

Individual Determinants of Social Behavior^(*)

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Abstract

This paper studies the individual determinants of four aspects of social behavior: attitudes in cooperating with anonymous others; propensity to rely on family and friend help as for finding a job or dealing with government red tape; interest in politics; and group and association participation. Using individual data from the Italian SHIW, we find that older and more educated individuals display a greater attitude to cooperation, an higher interest in politics, and a more intense association activity. In contrast, the likelihood to rely on blood ties and personal knowledge does not depend on age and education. We also find that homeownership is more often than not associated with good social conduct, while urban residence has a negative impact on public behavior. Finally, having Left political opinion increases the propensity to cooperate and the interest in politics, while it does not affect the likelihood to make use of blood ties and personal knowledge in the job market or vis-à-vis the bureaucracy.

Keywords: social norms, social capital

JEL Numbers: Z0, Z13

^(*) We thank (...) for comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.

I. Introduction

A growing body of research documents that measures of *good* social behavior is associated with effective public policies and more successful economic outcomes. Putnam (1993) jump-started this research by showing that Italian local governments are more efficient where there is greater civic engagement. Knack and Keefer (1997) find that a one standard-deviation increase in survey-based measure of country-level trust increases economic growth by more than one-half of a standard deviation. Hall and Jones (1999) argue that social infrastructure is the fundamental determinant of productivity. In short: trust, reciprocity, and habits of co-operation minimize the scope of transaction costs and spur economic success.

While the effects of social behavior on economic outcomes have been thoroughly explored, much less is known on the individual characteristics of those who behave in a socially desirable way. Who are those endowed with an higher degree of public spirit? What are the features of those who behave more honestly or those more intensively involved in the local community?

Previous attempts to unveil the individual determinants of social behavior have been made by Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) and Glaeser et al. (2002). Both papers are based on the U.S. case, which is clearly at most only illustrative as for the European experience of civic virtues. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), focus on the GSS question on how much a respondent trusts other people: however, Glaeser et al. (2000) have raised significant questions about the reliability of this measure, showing that subjects who report that they are trusting, do not act more trusting in a standard trust game. To overcome the difficulties with such a measure, Glaeser et al. (2002) use as a proxy of good social behavior organization membership. Yet, as recognized by the authors themselves, this measure is incomplete, since it does not touch on aspects of social behavior that are not captured in group membership.

As explained by Dasgupta and Sarageldin (2000), social behavior is *multidimensional*. It includes many aspects of social life that can hardly be combined. For instance, those who are mostly inclined to trust people or to cooperate with anonymous others do not necessarily correspond to those who play fair in a job-finding game –when their key interest is at stake– and avoid to rely on the help of their network of family and friends to achieve the intended result. Again, those who are interested in politics do not necessarily match with those who are better endowed with civic virtues or involved in community level activities, such as religious or volunteer groups. As it will be evident below, our results suggest that there considerable individual heterogeneity as for the determinants of the various aspects of social life.

This paper tries to add to the previous literature by using the 2004 special section on social behavior of the Bank of Italy's Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). The survey distinguishes four aspects of social behavior: attitudes in cooperating with anonymous others; propensity to rely on family and friend help

as for finding a job or dealing with government red tape; interest in politics; and group and association participation. Our findings strongly support the idea that that social behavior is multidimensional: the different aspects of social behavior are only weakly correlated among each other and are explained by different individual determinants.

The results can be summarized as follows. Civic cooperation increases with age and is strongly correlated with education. High-income household display greater civic virtues. Controlling for income, blue-collar workers are the most civic. We also find that civic cooperation is positively associated with homeownership and having Left political opinion, while negatively associated with urban residence. The likelihood to rely on blood ties and personal knowledge is basically affected by a complete different set of individual determinants. In contrast to civic-ness, it does not depend on age and education. Females refrain more while wage-and-salary workers are the most inclined to relying on family and friend networks. Urban status is positively correlated, while homeownership negative associated, with a more intense use of on blood ties and personal knowledge. Interest in politics and organization membership depend both positively on age and education, while being a female impacts negatively on both aspects of social behavior. Interest in politics increases with homeownership and Left political opinion. Joining groups and associations is negatively related to mobility.

The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data and the variables. Section III presents the empirical evidence. Section IV concludes.

II. Data and Variable Description

The data source is the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). This survey is conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy on a representative sample of about 8,000 households: see Brandolini and Cannari (1994) for details.¹ The SHIW collects detailed information on Italian households, such as age and education, and income. An important feature of the SHIW is the fact that the *standard* information on demographic and economic aspects, which are recorded regularly every wave and are similar to those collected by other surveys such as the American PSID or CPS, are supplemented by special sections. Below, we exploit the 2004 wave of the survey, which include a special section on social behavior.

The special section distinguishes four aspects of social behavior: attitudes towards civic virtues; propensity to rely on family and friend help as for finding a job or dealing with government red tape; interest in politics; and group and association participation.

¹ SHIW micro-data are publicly available at www.bancaditalia.it.

The strength of norms of civic cooperation, which refers to the individual attitudes in cooperating with anonymous others, is assessed from responses to question about whether each of the following behaviors can “always be justified, never be justified, or something in between.”

- a) “avoiding a fare on public transport”
- b) “keeping money you obtain by accident when it would be possible to return it to the rightful owner (for example, if you found a wallet with the owner’s name and address, or if you were given too much change at the supermarket check-out)”
- c) “failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle.”²

Respondents chose a number from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). We reverse these scales, so that larger values indicate greater cooperation, and summed values over the three items to create a scale with a 30-point maximum. We find however that the share of individuals who assessed all the above items as never justifiable (that is, the share of those who scored 30 points in our reverse scale) is pretty high (43 percent in our sample, see Table 1). Therefore, we decided to use a dummy variable CIVIC that takes on the value of one if the respondent never find any of the above behavior justifiable, and zero otherwise.³

Civic virtue can be defined as the pursuit of the public good at the expenses of all purely individual and private ends. However, maximizing individuals could trade off the moral returns from civic-ness with the returns from opportunism. What happens to public-spirited citizens, when some of their key interests is at stake? The individual attitude to fairness in a context of potential substantial incentives for opportunism is assessed from responses to the following question: “Have you ever asked relatives or friends and acquaintances to help you or a member of your household find work or deal with government red tape (e.g. speed up formalities)?” We use a dummy variable REFERRAL, which that equals one if the individual answers that she has never asked for help. In our sample, 74 percent of the respondents declare that this is the case (see Table 1).

Notwithstanding the scant empirical evidence on the matter, in Italy the scope of blood ties and personal knowledge seems to be quite widespread. According to the old anthropological work of Banfield (1958), maximizing the short term material advantages of the family nucleus (*amoral familism*) or the restricted circle of acquaintances at the expenses of norms of general validity was the distinctive feature of southern Italians (see, also Ichino and Maggi (2000)). More recently, however, regional disparities in nepotism seem to be heavily reduced at least, as the 1992 northern episodes of corruption of *Mani Pulite* and the 2006 episodes labeled *Piedi Puliti* show. In some respects, relying on the network of family and friends should not

² Our measure for civiness is thus similar to that of the long celebrated paper by Knack and Keefer (1997), which also provides an illustration of the cross-country correlation between this measure and other qualitative and anecdotic evidence on civic norms.

³ In any case, results obtained by using the 30-points reverse scale are in line with those reported in the text (and are available upon request)

be associated with bad social behavior. For instance, information acquisition from the inner circle of acquaintances as for the quality of a medical specialist or a restaurant does not carry with it negative social consequences. Referrals in dealing with bureaucracy or in the labor market do not have, however, positive social implications. While asking for help to speed up red tape is without a doubt an opportunistic device, the use of personal referrals in the labor market has in principle a more ambiguous nature. For instance, labor economics would argue that personal referrals reduce information asymmetry between employers and employees and secure a better matching. As for the Italian case, however, the positive effect of job referrals could easily be ruled out: as shown by Pistaferri (1999), workers hired through personal referrals display a negative wage premium, which runs counter to the better-match story.

A long tradition going back at least to Toqueville (1932) suggests that interest in public issues is a key sign of public virtue. The awareness of the issues relevant for the society at large is captured from responses to the question on individual interest in politics. Our dummy POLITICS takes on the value of one for those who declare to be very or fairly interested in politics. Table 1 shows that roughly 25 percent of the respondents in our sample care about politics.

Putnam (1993, 2000) argues that organization membership contributes to effective social collaboration, since associations instill in their members habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public-spiritedness. Glaeser et al (2002) use organization membership as proxy for social behavior. To measure the propensity to participate in associations, we use the dummy ASSOCIATIONS, which takes the value of one for those who respond positively to the following question: “In the last year, have you taken an active part in gathering of any of the following groups or associations: associations/groups involved in social, environmental, union policy, religious, cultural, sports or recreational, professional, or voluntary activities?”. Only 13 percent of the respondents have joined groups and associations.

The dataset includes 3,798 observations.⁴ In addition to the four measures of social behavior (the dependent variables), Table 1 gives also the means and standard deviations for the other variables used in the paper (the description of the variables is in the Appendix).

A first set of variables refer to *basic* individual characteristics. Accordingly, the average respondent is 55 years old (it is a female for the 38 percent of the cases). Roughly 91 percent of the respondents have at most a high school diploma, while college graduates and individuals with a post-college qualification represent respectively 8.7 and 0.2 percent of the sample. Married respondents represent 61 percent, while widows or separated/divorced comprise of about 14 percent of the sample. As for the professional activity, the sample

⁴ The special sections are considered to be quite demanding for the respondents and very expensive for the Bank of Italy. This explains why the questions included in a special section are posed only to a subset of the respondents. In our case, the social behavior questions were asked to 3,798 households (out of the 8,000 households included in the 2004 wave of the SHIW).

includes blue-collar (17 percent), office workers or school teachers (17 percent), high-level payroll employees (3 percent); self-employed (11.5 percent); and not-employed (51 percent).

A second set of variables includes *additional* individual characteristics, which according to theory and previous literature may affect social behavior.

First, social behavior can be correlated with geographic mobility. Longer relations within the same community may spur good public conduct because the scope for repeated interaction is increased.⁵ Moreover, if the individual civiness is influenced by the average level of civiness in a community, then those who has been living in the current place of residence for long may be more exposed to the community moral pressure and sanctions. To make a first assessment of the effect of mobility on civic virtues, we exploit the confidential SHIW data on the birthplace of workers. This information is at the level of the 103 Italian Provinces that cover the country. While this is certainly not ideal, we should still be able to detect the effect of mobility through the different outcomes for those who work where they were born (the ‘stayers’) and the others (the ‘movers’). This latter group represents 22 percent of our sample.

Second, homeownership may impact on social behavior. A long tradition conjectures that homeownership affects a household’s voting behavior, political ideology, and group membership. For instance, Engels (1935) argues that once a worker purchased a home, he ceased to belong to the proletariat. According to DiPasquale and Glaser (1998), homeownership may create incentives for households to improve the quality of their community since community quality is capitalized into the value of their home (see, also, Dietz and Haurin (2003)). To assess the impact of homeownership on social conduct, we use the SHIW information about whether the main residence is own by the household. Given the widespread homeownership that features Italy, the percentage of respondents that own their home is pretty high (68 percent).

Third, we study the effect of urban residence on social behavior. In principle, this effect is ambiguous. Marx’s epithet about the idiocy of rural life suggests that civiness may be positively associated with urbanization. Glaeser (2004) discusses how cities shape individuals’ incentives to become involved in civic matters and politics: urban proximity may facilitate interactions in political community matters. Borck (2006) provide some supporting evidence by using the German Socio-Economic Panel. On the other hand, a folk theorem sees civic virtue in traditional villages and vice in the city. As observed by Putnam (2000), people appear to be more trusting and more likely to think that others are fair outside of big cities. Perhaps this reflects the greater presence of opportunistic behavior in cities: if urban areas facilitate social flight, then it may be easy for urbanites to behave opportunistically and escape punishment. To evaluate the impact of city size on social behavior we refer to number of inhabitants in the municipality of residence, which is a

⁵ In game theory, cooperative solution emerges as stable equilibrium in repeated games.

data available in the SHIW. Our proxy for urban residence is a dummy that equals one if the individual resides in a municipality that has more than 200,000 inhabitants (18 percent in our sample, Table 1).

Finally, we investigate the relation between political opinions and civicness. This is one of the hottest ever debated issues in Italy. For instance, *La Repubblica*, a leading Italian newspaper supportive of the Left has argued that the difference between Left- and Right-oriented individuals is of an anthropological nature, as having a conservative opinion is tantamount to being less cooperative. Again, the Left's prime minister Mr. Romano Prodi stated that those who vote for the Right coalition of parties, led by the former prime minister Mr. Silvio Berlusconi, are those who use to park the car in illegal parking space.⁶ The SHIW does not contain questions on the political preferences of the respondents. However, in the 2004 wave individuals are asked to indicate with reference to level of taxes and public expenditures, which of the following statements is closest to his/her opinion:

- a) "the Government's duty is to provide all citizens with as many public services as possible (e.g. school, healthcare, pensions, transport, etc.) even if it means heavy taxes"
- b) "the Government has some unavoidable expenses for social welfare, which should be covered by taxes and duties, increasing these as when necessary"
- c) "taxation is too high, so if there is not enough money expenses should be reduced by cutting back services"
- d) "the Government should raise the bare minimum in taxes and duties to cover absolutely essential public services (e.g. defense, justice, the police, etc.) and leave the rest to private initiative."

Since a preference for high-tax and high-expenditures is a distinctive mark of the Left voter, we use a dummy variable (Left) that takes on the value of one if a respondent picks one of the above items a) and b) as the answer that better fits her opinions. In our sample 53 percent of the respondents are classified as Left's voters (see Table 1).

Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for our four measures of social behavior. Consistent with the idea that social behavior is multidimensional, and that it includes many aspects of social life that can hardly be combined, the cross-correlation coefficients for the four variables are quite small. The highest correlation is found for POLITICS and ASSOCIATIONS (30 percent). CIVIC is basically uncorrelated with the other variables, while REFERRAL is negatively correlated with both POLITICS and ASSOCIATIONS.

III. Econometric Results

⁶ This was reported by the newspaper *Il Foglio*, in May 2006.

We start in Table 3 by regressing the variable CIVIC on a set of individual characteristics. Column 1 reports our ‘minimal’ specification.⁷ First, the age variables indicates that civiness increases with age. The coefficient on Female is positive although not always significant at the usual level. Education is positively correlated with CIVIC: compared to those with elementary school as highest achievement, college graduates are 25-30 percent more likely to display civic attitudes. On the other hand, marital status is uninfluential. In Column 2 we add family income and wealth to the previous set of individual controls. In principle, since education and income are correlated, the effect of education on civiness could be spurious and due to the circumstance that high-income (or high-wealth) households are better citizens. Our results do not provide much ground for this interpretation: both coefficients on income and wealth enter with positive signs (however, with low significance for family wealth) while the points estimates for the education dummies decreases only marginally. Column 3 adds dummies for the work status of the respondents. Again, this set of controls is likely to be jointly determined with education (and income), so that their inclusion could lead to underestimate the true effect of education (and income) on CIVIC. Again, this does not seem to be the case, as the coefficients for education (and income) basically do not change. Controlling for all the individual observables, we find that wage-and-salary workers, in particular blue-collar, are the most civic. The difference in the probability of displaying civic virtues between a blue-collar worker and a self-employed, both a member of the arts or professions and a sole proprietor or freelance, is over 10 percent. We also find that not employed are less civic, but their coefficient does not enter significantly.

While we look at the individual determinants of social behavior, most of the literature has followed Putnam (1993) and viewed social behavior as a community-level attribute (see: de Blasio and Nuzzo (2006)). To make sure that our results are not driven by some omitted territorial variables, we run a number of experiments. First, we insert in Column 4 a dummy for households residing in the south of Italy. We find that southern residence is associated with a 3.5 percent negative difference in CIVIC. However, all the estimated coefficients remain unaffected and the explanatory power of the regression increases only negligibly. Second, we take an even more conservative stance and run (Column 5) a specification with 20 regions fixed-effects. This amounts to identifying the individual determinants of CIVIC through the variation across household within each region. It represents an extremely conservative specification: to the extent the households within the same region are similar, we are probably eliminating a lot of the variation needed to identify the results. Remarkably, however, the results are undistinguishable from previous regressions. Note that region-level fixed effects explain 40 percent of the observed variation in civiness. Accordingly, even in the conservative specification, the individual determinants still predict most of the variation in CIVIC. Finally, in all specification we also presents (in squared brackets) the standard errors corrected for the potential clustering of the residuals at the regional level. Again, results keep remaining mostly undisputed.

⁷ All regressions are based on appropriate weighted data. The coefficient estimates however are not sensitive to weighting or not weighting the data.

In Table 4 we focus on the additional individual characteristics, which according to theory and previous literature may impact on social behavior. We add these variable to the specification reported in Column 4 of Table 3. However, we do not report in Table 4 all the coefficients on the individual characteristics of Table 3 since they remain very stable.

We start by considering geographic mobility. Previous work on the effect of mobility on social behavior find puzzling results. Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) show that the impact of mobility on trust is basically zero, while DiPasquale and Glaser (1998) argue that reduced mobility is positively associated with a number of proxies for citizenship. To assess the role of mobility in our sample, we include (Column 1) a dummy variable equal to one for the movers, which are defined as those who do not reside in the same province where they were born.⁸ We find that mobility does not impact on CIVIC, as the dummy for movers is negative but not significant. This result is consistent with the idea that community-level influence is a factor of limited role. If the individual civiness is affected by the community- level of civiness, then the movers, that is those who has not been living in the community for long, may be less exposed to the community moral pressure and sanctions. Then, we move to homeownership. In Column 2 we add a dummy for those households who own the home where they live. We find that the effect of homeownership on CIVIC is positive and highly significant: compare to the renters, homeowners are 7 percent more likely to display civic attitudes. Subsequently, we analyze city size. In Column 3 we check whether urbanites are more prone to behave civically, by inserting a dummy that equals one if the individual resides in municipally that has more than 200,000 inhabitants. While this only one of the possible many ways to measure urban residence, additional results (available upon request) show that the effect of city size on CIVIC is basically insensitive to how we decide to model the city size. We find that this dummy enters negatively and with high significance. Compare to the residents of smaller cities, larger area inhabitants are 6% less likely to display cooperative attitudes towards anonymous others. Finally, we study the relation between political opinion and civiness (Column 4). The dummy variable Left enters with high significance and a positive point estimates: compare to Right electors, Left voters are 8 per cent more likely to display good social behavior.

A key concern is that the additional controls may be cross-correlated. For instance, homeownership may create barriers to mobility and thus discourage migration. Again, being a mover can be associated with urban status since migration is predominantly directed towards urban centers. Moreover, because of the legacy of large industrial plants in the largest metropolitan areas, urban status may be correlated with Left political opinion. When included one-to-one the points estimates of correlated controls could be biased, since any of them may pick up the effects of the others. To lesser these concerns, we run (Column 5) a regression that includes all the additional controls simultaneously. We find that all the estimated effects remain undisputed.

⁸ Only 3,660 (out of 3,798) individuals provide information on the province of birth.

Those who are mostly inclined to cooperate with anonymous others do not necessarily correspond to those who play fair when their key interest is at stake, as in a job-finding game or vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, and avoid to rely on the help of their network of family and friends to achieve the intended result. To assess the individual attitude to fairness in a context of potential substantial incentives for opportunism, we replicate in Table 5 the econometric specifications of Table 3 by using REFERRAL as dependent variable.

Compare to the personal stance in cooperating with anonymous others, REFERRAL is driven by a different set of factors. First, older cohorts are undistinguishable from their younger counterparts, as the age variable does not enter significantly. This is interesting because there is a popular view that considers the supposed moral decadence of current times as an effect of reduced moral values in the younger generations. This view does not find empirical support. Second, and even more interesting, education does not effect the intensity of opportunistic device. To be sure, Column 1 shows that both those with a junior high school diploma as maximum achievement and college graduates display a less reliance on acquaintances; however, this finding is not robust to the introduction of additional controls (Columns 2-5). Remarkably, the most educated – those with a post graduate qualification – show a consistent higher reliance on blood ties and personal knowledge, even though the coefficient is imprecisely measured. Given that in the Italian case, post graduate qualification is valuable for academic job opportunities (while it is quite worthless elsewhere), the finding is consistent with the idea that the Italian academia suffers from nepotism. Third, we find that females are less inclined to favoritism: a female is 6 percent less likely than a man to have asked for help to find work or deal with government red tape. This result is interesting, as previous research has shown that females trust less (Glaeser et al. (2002)). Fourth, marital status is unimportant. Fifth, high-income and high-wealth families are also less inclined to behave dishonestly. Sixth, controlling for all the above observables, junior manager, self-employed (both member of the arts or professions and sole proprietor or freelance), and not-employed are the groups less prone to partiality.

We also find that, controlling for the above household observables, a southern resident is 10 percent more likely to rely on the family and friend network. This result echoes Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993). Southern residence, however, contributes only partially (20 percent) to the observed variation in REFERRAL (note also that including region-level fixed effects explain only 1 percent of the observed variation).

As the additional variables that may impact on REFERRAL, Table 6 shows that mobility has no role, while urban residence is positively correlated with and homeownership negatively associated with the reliance on the acquaintance network. Crucially, the coefficient on the dummy variable Left is basically zero. In contrast with the results for the generalized attitude to cooperate, having Left political opinion does not affect the likelihood to make use of blood ties and personal knowledge in the job market or vis-à-vis the bureaucracy.

Good citizens are citizens who are informed about the issues of general relevance. Table 7 shows the role of the basic individual determinants of POLITICS. We find that interest in politics increases with age, though at a declining rate. The coefficient on Female is negative and highly significant, while education is strongly positively correlated with the individual awareness about matters of public significance. Being single is associated with an higher political interest, as the dummies married and separated or widow both display negative values that are significant most of the times. Income and wealth also enter positively. Across job groups, office worker, junior manager/cadre, and member of arts or professions display the highest coefficients. Controlling for all the observables, southern individuals care about politics 3 percent less than their center-north counterparts.

As for the additional determinants of POLITICS, Table 8 shows that Left voters are unambiguously more involved in the political debate. Homeowner also show a positive point estimate, which is however only significant when the standard errors are not adjusted for clustering.

As a final measure of social behavior, we use the number of groups and associations that an individual is an active member of. As shown in Table 9, the individual basic determinants of ASSOCIATIONS are similar to those of POLITICS as for the role of age, sex, education. In contrast, marital status, income, and wealth basically do not seem to matter. The groups of junior manager/cadre, manager, member of arts or professions, and not employed are the most involved in associations. Finally, southern Italians participate less in group activities. It should also be noted (Table 10) that except for geographic mobility that is inversely related to ASSOCIATIONS, the additional individual determinants of social behavior do not display any role.

IV. Concluding remarks

A wide ranging literature has shown that good social behavior is associated with positive economic outcomes. This paper complements this literature by investigated what are the characteristics of those endowed with an higher degree of public spirit. It shows that social behavior is a multidimensional concept, which includes many aspects of social life that can hardly be combined. Accordingly, it describes the individual determinants of four aspects of social conduct: attitudes in cooperating with anonymous others; propensity to rely on family and friend help as for finding a job or dealing with government red tape; interest in politics; and group and association participation.

Older and more educated individuals display a greater attitude to cooperation, an higher interest in politics, and a more intense association activity. In contrast, the likelihood to rely on blood ties and personal knowledge does not depend on age and education. We also find that homeownership is more often than not

associated with good social conduct, while urban residence has mostly a negative impact on public behavior. Finally, having Left political opinion increases the propensity to cooperate and the interest in politics, while it does not affect the likelihood to make use of blood ties and personal knowledge in the job market or vis-à-vis the bureaucracy.

Overall our results challenge some conventional views. First, they show that taking one particular measure of social behavior as a proxy for the overall individual endowment of citizenship (or social capital) can be highly misleading. Second, our evince show that before a policy receipt of general validity can only be attempted, much remains to be done. Take the most celebrated measure to increase citizenship: education. Our results show that nepotism - which is perhaps among the aspects social behavior considered in this paper the most disturbing one - is not affected by the level of individual human capital. This is clearly is bad news for those who believe in the magic virtues of schooling.

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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	St. dev.	Min	Max	Obs.
<i>Dependent Variables</i>					
CIVIC	0.434	0.496	0	1	3798
REFERRAL	0.744	0.436	0	1	3798
POLITICS	0.252	0.434	0	1	3798
ASSOCIATIONS	0.128	0.334	0	1	3798
<i>Basic Individual Determinants</i>					
Age	55.048	16.447	19	97	3798
Female	0.384	0.486	0	1	3798
<i>Education:</i>					
Elementary school or none	0.324	0.468	0	1	3798
Junior High School	0.290	0.454	0	1	3798
High School	0.299	0.456	0	1	3798
Bachelor Degree	0.083	0.276	0	1	3798
Post graduate	0.002	0.047	0	1	3798
<i>Marital status:</i>					
Single	0.136	0.343	0	1	3798
Married	0.616	0.486	0	1	3798
Separated or Widow	0.247	0.431	0	1	3798
Family Income	0.030	0.027	0	1.023	3798
Family Wealth	0.206	0.335	0	7.941	3798
<i>Work status:</i>					
Blue collar or similar	0.174	0.379	0	1	3798
Office worker – school teacher	0.168	0.374	0	1	3798
Junior manager – cadre	0.022	0.147	0	1	3798
Manager	0.011	0.112	0	1	3798
Member arts or professions	0.029	0.167	0	1	3798
Sole proprietor and freelance	0.086	0.280	0	1	3798
Not employed	0.510	0.499	0	1	3798
<i>Additional Individual Determinants</i>					
Mover	0.224	0.417	0	1	3660
Home Owner	0.676	0.468	0	1	3798
Urban resident	0.183	0.387	0	1	3798
Left	0.529	0.445	0	1	3798

Notes: The description of the variables is in the Appendix.

Table 2. Correlation Matrix for the Dependent Variables

	CIVIC	REFERRAL	POLITICS	ASSOCIATIONS
CIVIC	-			
REFERRAL	0.119	-		
POLITICS	0.060	-0.033	-	
ASSOCIATIONS	0.044	-0.080	0.287	-

Notes: The description of the variables is in the Appendix.

Table 3. Basic Determinants of CIVIC

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	0.012 (0.004)*** [0.005]**	0.010 (0.004)*** [0.005]**	0.010 (0.004)*** [0.005]**	0.010 (0.004)*** [0.005]**	0.009 (0.004)** [0.005]*
Age squared (×100)	-0.004 (0.004) [0.003]	-0.003 (0.003) [0.004]	-0.003 (0.003) [0.004]	-0.003 (0.003) [0.004]	-0.003 (0.003) [0.004]
Female	0.027 (0.019) [0.027]	0.032 (0.019)* [0.027]	0.033 (0.020)* [0.030]	0.034 (0.020)* [0.029]	0.024 (0.021) [0.029]
i. Junior High School	0.106 (0.024)*** [0.046]**	0.096 (0.024)*** [0.046]**	0.094 (0.024)*** [0.047]**	0.090 (0.025)*** [0.045]**	0.090 (0.025)*** [0.044]**
ii. High School	0.172 (0.025)*** [0.037]***	0.150 (0.025)*** [0.036]***	0.160 (0.027)*** [0.034]***	0.155 (0.027)*** [0.031]***	0.155 (0.027)*** [0.033]***
iii. Bachelor Degree	0.293 (0.030)*** [0.038]***	0.250 (0.034)*** [0.043]***	0.267 (0.036)*** [0.041]***	0.264 (0.036)*** [0.040]***	0.263 (0.037)*** [0.043]***
iv. Post graduate	0.319 (0.142)* [0.107]**	0.277 (0.155) [0.119]	0.283 (0.155) [0.124]	0.294 (0.150)* [0.118]**	0.288 (0.153)* [0.120]**
i. Married	0.042 (0.026) [0.038]	0.031 (0.027) [0.039]	0.031 (0.027) [0.040]	0.036 (0.027) [0.042]	0.037 (0.027) [0.042]
ii. Separated or Widow	0.028 (0.030) [0.052]	0.025 (0.030) [0.052]	0.028 (0.031) [0.053]	0.030 (0.031) [0.055]	0.033 (0.031) [0.061]
Family Income		1.374 (0.434)*** [0.633]**	1.473 (0.440)*** [0.667]**	1.317 (0.448)*** [0.594]**	1.111 (0.449)** [0.540]**
Family Wealth		0.019 (0.031) [0.031]	0.035 (0.033) [0.036]	0.036 (0.033) [0.036]	0.048 (0.033) [0.035]
i. Office worker			-0.047 (0.030) [0.060]	-0.046 (0.030) [0.060]	-0.048 (0.030) [0.062]
ii. Junior manager/cadre			-0.045 (0.059) [0.084]	-0.043 (0.059) [0.084]	-0.053 (0.061) [0.081]
iii. Manager			-0.036 (0.083) [0.059]	-0.033 (0.083) [0.059]	-0.037 (0.084) [0.061]
iv. Member arts or professions			-0.131 (0.051)** [0.072]*	-0.128 (0.051)** [0.073]*	-0.146 (0.050)*** [0.072]**
v. Sole proprietor and freelance			-0.101 (0.034)*** [0.050]*	-0.098 (0.034)*** [0.052]*	-0.109 (0.034)*** [0.053]**
vi. Not employed			-0.041 (0.029) [0.048]	-0.038 (0.029) [0.048]	-0.051 (0.030) [0.048]
South				-0.035 (0.018)* [0.039]	
Regional Fixed-Effects	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Pseudo R2	0.037	0.041	0.043	0.044	0.071
Observed Prob	0.434	0.434	0.434	0.434	0.434
Predicted Prob	0.431	0.431	0.432	0.432	0.431
Number of observations	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,798

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if the individual considers “never justifiable” all the following situations: a) not paying for your ticket on public transport; b) keeping money that you obtained by accident when it would be possible to return it to the rightful owner; c) not leaving your name for the owner of a car you accidentally scraped while parking. For a description of all the other variables see the Appendix. The reported coefficients are probit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of considering all the above situations as never justifiable, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. Robust standard errors in round brackets. Robust standard errors clustered on regions in squared brackets. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 4. Additional Determinants of CIVIC

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mover	-0.009 (0.020) [0.030]				0.001 (0.021) [0.028]
Home Owner		0.071 (0.019)*** [0.029]**			0.075 (0.020)*** [0.029]**
Urban resident			-0.064 (0.021)*** [0.028]**		-0.062 (0.022)*** [0.025]**
Left				0.078 (0.018)*** [0.035]**	0.078 (0.019)*** [0.036]**
Pseudo R2	0.043	0.046	0.045	0.047	0.051
Observed Prob	0.436	0.434	0.434	0.434	0.436
Predicted Prob	0.433	0.431	0.431	0.431	0.433
Number of observations	3,660	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,660

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if the individual considers “never justifiable” all the following situations: a) not paying for your ticket on public transport; b) keeping money that you obtained by accident when it would be possible to return it to the rightful owner; c) not leaving your name for the owner of a car you accidentally scraped while parking. For a description of all the other variables see the Appendix. All specifications include the additional controls listed in Column (4) of Table 3. The reported coefficients are probit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of considering all the above situations as never justifiable, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. Robust standard errors in round brackets. Robust standard errors clustered on regions in squared brackets. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 5. Basic Determinants of REFERRAL

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	0.003 (0.003) [0.003]	0.002 (0.003) [0.003]	0.000 (0.003) [0.003]	0.000 (0.003) [0.003]	0.000 (0.003) [0.003]
Age squared (×100)	0.002 (0.003) [0.003]	0.003 (0.003) [0.003]	0.003 (0.003) [0.003]	0.003 (0.003) [0.003]	0.002 (0.003) [0.003]
Female	0.066 (0.016)*** [0.031]**	0.071 (0.016)*** [0.031]**	0.063 (0.017)*** [0.033]**	0.065 (0.017)*** [0.031]**	0.059 (0.016)*** [0.031]**
i. Junior High School	0.047 (0.020)** [0.026]**	0.032 (0.020) [0.023]	0.040 (0.020) [0.023]	0.028 (0.021) [0.021]	0.031 (0.020) [0.021]
ii. High School	0.030 (0.021) [0.022]	-0.004 (0.023) [0.023]	-0.003 (0.023) [0.027]	-0.018 (0.023) [0.027]	-0.016 (0.024) [0.026]
iii. Bachelor Degree	0.068 (0.026)** [0.047]	0.004 (0.041) [0.038]	-0.005 (0.035) [0.039]	-0.013 (0.035) [0.041]	-0.007 (0.034) [0.041]
iv. Post graduate	-0.020 (0.153) [0.156]	-0.114 (0.158) [0.177]	-0.108 (0.178) [0.162]	-0.056 (0.169) [0.157]	-0.035 (0.161) [0.158]
i. Married	0.043 (0.023)** [0.055]	0.029 (0.054) [0.055]	0.025 (0.023) [0.054]	0.022 (0.025) [0.068]	0.037 (0.023) [0.058]
ii. Separated or Widow	0.015 (0.026) [0.065]	0.015 (0.025) [0.066]	0.017 (0.026) [0.068]	0.021 (0.026) [0.068]	0.019 (0.026) [0.070]
Family Income		1.644 (0.471)*** [1.087]	1.642 (0.485)*** [1.073]	0.876 (0.483)* [0.825]	0.834 (0.484)* [0.814]
Family Wealth		0.073 (0.032)** [0.072]	0.062 (0.033)* [0.062]	0.067 (0.033)* [0.065]	0.059 (0.033)* [0.063]
i. Office worker			0.023 (0.024) [0.035]	0.030 (0.024) [0.035]	0.042 (0.024) [0.033]
ii. Junior manager/cadre			0.105 (0.039)** [0.035]***	0.112 (0.037)** [0.031]***	0.116 (0.036)** [0.028]***
iii. Manager			0.003 (0.024) [0.023]	0.020 (0.067) [0.068]	0.032 (0.064) [0.065]
iv. Member arts or professions			0.124 (0.034)*** [0.035]***	0.129 (0.033)*** [0.034]***	0.130 (0.031)*** [0.032]***
v. Sole proprietor and freelance			0.046 (0.027) [0.040]	0.055 (0.026)** [0.038]	0.062 (0.026)** [0.037]
vi. Not employed			0.079 (0.024)*** [0.027]***	0.087 (0.024)*** [0.028]***	0.097 (0.025)*** [0.029]***
South				-0.104 (0.017)*** [0.032]***	
Regional fixed-effects	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Pseudo R2	0.027	0.035	0.039	0.049	0.049
Observed Prob	0.744	0.744	0.744	0.744	0.744
Predicted Prob	0.750	0.753	0.754	0.756	0.761
Number of observations	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,798

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if the individual answers that she never has asked relatives or friends and acquaintances to help her or a member of her household find work or deal with government red tape. For a description of all the other variables see the Appendix. The reported coefficients are probit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of answering that she never asked for help, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. Robust standard errors in round brackets. Robust standard errors clustered on regions in squared brackets. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 6. Additional Determinants of REFERRAL

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mover	-0.020 (0.018) [0.023]				-0.014 (0.018) [0.020]
Home Owner		0.048 (0.017)*** [0.023]**			0.044 (0.017)** [0.020]**
Urban resident			-0.062 (0.020)*** [0.027]**		-0.057 (0.020)*** [0.026]**
Left				0.006 (0.016) [0.025]	0.017 (0.016) [0.026]
Pseudo R2	0.049	0.051	0.052	0.049	0.053
Observed Prob	0.747	0.744	0.744	0.744	0.747
Predicted Prob	0.759	0.756	0.756	0.757	0.759
Number of observations	3,660	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,660

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if the individual answers that she never has asked relatives or friends and acquaintances to help her or a member of her household find work or deal with government red tape. For a description of all the other variables see the Appendix. All specifications include the additional controls listed in Column (4) of Table 5. The reported coefficients are probit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of answering that she never asked for help, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. Robust standard errors in round brackets. Robust standard errors clustered on regions in squared brackets. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 7. Basic Determinants of *POLITICS*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	0.014 (0.006)** [0.003]***	0.013 (0.003)*** [0.005]**	0.011 (0.003)*** [0.005]**	0.012 (0.003)*** [0.005]**	0.011 (0.003)*** [0.005]**
Age squared (×100)	-0.010 (0.005)** [0.003]***	-0.009 (0.003)** [0.005]*	-0.009 (0.003)*** [0.004]*	-0.009 (0.003)*** [0.004]*	-0.009 (0.003)*** [0.004]**
Female	-0.108 (0.016)*** [0.012]***	-0.103 (0.016)*** [0.021]***	-0.111 (0.016)*** [0.019]***	-0.110 (0.016)*** [0.019]***	-0.119 (0.016)*** [0.018]***
i. Junior High School	0.106 (0.024)*** [0.047]**	0.096 (0.024)*** [0.046]**	0.101 (0.024)*** [0.046]**	0.096 (0.024)*** [0.046]**	0.095 (0.024)*** [0.044]**
ii. High School	0.295 (0.024)*** [0.036]***	0.273 (0.025)*** [0.033]***	0.246 (0.026)*** [0.031]***	0.239 (0.026)*** [0.031]***	0.235 (0.026)*** [0.031]***
iii. Bachelor Degree	0.452 (0.033)*** [0.052]***	0.404 (0.035)*** [0.058]***	0.359 (0.039)*** [0.031]***	0.354 (0.039)*** [0.031]***	0.355 (0.040)*** [0.060]***
iv. Post graduate	0.525 (0.139)*** [0.162]***	0.473 (0.153)*** [0.188]**	0.421 (0.166)** [0.186]**	0.435 (0.163)*** [0.186]**	0.451 (0.159)*** [0.195]**
i. Married	-0.042 (0.023)* [0.022]*	-0.052 (0.023)** [0.024]**	-0.056 (0.023)** [0.025]**	-0.051 (0.023)** [0.025]**	-0.039 (0.023)* [0.025]
ii. Separated or Widow	-0.048 (0.025) [0.035]	-0.050 (0.024)** [0.036]	-0.050 (0.025)* [0.035]	-0.049 (0.025)* [0.035]	-0.037 (0.025) [0.035]
Family Income		0.967 (0.271)*** [0.696]	0.874 (0.273)*** [0.676]	0.793 (0.276)*** [0.646]	0.619 (0.279)** [0.604]
Family Wealth		0.037 (0.024) [0.025]	0.060 (0.025)** [0.032]*	0.058 (0.025)** [0.033]*	0.068 (0.025)*** [0.031]**
i. Office worker			0.098 (0.028)*** [0.043]**	0.099 (0.056)* [0.043]**	0.111 (0.029)*** [0.042]***
ii. Junior manager/cadre			0.099 (0.056)* [0.067]	0.099 (0.055)* [0.068]	0.099 (0.056)* [0.071]
iii. Manager			0.071 (0.074) [0.079]	0.073 (0.074) [0.079]	0.078 (0.074) [0.081]
iv. Member arts or professions			0.093 (0.032)*** [0.051]*	0.093 (0.051)** [0.079]	0.101 (0.034)*** [0.052]***
v. Sole proprietor and freelance			-0.029 (0.049) [0.028]	-0.027 (0.027) [0.050]	-0.017 (0.029) [0.054]
vi. Not employed			0.043 (0.028) [0.028]	0.045 (0.026)* [0.029]	0.049 (0.026)* [0.027]*
South				-0.039 (0.015)** [0.029]	
Regional fixed-effects	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Pseudo R2	0.096	0.103	0.108	0.110	0.129
Observed Prob	0.252	0.252	0.252	0.2523	0.252
Predicted Prob	0.230	0.229	0.229	0.227	0.222
Number of observations	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,798

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if the individual answers that she is very or fairly interested in politics. For a description of all the other variables see the Appendix. The reported coefficients are probit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of answering that she is interested in politics, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. Robust standard errors in round brackets. Robust standard errors clustered on regions in squared brackets. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 8. Additional Determinants of *POLITICS*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mover	0.022 <i>(0.018)</i> [0.015]				0.024 <i>(0.018)</i> [0.015]
Home Owner		0.038 <i>(0.016)**</i> [0.028]			0.031 <i>(0.017)*</i> [0.027]
Urban resident			0.007 <i>(0.018)</i> [0.021]		0.010 <i>(0.019)</i> [0.022]
Left				0.038 <i>(0.015)**</i> [0.019]*	0.041 <i>(0.016)**</i> [0.021]*
Pseudo R2	0.109	0.111	0.110	0.111	0.111
Observed Prob	0.256	0.252	0.252	0.252	0.256
Predicted Prob	0.231	0.226	0.227	0.227	0.230
Number of observations	3,660	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,798

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if the individual answers that she is very or fairly interested in politics. For a description of all the other variables see the Appendix. All specifications include the additional controls listed in Column (4) of Table 7. The reported coefficients are probit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of answering that she is interested in politics, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. Robust standard errors in round brackets. Robust standard errors clustered on regions in squared brackets. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 9. Basic Determinants of ASSOCIATIONS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	0.009 (0.002)*** [0.003]***	0.008 (0.002)*** [0.003]***	0.007 (0.003)*** [0.003]**	0.007 (0.002)*** [0.002]**	0.007 (0.002)*** [0.003]**
Age squared (×100)	-0.008 (0.002)*** [0.003]***	-0.007 (0.002)*** [0.003]***	-0.007 (0.002)*** [0.003]**	-0.007 (0.002)*** [0.002]***	-0.007 (0.002)*** [0.003]***
Female	-0.037 (0.012)*** [0.017]**	-0.035 (0.012)*** [0.016]**	-0.039 (0.012)*** [0.016]**	-0.037 (0.016)** [0.012]***	-0.039 (0.012)** [0.015]**
i. Junior High School	0.024 (0.017) [0.014]*	0.019 (0.017) [0.013]	0.025 (0.017) [0.014]**	0.018 (0.013) [0.016]	0.025 (0.017) [0.014]*
ii. High School	0.073 (0.019)*** [0.017]***	0.062 (0.018)*** [0.016]***	0.058 (0.019)*** [0.016]***	0.049 (0.017)*** [0.019]***	0.057 (0.019)*** [0.019]***
iii. Bachelor Degree	0.153 (0.031)*** [0.042]***	0.125 (0.031)*** [0.036]***	0.124 (0.032)*** [0.066]**	0.095 (0.039)*** [0.032]***	0.098 (0.031)*** [0.038]***
iv. Post graduate	0.192 (0.165) [0.100]	0.152 (0.157) [0.080]*	0.123 (0.150) [0.066]**	0.147 (0.074)** [0.157]	0.149 (0.157)* [0.068]***
i. Married	-0.002 (0.017) [0.021]	-0.006 (0.017) [0.022]	-0.007 (0.017) [0.022]	-0.001 (0.021) [0.019]	-0.005 (0.021) [0.019]
ii. Separated or Widow	-0.021 (0.019) [0.022]	-0.022 (0.019) [0.022]	-0.021 (0.019) [0.022]	-0.020 (0.021) [0.020]	-0.012 (0.019) [0.020]
Family Income		0.300 (0.201) [0.233]	0.259 (0.252) [0.217]	0.296 (0.253) [0.218]	0.194 (0.199) [0.192]
Family Wealth		0.024 (0.016) [0.013]	0.023 (0.017) [0.011]**	0.022 (0.017) [0.015]	0.017 (0.016) [0.015]
i. Office worker			0.028 (0.022) [0.042]	0.030 (0.022) [0.042]	0.030 (0.021) [0.040]
ii. Junior manager/cadre			0.101 (0.050)** [0.048]**	0.103 (0.050)** [0.048]**	0.127 (0.053)*** [0.031]**
iii. Manager			0.095 (0.066)* [0.071]	0.098 (0.067)* [0.071]	0.103 (0.067)* [0.071]*
iv. Member arts or professions			0.081 (0.044)** [0.087]	0.080 (0.044)** [0.087]	0.093 (0.045)** [0.088]
v. Sole proprietor and freelance			0.027 (0.025) [0.043]	0.028 (0.025) [0.043]	0.029 (0.025) [0.042]
vi. Not employed			0.051 (0.019)*** [0.031]*	0.053 (0.019)*** [0.029]*	0.055 (0.019)*** [0.030]*
South				-0.045 (0.011)*** [0.022]*	
Regional fixed-effects	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES
Pseudo R2	0.033	0.035	0.040	0.045	0.073
Observed Prob	0.128	0.128	0.128	0.128	0.128
Predicted Prob	0.120	0.120	0.119	0.118	0.110
Number of observations	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,798

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if the individual answers that she has taken in the year before the survey an active part in gatherings of any of the following groups or associations: associations/groups involved in social, environmental, union policy, religious, cultural, sports or recreational, professional or voluntary activities. For a description of all the other variables see the Appendix. The reported coefficients are probit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of answering that she has joined groups or associations, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. Robust standard errors in round brackets. Robust standard errors clustered on regions in squared brackets. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Table 9. Additional Determinants of ASSOCIATIONS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Mover	-0.023 (0.012)* [0.010]**				-0.022 (0.012)* [0.021]
Home Owner		0.017 (0.012) [0.014]			0.007 (0.012) [0.016]
Urban resident			-0.014 (0.013) [0.024]		-0.013 (0.014) [0.025]
Left				-0.008 (0.012) [0.018]	-0.009 (0.012) [0.017]
Pseudo R2	0.047	0.046	0.046	0.045	0.047
Observed Prob	0.131	0.128	0.128	0.128	0.131
Predicted Prob	0.120	0.117	0.118	0.118	0.120
Number of observations	3,660	3,798	3,798	3,798	3,660

Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator variable taking value one if the individual answers that she has taken in the year before the survey an active part in gatherings of any of the following groups or associations: associations/groups involved in social, environmental, union policy, religious, cultural, sports or recreational, professional or voluntary activities. For a description of all the other variables see the Appendix. All specifications include the additional controls listed in Column (4) of Table 9. The reported coefficients are probit estimates of the effect of a marginal change in the corresponding regressor on the probability of answering that she has joined groups or associations, computed at the sample mean of the independent variables. Regressions are weighted to population proportions. Robust standard errors in round brackets. Robust standard errors clustered on regions in squared brackets. *significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.

Appendix. Description of the Variables

Variable	Description
CIVIC	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual considers “never justifiable” all the following situations: a) not paying for your ticket on public transport; b) keeping money that you obtained by accident when it would be possible to return it to the rightful owner; c) not leaving your name for the owner of a car you accidentally scraped while parking.
REFERRAL	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual answers that she has never asked relatives or friends and acquaintances to help her or a member of her household find work or deal with government red tape (e.g. speed up formalities).
POLITICS	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual answers that she is very or fairly interested in politics.
ASSOCIATIONS	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual has taken in the year before the survey an active part in gatherings of any of the following groups or associations: associations/groups involved in social, environmental, union policy, religious, cultural, sports or recreational, professional or voluntary activities.
Age	Individual’s age at the survey date
Female	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual is a female
Junior High School	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual has the junior high school as the highest level of education
High School	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual has the high school as the highest level of education
Bachelor Degree	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual has a bachelor degree as the highest level of education
Post graduate	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual has a post-graduate title as the highest level of education
Married	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual is married
Separated or Widow	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual is separated or widow
Family Income	Family net disposable income (millions of euros)
Family Wealth	Sum of family real assets (property, companies, and valuables), financial assets (deposits, government securities, equity, etc.), net of financial liabilities (mortgages and other debts) (millions of euros).
Office worker	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual is an office worker
Junior manager/cadre	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual is a junior manager/cadre
Manager	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual is a manager
Member of arts or professions	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual is a member of arts or professions
Sole proprietor and freelance	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual is a sole proprietor or free lance
Not employed	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual is not employed
Mover	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual actually lives in a province different from that in which he was born.
Home Owner	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual own the house where he lives.
Urban resident	Dummy variable that equals one if the individual resides in municipally that has more than 200,000 inhabitants.
Left	Dummy variable that equals one if the one of the following statements is closest to the individual opinions: - the government’s duty is to provide all citizens with as many public services as possible even if it means heavy taxes; - the government has some unavoidable expenses for social welfare, which should be covered by taxes and duties, increasing these as and when necessary. Instead, the dummy equals zero if the individual opinion is closest to one of the following statements: - taxation is too high, so if there is not enough money, expenses should be reduced by cutting back taxes; - the government should raise the bare minimum in taxes and duties to cover absolutely essential public services and leave the rest to private initiative.