes             |

Wald Chi 2 test (47 df)                    106.42\*\*      106.65\*\*      90.18\*\*      123.84\*\*      95.72\*\*      65.72\*\*

The reference group of the variables is given in parenthesis: Employment Status (voluntary full-time), Labor Market Position (permanent), Unemployment (never), Educational Level (medium), Gender (man) Age (20 or younger), Tenure (less than 1 month), Position in the Household (not married), Spouse in the Household (no spouse in the household), breadwinner (not bread winner), children (does not have children), city type (does not want to live in city), Province (Limburg)

Table A4: Ordered probit models, employed individuals only, 833 cases (\*: significant at 10%, \*\*: significant at 5%).

|                              | importance<br>of leisure | care            | work too little time for<br>friends | household<br>tasks | too rigid<br>daily<br>schedule |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|
| <b>Employment Status</b>     |                          |                 |                                     |                    |                                |
| involuntary part-time        | 0.15<br>(0.14)           | 0.08<br>(0.15)  | 0.19<br>(0.13)                      | 0.06<br>(0.13)     | 0.31<br>(0.14)**               |
| involuntary fulltime         | 0.72<br>(0.23)**         | 0.51<br>(0.23)* | 0.49<br>(0.20)**                    | 0.21<br>(0.18)     | 0.39<br>(0.21)*                |
| voluntary part-time          | 0.32<br>(0.13)**         | 0.19<br>(0.12)  | 0.01<br>(0.12)                      | 0.01<br>(0.13)     | 0.32<br>(0.12)**               |
| <b>Labor Market Position</b> |                          |                 |                                     |                    |                                |
| temporary                    | 0.15<br>(0.15)           | 0.14<br>(0.14)  | 0.30<br>(0.13)*                     | 0.15<br>(0.14)     | 0.21<br>(0.14)                 |
| <b>Unemployment</b>          |                          |                 |                                     |                    |                                |
| < 1 month                    | 0.05<br>(0.13)           | 0.03<br>(0.13)  | 0.06<br>(0.13)                      | 0.07<br>(0.13)     | -0.12<br>(0.14)                |
| 1 ≤ month < 2                | 0.08<br>(0.15)           | 0.21<br>(0.15)  | -0.02<br>(0.13)                     | 0.01<br>(0.14)     | 0.06<br>(0.14)                 |
| 2 ≤ months < 6               | 0.05<br>(0.13)           | -0.09<br>(0.11) | -0.16<br>(0.13)                     | -0.15<br>(0.12)    | 0.03<br>(0.12)                 |
| 0.5 ≤ year < 1               | 0.08<br>(0.15)           | 0.10<br>(0.15)  | -0.19<br>(0.15)                     | -0.29<br>(0.15)    | 0.11<br>(0.13)                 |
| 1 ≤ years < 2                | 0.01<br>(0.17)           | -0.08<br>(0.17) | -0.04<br>(0.18)                     | -0.19<br>(0.22)    | 0.16<br>(0.13)                 |
| 2 ≤ years < 5                | 0.06<br>(0.21)           | 0.01<br>(0.22)  | 0.21<br>(0.20)                      | 0.26<br>(0.19)     | -0.21<br>(0.23)                |
| 5 ≤ years                    | -0.38<br>(0.26)          | -0.20<br>(0.20) | -0.17<br>(0.18)                     | -0.01<br>(0.24)    | -0.18<br>(0.19)                |
| <b>Educational Level</b>     |                          |                 |                                     |                    |                                |
| low                          | 0.19<br>(0.12)           | 0.06<br>(0.12)  | 0.12<br>(0.13)                      | 0.04<br>(0.13)     | -0.22<br>(0.13)                |
| high                         | 0.16<br>(0.09)           | 0.13<br>(0.08)  | 0.00<br>(0.08)                      | -0.03<br>(0.08)    | -0.13<br>(0.08)                |
| <b>Gender</b>                |                          |                 |                                     |                    |                                |
| woman                        | -0.04<br>(0.10)          | 0.16<br>(0.10)* | 0.34<br>(0.10)**                    | 0.27<br>(0.10)**   | -0.05<br>(0.09)                |
| <b>Age Group</b>             |                          |                 |                                     |                    |                                |
| 20 < age ≤ 25                | 0.24<br>(0.47)           | 0.14<br>(0.48)  | 0.55<br>(0.46)                      | 0.26<br>(0.55)     | -0.52<br>(0.44)                |
| 25 < age ≤ 30                | 0.19<br>(0.49)           | 0.24<br>(0.50)  | 0.39<br>(0.47)                      | 0.26<br>(0.55)     | -0.54<br>(0.44)                |
| 30 < age ≤ 35                | 0.32<br>(0.49)           | 0.35<br>(0.50)  | 0.46<br>(0.47)                      | 0.14<br>(0.56)     | -0.60<br>(0.45)                |
| 35 < age ≤ 40                | 0.18<br>(0.51)           | 0.21<br>(0.51)  | 0.53<br>(0.48)                      | 0.34<br>(0.56)     | -0.73<br>(0.45)                |
| 40 < age ≤ 45                | 0.18<br>(0.50)           | 0.12<br>(0.50)  | 0.42<br>(0.49)                      | 0.38<br>(0.57)     | -0.66<br>(0.45)                |
| 45 < age ≤ 50                | 0.12<br>(0.51)           | 0.26<br>(0.50)  | 0.49<br>(0.49)                      | 0.42<br>(0.56)     | -0.54<br>(0.46)                |
| 50 < age ≤ 55                | 0.13<br>(0.53)           | 0.25<br>(0.51)  | 0.49<br>(0.48)                      | 0.32<br>(0.57)     | -0.59<br>(0.46)                |
| 55 < age                     | 0.03<br>(0.58)           | 0.24<br>(0.54)  | 0.04<br>(0.58)                      | -0.27<br>(0.63)    | -1.04<br>(0.50)*               |



| <b>Tenure</b>                    |                  |                  |                 |                 |                  |
|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|
| 1 - 2 months                     | 0.50<br>(0.42)   | 0.19<br>(0.38)   | -0.25<br>(0.42) | -0.11<br>(0.46) | -0.16<br>(0.40)  |
| 2 - 6 months                     | 0.15<br>(0.35)   | -0.04<br>(0.30)  | 0.14<br>(0.35)  | -0.09<br>(0.34) | 0.23<br>(0.36)   |
| 6 months - 1 year                | 0.13<br>(0.36)   | -0.30<br>(0.30)  | -0.18<br>(0.34) | -0.29<br>(0.34) | 0.01<br>(0.36)   |
| 1 - 2 years                      | 0.19<br>(0.33)   | 0.01<br>(0.29)   | -0.03<br>(0.32) | -0.01<br>(0.32) | -0.01<br>(0.34)  |
| 2 - 5 years                      | 0.05<br>(0.33)   | 0.15<br>(0.28)   | 0.09<br>(0.33)  | -0.02<br>(0.32) | 0.04<br>(0.33)   |
| 5 - 10 years                     | 0.35<br>(0.34)   | 0.04<br>(0.30)   | 0.17<br>(0.34)  | 0.11<br>(0.33)  | 0.13<br>(0.34)   |
| > 10 years                       | 0.20<br>(0.34)   | 0.16<br>(0.29)   | -0.01<br>(0.33) | -0.03<br>(0.32) | 0.20<br>(0.34)   |
| <b>Position in the Household</b> |                  |                  |                 |                 |                  |
| head                             | 0.13<br>(0.22)   | 0.10<br>(0.23)   | -0.12<br>(0.20) | 0.07<br>(0.29)  | -0.01<br>(0.25)  |
| spouse                           | -0.06<br>(0.17)  | 0.01<br>(0.18)   | -0.15<br>(0.17) | 0.01<br>(0.20)  | -0.25<br>(0.19)  |
| child                            | -0.03<br>(0.35)  | 0.45<br>(0.29)   | 0.86<br>(0.36)* | 0.28<br>(0.35)  | -0.02<br>(0.36)  |
| spouse in the household          | 0.19<br>(0.13)   | 0.25<br>(0.13)*  | 0.00<br>(0.12)  | -0.03<br>(0.12) | -0.12<br>(0.12)  |
| breadwinner                      | -0.08<br>(0.20)  | -0.03<br>(0.19)  | 0.20<br>(0.17)  | -0.04<br>(0.24) | -0.22<br>(0.23)  |
| children                         | -0.28<br>(0.11)* | 0.33<br>(0.10)** | -0.15<br>(0.11) | 0.05<br>(0.10)  | 0.08<br>(0.10)   |
| city type                        | 0.05<br>(0.09)   | -0.08<br>(0.08)  | -0.04<br>(0.09) | -0.05<br>(0.09) | -0.19<br>(0.09)* |
| <b>Province (11 dummies)</b>     |                  |                  |                 |                 |                  |
| Yes                              | Yes              | Yes              | Yes             | Yes             | Yes              |

Wald Chi 2 test (47 df)                    91.24\*\*      82.67\*\*      102.11\*\*      61.24\*      61.47\*

The reference group of the variables is given in parenthesis: Employment Status (voluntary full-time), Labor Market Position (permanent), Unemployment (never), Educational Level (medium), Gender (man) Age (20 or younger), Tenure (less than 1 month), Position in the Household (not married), Spouse in the Household (no spouse in the household), breadwinner (not bread winner), children (does not have children), city type (does not want to live in city), Province (Limburg)

Table A5: Ordered probit models, employed individuals only, 833 cases (\*: significant at 10%, \*\*: significant at 5%).

|                              | wage              | career            | training          | security         | convenient<br>working<br>time | interest         | self<br>develop<br>ment | use<br>knowledge<br>and abilities |
|------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <b>Employment Status</b>     |                   |                   |                   |                  |                               |                  |                         |                                   |
| involuntary part-time        | -0.26<br>(0.14)*  | 0.07<br>(0.14)    | -0.12<br>(0.14)   | -0.05<br>(0.13)  | 0.36<br>(0.15)**              | 0.05<br>(0.15)   | -0.12<br>(0.15)         | -0.14<br>(0.15)                   |
| involuntary fulltime         | -0.36<br>(0.22)*  | -0.19<br>(0.24)   | -0.40<br>(0.22)*  | -0.38<br>(0.26)  | 0.58<br>(0.27)**              | -0.04<br>(0.21)  | 0.07<br>(0.24)          | 0.12<br>(0.26)                    |
| voluntary part-time          | -0.06<br>(0.14)   | -0.28<br>(0.13)** | -0.25<br>(0.12)** | -0.10<br>(0.13)  | 0.81<br>(0.14)**              | -0.15<br>(0.14)  | -0.22<br>(0.14)         | -0.07<br>(0.14)                   |
| <b>Labor Market Position</b> |                   |                   |                   |                  |                               |                  |                         |                                   |
| temporary                    | -0.14<br>(0.14)   | -0.17<br>(0.15)   | 0.03<br>(0.14)    | -0.24<br>(0.15)  | 0.09<br>(0.15)                | -0.09<br>(0.15)  | -0.17<br>(0.15)         | -0.19<br>(0.15)                   |
| <b>Unemployment</b>          |                   |                   |                   |                  |                               |                  |                         |                                   |
| < 1 month                    | -0.29<br>(0.14)*  | -0.17<br>(0.13)   | 0.07<br>(0.14)    | 0.19<br>(0.14)   | 0.09<br>(0.13)                | -0.05<br>(0.13)  | 0.01<br>(0.14)          | 0.04<br>(0.14)                    |
| 1 ≤ month < 2                | 0.06<br>(0.16)    | -0.08<br>(0.16)   | -0.16<br>(0.13)   | 0.18<br>(0.13)   | 0.22<br>(0.13)                | -0.01<br>(0.15)  | 0.03<br>(0.13)          | 0.01<br>(0.13)                    |
| 2 ≤ months < 6               | -0.19<br>(0.13)   | -0.25<br>(0.14)   | -0.13<br>(0.14)   | 0.13<br>(0.14)   | 0.15<br>(0.13)                | 0.02<br>(0.13)   | -0.06<br>(0.15)         | -0.09<br>(0.15)                   |
| 0.5 ≤ year < 1               | 0.10<br>(0.17)    | -0.16<br>(0.17)   | -0.25<br>(0.15)   | 0.26<br>(0.17)   | -0.12<br>(0.16)               | -0.12<br>(0.15)  | -0.12<br>(0.16)         | -0.22<br>(0.17)                   |
| 1 ≤ years < 2                | -0.67<br>(0.19)** | -0.71<br>(0.15)** | -0.36<br>(0.17)*  | -0.17<br>(0.18)  | -0.07<br>(0.17)               | -0.13<br>(0.21)  | -0.50<br>(0.20)*        | -0.53<br>(0.22)*                  |
| 2 ≤ years < 5                | -0.33<br>(0.23)   | -0.21<br>(0.20)   | -0.49<br>(0.24)*  | 0.22<br>(0.20)   | -0.17<br>(0.18)               | 0.06<br>(0.21)   | -0.18<br>(0.22)         | -0.17<br>(0.24)                   |
| 5 ≤ years                    | -0.65<br>(0.25)** | -0.43<br>(0.21)*  | -0.57<br>(0.17)** | 0.15<br>(0.22)   | -0.09<br>(0.22)               | -0.17<br>(0.21)  | -0.16<br>(0.24)         | -0.17<br>(0.26)                   |
| <b>Educational Level</b>     |                   |                   |                   |                  |                               |                  |                         |                                   |
| low                          | 0.26<br>(0.13)*   | 0.08<br>(0.13)    | -0.08<br>(0.13)   | 0.39<br>(0.13)** | 0.32<br>(0.13)*               | 0.05<br>(0.13)   | 0.18<br>(0.14)          | 0.16<br>(0.14)                    |
| high                         | 0.13<br>(0.09)    | 0.23<br>(0.09)**  | 0.21<br>(0.09)*   | -0.04<br>(0.09)  | 0.18<br>(0.09)*               | 0.21<br>(0.08)** | 0.37<br>(0.09)**        | 0.36<br>(0.09)**                  |
| <b>Gender</b>                |                   |                   |                   |                  |                               |                  |                         |                                   |
| woman                        | -0.05<br>(0.11)   | -0.17<br>(0.10)*  | 0.17<br>(0.10)*   | 0.13<br>(0.10)   | 0.11<br>(0.11)                | 0.22<br>(0.10)** | 0.21<br>(0.11)*         | 0.22<br>(0.11)**                  |
| <b>Age Group</b>             |                   |                   |                   |                  |                               |                  |                         |                                   |
| 20 < age ≤ 25                | 0.17<br>(0.31)    | 0.29<br>(0.35)    | 0.13<br>(0.32)    | 0.59<br>(0.30)   | 0.22<br>(0.43)                | 0.72<br>(0.42)*  | 0.43<br>(0.43)          | 0.39<br>(0.44)                    |
| 25 < age ≤ 30                | -0.00<br>(0.32)   | -0.05<br>(0.37)   | -0.32<br>(0.35)   | 0.37<br>(0.34)   | 0.08<br>(0.45)                | 0.54<br>(0.42)   | 0.52<br>(0.45)          | 0.52<br>(0.46)                    |
| 30 < age ≤ 35                | -0.01<br>(0.33)   | 0.02<br>(0.36)    | -0.17<br>(0.36)   | 0.44<br>(0.35)   | 0.36<br>(0.46)                | 0.52<br>(0.42)   | 0.53<br>(0.45)          | 0.52<br>(0.46)                    |
| 35 < age ≤ 40                | 0.17<br>(0.34)    | 0.17<br>(0.38)    | 0.05<br>(0.36)    | 0.49<br>(0.35)   | 0.30<br>(0.47)                | 0.42<br>(0.43)   | 0.92<br>(0.45)*         | 0.89<br>(0.46)                    |
| 40 < age ≤ 45                | -0.07<br>(0.35)   | -0.04<br>(0.38)   | -0.14<br>(0.37)   | 0.25<br>(0.36)   | -0.03<br>(0.48)               | 0.53<br>(0.44)   | 0.77<br>(0.45)          | 0.73<br>(0.46)                    |
| 45 < age ≤ 50                | 0.20<br>(0.34)    | -0.06<br>(0.37)   | -0.19<br>(0.37)   | 0.46<br>(0.36)   | 0.10<br>(0.46)                | 0.24<br>(0.44)   | 0.83<br>(0.46)          | 0.75<br>(0.47)                    |
| 50 < age ≤ 55                | -0.07<br>(0.35)   | -0.16<br>(0.39)   | -0.28<br>(0.37)   | 0.38<br>(0.37)   | 0.07<br>(0.46)                | 0.44<br>(0.43)   | 0.71<br>(0.46)          | 0.71<br>(0.47)                    |
| 55 < age                     | -0.04<br>(0.46)   | -0.36<br>(0.48)   | -0.20<br>(0.41)   | 0.24<br>(0.44)   | 0.19<br>(0.51)                | 0.34<br>(0.48)   | 0.68<br>(0.47)          | 0.68<br>(0.49)                    |
| <b>Tenure</b>                |                   |                   |                   |                  |                               |                  |                         |                                   |

|                                  |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                  |                  |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| 1 - 2 months                     | -0.01<br>(0.39) | -0.03<br>(0.37) | -0.16<br>(0.36) | 0.12<br>(0.40)  | -0.46<br>(0.43) | 0.14<br>(0.37)  | -0.18<br>(0.43)  | -0.26<br>(0.47)  |
| 2 - 6 months                     | -0.11<br>(0.36) | 0.20<br>(0.34)  | 0.16<br>(0.26)  | -0.02<br>(0.31) | -0.41<br>(0.40) | -0.32<br>(0.32) | 0.02<br>(0.34)   | 0.14<br>(0.37)   |
| 6 months - 1 year                | -0.09<br>(0.36) | 0.23<br>(0.34)  | 0.48<br>(0.26)  | 0.69<br>(0.34)* | -0.17<br>(0.41) | 0.05<br>(0.33)  | 0.27<br>(0.34)   | 0.28<br>(0.38)   |
| 1 - 2 years                      | -0.23<br>(0.33) | 0.05<br>(0.32)  | 0.02<br>(0.25)  | 0.02<br>(0.30)  | -0.29<br>(0.38) | -0.03<br>(0.30) | 0.10<br>(0.32)   | 0.09<br>(0.35)   |
| 2 - 5 years                      | -0.16<br>(0.33) | 0.07<br>(0.32)  | 0.17<br>(0.24)  | 0.31<br>(0.30)  | -0.16<br>(0.38) | -0.23<br>(0.29) | 0.01<br>(0.31)   | 0.00<br>(0.35)   |
| 5 - 10 years                     | 0.04<br>(0.34)  | -0.06<br>(0.33) | 0.10<br>(0.26)  | 0.38<br>(0.31)  | -0.26<br>(0.39) | -0.14<br>(0.30) | 0.04<br>(0.33)   | 0.03<br>(0.36)   |
| > 10 years                       | -0.15<br>(0.34) | -0.04<br>(0.33) | 0.05<br>(0.25)  | 0.69<br>(0.31)* | 0.01<br>(0.39)  | -0.26<br>(0.29) | -0.05<br>(0.31)  | -0.09<br>(0.35)  |
| <b>Position in the Household</b> |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |                  |                  |
| head                             | 0.09<br>(0.23)  | 0.06<br>(0.22)  | -0.14<br>(0.25) | 0.29<br>(0.21)  | 0.05<br>(0.24)  | -0.11<br>(0.19) | 0.67<br>(0.23)** | 0.71<br>(0.23)** |
| spouse                           | 0.03<br>(0.18)  | -0.30<br>(0.17) | -0.05<br>(0.19) | 0.27<br>(0.16)  | -0.23<br>(0.20) | -0.07<br>(0.18) | 0.31<br>(0.22)   | 0.39<br>(0.22)   |
| child                            | -0.30<br>(0.32) | -0.53<br>(0.29) | -0.15<br>(0.32) | 0.65<br>(0.33)  | 0.02<br>(0.35)  | 0.41<br>(0.28)  | 0.58<br>(0.34)   | 0.61<br>(0.34)   |
| spouse in the household          | 0.08<br>(0.13)  | 0.17<br>(0.13)  | -0.02<br>(0.12) | 0.13<br>(0.13)  | 0.14<br>(0.12)  | 0.13<br>(0.12)  | 0.14<br>(0.13)   | 0.09<br>(0.14)   |
| breadwinner                      | -0.04<br>(0.20) | -0.32<br>(0.19) | -0.10<br>(0.22) | 0.01<br>(0.19)  | -0.19<br>(0.20) | 0.13<br>(0.17)  | -0.20<br>(0.18)  | -0.17<br>(0.19)  |
| children                         | -0.14<br>(0.12) | -0.10<br>(0.11) | -0.13<br>(0.12) | 0.06<br>(0.11)  | -0.05<br>(0.11) | 0.01<br>(0.11)  | -0.21<br>(0.12)  | -0.19<br>(0.12)  |
| city type                        | -0.06<br>(0.09) | -0.01<br>(0.09) | -0.06<br>(0.09) | 0.08<br>(0.09)  | -0.11<br>(0.09) | -0.05<br>(0.08) | -0.17<br>(0.09)  | -0.14<br>(0.09)  |
| <b>Province (11 dummies)</b>     | Yes             | Yes             | Yes             | Yes             | Yes             | Yes             | Yes              | Yes              |

Wald Chi 2 test (47 df)      77.78\*\*   115.12\*\*   101.33\*\*   116.96\*\*   110.38\*\*   92.06\*\*   71.22\*\*   79.31\*\*

The reference group of the variables is given in parenthesis: Employment Status (voluntary full-time), Labor Market Position (permanent), Unemployment (never), Educational Level (medium), Gender (man) Age (20 or younger), Tenure (less than 1 month), Position in the Household (not married), Spouse in the Household (no spouse in the household), breadwinner (not bread winner), children (does not have children), city type (does not want to live in city), Province (Limburg)