

# THE YOUTH GUARANTEE: A REAL OPPORTUNITY FOR NEETS?

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## 1. Introduction

Young people have born most of the social cost of the economic and financial crisis, especially in the Southern member states of the European Union (EU), where the consequences of the recession were hard and long lasting. In Italy, the unemployment rate of people between 15 and 30 years of age has risen from about 15% in 2008 up to a historical peak of 32% in 2014. While the situation had improved in the last few years, almost 2.5 million young European people under the age of 30 were still unemployed in 2016 and 16% of them were Italians.

High and persistent youth unemployment has a negative effect for young people in terms of future employability, increased risk of poverty and social exclusion. Furthermore, high youth unemployment has a negative effect on economic growth and productivity and represents a serious economic burden for the society as a whole.

In addition to the group of young people who are unemployed (i.e. available to start work and actively seeking employment), there is another large group of young people who are further detached from the labour market, that is composed by inactive who either do not seek actively for a job, or are not available to start work or both. Taken together, the two groups ('unemployed' and 'inactive') of people aged between 15 and 30, form a distinct population called 'NEETs' (Not in Employment nor in Education or Training). The percentage of NEETs over young people aged 15-29 is 14% in the European Union as a whole but much higher in southern European countries, such as Italy, where almost one under 30 in four is NEET.

Against this background, the European Commission launched the European Youth Guarantee Initiative in 2013. The Youth Guarantee is a programme aimed at ensuring that NEET individuals under the age of 25, i.e. individuals with no education, employment or training, reactivate within a period of four months after becoming unemployed or leaving formal education. With this objective in mind, the programme guarantees that NEET individuals receive a good-quality offer of employment, education, training or internship, in order to exit the NEET condition.

This study contributes to the scarce evidence on the effects of the Youth Guarantee by providing an impact evaluation for an Italian region, Tuscany. Even though the aim of the programme is to let young people exit the NEET condition, either through the entrance into the labour market or into the education/training system, our evaluation focus only on employment outcomes. The reason for this choice lies both in the characteristics of users (mainly fresh graduates rather than early school leavers) and in the nature of the main measures provided in Tuscany within the programme (internships and matching measures account for more than 50%).

To assess the employment impact of the Youth Guarantee, we identify two different control groups of non-participants: a group of young who registered online but did not go to the PES office and a group of people signed up by the PES but not participating in the programme. We contrast the employment outcomes of these groups through statistical matching, i.e. by comparing people with similar personal characteristics and employment careers.

The effects of the programme are evaluated on different employment outcomes, but all results point to a positive and statistically significant impact of the Youth Guarantee on the working career of young people.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Youth Guarantee programme and Section 3 the literature on active labour market for young people. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy, from the identification approach to the databases used. Section 5 discusses the results and section 6 concludes.

## 2. The Youth Guarantee


The Youth Guarantee has been carried out in Italy since April 2014 and its management is in charge of the Regions through the Public Employment Service (PES) network. Italy implemented the Youth Guarantee programme extending the eligible group to include people until 30 years of age<sup>1</sup>.

Participation in the Youth Guarantee consists of different steps. First, young people must register online to show their interest in the programme. Secondly, they receive an appointment at the Public Employment Service office where they are interviewed and can formally sign up for the programme, effectively becoming participants. Finally, a number of participants are given access to active labour policies, e.g. internships, vocational training, employment support programs and community service.

Data for Tuscany shows that from April 2014 to December 2017 slightly more than 110,000 young people (aged 15–29) have joined the project, one in four NEETs. Only 75,000 of the registered users have undergone the welcome meeting, only 72,000 of them have become effective participant by signing up for the programme by a PES and about 38,000 have entered an active measure. These numbers represent only 50% of those undergoing the welcome meeting, 41% of the online registered users, and 12% of the target population<sup>2</sup>, respectively.

The analysis of users' characteristics highlights a typical profile of the participant in the Youth Guarantee programme, which is native, 20-24years old, just graduated from high school. A comparison of the features of participants with those of the target population (Graph 1) shows that the most represented profiles among users are the very young ones and the ex students; on the contrary, foreigners and inactive are infrequently treated by the programme.

**Graph 1. Participants' characteristics**



<sup>1</sup> Through the YG countries commit to assisting young people under the age of 25, within four months of becoming unemployed or leaving education. Relative to this commitment, 11 countries followed the EC's recommendation and targeted the under-25s, 15 countries extended the eligible group and implemented YG aimed at people under 30 years of age, and France and the Netherlands established age groups somewhere in between, 26 and 27 years, respectively (Escudero and Mourelo, 2017).

<sup>2</sup> The target population is represented by NEET people as estimated though the Labour Force Survey

### 3. Literature overview

The Youth Guarantee was presented as one of the most innovative labour market policies of the last few decades, offering the possibility to reform vocational training schemes, education systems and public employment services (PES) (Ilo, 2017). In fact, the YG initiative relies on active policies as the suitable means to increase youth employability and on public employment services, which are naturally pointed out as the channel to put in practice the activation strategies for NEET people. Effectively, over the past decade, activation strategies have been broadly and variously implemented by European countries in order to improve human capital, reduce labour market mismatch and increase the empowerment of young people on their real employment chances. Actually, all these functions are theoretically attributable to active policies.

Evidence on the effectiveness of active policies for young people suggests that, if well-designed, such strategies can contribute to enhance employment chances and minimising any interferences on work incentives for beneficiaries (Immervoll & Scarpetta 2012). International literature on the effectiveness of active policies for youth remains however ambiguous as proved by a recent meta-analysis on 113 evaluations: slightly more than one on three evaluations found positive effect for youth programs and, relevantly, a number of studies stress the importance of the programs, instead of single actions, in favoring better employment performances (Kluve et al. 2016). Notice finally that, given the distinctive characteristics of young unemployed, the assessment of longer term employment effects is important because the decision to come back to school is also a desirable (Caliendo et al. 2011).

Focusing on the specific Italian context, the literature about active policies for youth is actually limited by the peculiar scarcity of data. Irpet in 2014 measured the employment impact of the public offer in active policies in Tuscany and results confirmed the existence of a real "activation effect" by comparing unemployed involved or not in the PES actions; moreover, PES actions results generally more effective for very young beneficiaries and exactly for them a rapid intervention is particularly relevant: delaying 1 month in actions produces a more than proportional effect on waiting time for employment in case of young newcomers in the labour market (fresh graduates in the analysis). Generally, evaluation analysis concentrated on specific actions, such as training activities. Empirical analyses on the effectiveness of training courses highlight the higher impact of vocational courses on younger unemployed (Biewen et al. 2007; Rinne et al., 2011). For the Italian case, several analyses point to a positive and statistically significant effect of training courses on young people employment prospects (Irpet, 2011; Mazzolini and Orlando, 2014; Severati et al, 2015; Duranti and Sciclone, 2017; Mo Costabella, 2017). A recent research line investigates on the effect of interships as a specific typology of on-the-job training, eventually comparing it to traditional vocational training programs. This stream of research is particularly relevant in Italy, where internship has become a commonly used measure for young people entering the labor market. Relating to Friuli Venezia Giulia Region, Naldini et al. found a positive effect both for classroom and on-the-job training, but the effect of the second significantly exceeded the advantage of traditional courses; looking to some age heterogeneities, they found a major effect exactly for people with less than 30 years old and, specifically, for those who integrated training and work experiences. In another recent study based on the case of Umbria region, the attention is focused on a project aimed at enrolling neo-graduated into a fully-subsidized intership but less definitive effects have been proven for this sub-group of young people: participants are more likely to be employed but it is equally likely to be registered as unemployed (Ghirelli et al. 2018). Finally, a recent study on quality interships for under 30 years old people in Tuscany confirmed the advantage of trainees compared to similar unemployed and, separately, compared to other fixed-term workers; noteworthy their advantage seem persistent over within two years post experience (Cappellini et al. 2018).

Specifically regarding the Youth Guarantee initiative, it has yet to be systematically evaluated because of its recent implementation. Anyway, the first wave of the programme is already terminated and some impact evaluations have been recently launched. In particular, DARES at the French Ministry of Labour found a highest positive effect during the participation at the programme or right after completing the programme because they considered as a positive exit all types of employment (for example including interships and civic service which are both outcome and action for participants) (DARES, 2016). The real effectiveness of these measures in facilitating young people's transition into the labour market is confirmed also for pioneer countries in the activation of youth guarantee as Norway (Hardoy, 2005), England (Blundell et al., 2004) and Finland (Hämäläinen et al., 2017). Nevertheless, some studies reveals a concentration of the effects within some specific groups of beneficiaries (i.e. high skilled in Finland) or during specific phases of the program implementation (Loison-Leruste et al., 2016). As a matter of fact, it doesn't exist any comprehensive evaluation for the YG implementation in Italy and Regions are basically engaged in monitoring activities without specific evaluation criteria. The Impact Assessment Office of the Italian Senate recently conducted an impact

evaluation in two regions (Piedmont and Sardinia) by comparing the variation in employment probabilities before and after the beginning of the YG initiative in the group of eligible (15-29 years old) and non eligible (30-40 years old) subjects (difference-in-differences method). Results indicate a marginal and restricted effect on young eligible in Piedmont and none effect in Sardinia within 12 months from the registration to YG portal (Senate Impact Assessment Office, 2017).

## 4. Empirical strategy

### 4.1 Identification

We rely on counterfactual impact evaluation to identify the effect of the Youth Guarantee on young NEETs (Imbens and Rubin, 2015).

Let  $Y$  the outcome of interest, and let  $W=1$  if the young participates in the programme, while  $W=0$  if the young does not participate. Then,  $Y(1)$  is the potential outcome if participating in the Youth Guarantee and  $Y(0)$  is the potential outcome if not participating. For a given subject  $i$ , the casual effect of participating in the programme would be the difference between the two potential outcomes, i.e.  $[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)]$ . The average impact of the programme for participants, is given by the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT):

$$(1) \quad ATT = E[Y(1) - Y(0)|W = 1]$$

where  $W$  is the treatment status. However, the outcome  $Y(0)$  is not observable for a participant. To overcome this problem, in an impact evaluation the comparison group plays the role of providing a good approximation to the counterfactual outcome of treated units. The comparison group should include units as similar as possible to those exposed to the treatment with respect to all the characteristics relevant for the choice of participating in the programme.

In our analysis the “treated” are the young who have registered online for the programme and then signed up officially by a PES in the first two years of implementation, 2014 and 2015. In the case of multiple treatment (e.g. people who sign up for the Youth Guarantee twice or more)<sup>3</sup>, it was decided to consider the first one.

To compare the outcomes of treated people with those not participating in the programme, two different comparison groups were selected. A first control group is represented by young people registering online for the Youth Guarantee in 2014 and 2015 without signing up for the programme by the Public Employment Service; in this case the starting date for the analysis of employment outcomes is the date of online registration. A second control group is represented by young people that, in the same period of implementation of the Youth Guarantee, have signed up for the Public Employment Service without participating in the programme; in this case, the starting date for the analysis of employment outcomes is the date in which the young has signed up for the Youth Guarantee (treated group) or to the Public Employment Service (control group).

The counterfactual impact analysis is based on matching, a methodology frequently used in impact evaluation studies because it does not need to specify a particular parametric relation between the outcome and the covariates. Moreover, a matching procedure reduces the number of not treated to a sub-sample (selected controls) with characteristics similar to those of the treated individuals. A strong assumption of matching methods is represented by the CIA (Conditional Independence Assumption), assuming that treated and control units with the same observable characteristics are randomly assigned to the programme. For the CIA to be plausible, it is necessary to choose a set of variables simultaneously influencing the participation in the programme and the employment outcome. For example, socio-demographic characteristics and the previous working career are important to capture factors that determine individual employment prospects. Our data contain a variety of such information, as described in Section 4.3. Moreover, our data allows us to have access to the employment history for each individual, which can incorporate information about unobserved variables not included in datasets, such as motivation and attitudes; for this reason, conditioning on past labour market outcomes is crucial for the CIA to hold (Heckman et al., 1998). Furthermore, regional labour market

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<sup>3</sup> In the period considered (2014 and 2015) the percentage of young people who signed up for the programme twice or more is 3,6%.

characteristics play an important role for employment prospects; we include in our dataset the area of residence, distinguishing between areas of crisis and other areas. Altogether, it is quite plausible that once we condition on this rich set of variables, the conditional independence assumption will hold, and thus there will not be any additional variable which jointly influence the participation decision and the outcome variable.

There are mainly two kind of matching estimators: matching on covariates and propensity score matching<sup>4</sup> (see Stuart, 2010 for a review). In this study we rely on the matching on covariates. In particular, the procedure makes use of a distance measure between the covariate vector  $\mathbf{x}$  of the treated individuals and those of the control individuals to define, for each treated unit, one or more similar not treated units. The advantage of this procedure is that matching is exact on some characteristics, leaving the matching on covariates distance only for some variables. In the case of first time jobseekers, the matching has been implemented on some covariates (age, citizenship, gender, area of residence, year and month of registration, number of past registrations as unemployed by the PES, days worked in the last year), after an exact matching on age classes<sup>5</sup>. In the case of unemployed with previous work experiences, the exact matching has been on a dummy indicating whether the young has worked as a seasonal worker and on a categorical variable indicating the last sector of activity; then, a matching on some covariates (age, citizenship, gender, area of residence, year and month of registration, last occupation<sup>6</sup>, days worked in the last year, number of previous registrations by the PES) has been conducted. Matching is done only with the nearest neighbour according to the distance measure used<sup>7</sup>; thus, not all controls are used, but only the subsample of not treated individuals more similar to the treated ones.

As already said in the introduction, our evaluation focus on employment outcomes. The main outcome of interest is the employment status of young people after 3, 6, 9, 12 and 18 month; therefore, we use different indicators, taking on the value 1 if the unemployed has been hired, after 3, 6, 9, 12 and 18 months respectively, and zero otherwise. As alternative outcome variables taking into account more qualitative aspects of employment, we chose: start of a job lasting at least 9 months, start of an open-ended job and the number of days worked after the end of the course. Finally, we use a measure of persistence, that is the monthly probability of being employed (a young is considered employed if he/she is working at least 5 days as an employee) in that month.

## 4.2 Data

Data used in the impact evaluation of the Youth Guarantee come from three different types of administrative data gathered by PES.

The primary source of data is the database of the Active labour policies of the Region of Tuscany. The dataset contains information on all people registering online to the Youth Guarantee: personal characteristics (sex, age, nationality, education level) and possible steps of participation (guidance, active labour market policies).

A second database contains information on jobseekers signed up by a Public Employment Service, from which we select the “control group” for the counterfactual analysis. In this database we also find people signed up for Youth Guarantee (56% of the total).

The third source of data is represented by the Compulsory Communications System of administrative data on employment dynamics, which record all the activations, transformations, fixed-term extensions and anticipated terminations of employment relationships between any worker and employer since the beginning of 2008.

Merging labour market administrative data with the first two aforementioned databases it is possible to check the employment outcomes of both treated and controls and to reconstruct their previous work history. A limitation of the

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<sup>4</sup> In propensity score matching, individuals are matched using a single index, the propensity score,  $p(X)$ , that is, the probability of participating in the programme with respect to all continuous and categorical covariates available in the dataset. The matching is done on the basis of the distance between the propensity scores of treated and controls individuals. In this case, no exact matching is done.

<sup>5</sup> Age classes are: less than 18, between 18 and 20, between 21 and 25, more than 25.

<sup>6</sup> Despite being categorical, this variable was used as a continuous one, giving it an ordinal value starting from intellectual professions down to unskilled occupations.

<sup>7</sup> Multiple matching is allowed when more controls have the same distance from one treated.

joined data set is the lack of information on self-employment: placement rates are therefore net of activation as self-employed.

### 4.3 Descriptive statistics

The group of participants counts 37,278 people, 16,733 with previous work experience and 20,545 first time jobseekers.

The first control group, taken from database of the Active labour policies of the Region of Tuscany and represented by people registering online for the programme without signing up by the Public Employment Service, counts 10,118 people, 3,889 with previous work experience and 6,229 first time jobseekers.

The second control group, represented by jobseekers signed up by a Public Employment Service but not for the Youth Guarantee, contains 45,863 people, 29,944 with previous work experience and 15,919 first time jobseekers.

Tables 2 and 3 show the main descriptive statistics of outcome and control variables, separately for the treated and the two control groups. In both comparisons, the employment prospects of participants are higher than those of non-participants. However, descriptive statistics show that treated and controls differ significantly in some important characteristics. For this reason, we will use matching procedures in order to compare employment outcomes of similar individuals which differ only in the exposure to treatment.

**Table 1. Descriptive statistics on control and outcome variables: first time jobseekers**

	Treated*		Controls	
	Participants	Young registered online	Young signed up by PES	
Age	21	24	22	
% females	47%	52%	47%	
% native	87%	90%	68%	
% living in crisis areas	14%	7%	12%	
% hired within 3 months	32%	14%	20%	
% hired within 6 months	41%	19%	26%	
% hired within 9 months	47%	22%	32%	
% hired within 12 months	51%	25%	36%	
% hired within 18 months	58%	30%	42%	
% with an open ended contract	30%	14%	21%	
% working at least 9 months	29%	13%	18%	
Days worked	166	77	110	

\* These descriptive statistics are estimated starting from the date when the young has signed up for the Youth Guarantee.

**Table 2. Descriptive statistics on control and outcome variables: unemployed with previous work experiences**

	Treated		Controls	
	Participants	Young registered online	Young signed up by PES	
Age	25	25	26	
% females	51%	53%	50%	
% native	91%	89%	74%	
% living in crisis areas	15%	11%	14%	
% seasonal workers	5%	6%	10%	
Days worked in the last year	118	132	220	
Number of registration by the PES	1,16	1,18	1,60	
Previous sector of activity: agriculture	3%	3,68	4%	
Previous sector of activity: manufacturing	19%	12,06	16%	
Previous sector of activity: personal services (including retail)	54%	40,73	37%	
Previous sector of activity: other services	12%	15,02	15%	
No job in the previous year	11%	28,52	27%	
% hired within 3 months	51%	36%	29%	
% hired within 6 months	65%	50%	45%	
% hired within 9 months	73%	57%	59%	
% hired within 12 months	77%	63%	65%	
% hired within 18 months	83%	70%	72%	
% with an open ended contract	58%	48%	53%	
% working at least 9 months	47%	35%	36%	
Days worked	261	200	206	

\* These descriptive statistics are estimated starting from the date when the young has signed up for the Youth Guarantee.

## 5. Results

After the application of matching procedures, individual characteristics are well balanced between treated and control units as show in the Appendix. Thus, under the CIA assumption, we can estimate the ATT as the difference between the employment outcomes of the treated and those of the controls. Results of the analyses are presented separately for first time jobseekers and unemployed with previous work experiences.

Results show that the Youth Guarantee has a positive effect on the probability of young people of being hired within 3, 6, 9, 12 and 18 months since the online registration. Contrasting the employment probability of participants in the Youth Guarantee with that of non participants signed up by the PES provides similar results, confirming the higher impact for first time jobseekers.

To take into account more qualitative aspects of employment, other outcome variables have been used: start of a job lasting at least 9 months, start of an open-ended job<sup>8</sup> and days worked. The use of these variables is very relevant due to the fact that a substantial proportion of participants gets a hiring thanks to two measures proposed the Youth Guarantee's path and partly financed with the program's resources: internship and matching measures by private placement agencies. The first measure lasts generally 6 months and the second one entitles the agency to a refund only

<sup>8</sup> The apprenticeship contract is considered open-ended.

in case of contracts lasting at least 6 months. Using the aforementioned outcome variables allows to assess if the effectiveness of the programme persists after the end of these “strong” measures. Results confirm the positive effect of the Youth Guarantee on young people’s working career.

**Table 3. Average treatment effects on the treated (ATTS): participants vs registered online for the programme**

		ATT	Std.Err.	z P>z
Unemployed with previous work experience	Probability of being hired within 3 months	0,09	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 6 months	0,12	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 9 months	0,13	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 12 months	0,13	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 18 months	0,12	0,01	0,00
	Days worked	46,55	4,69	0,00
	Probability of being with an open ended contract	0,09	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being working at least 9 months	0,08	0,01	0,00
First time jobseers	Probability of being hired within 3 months	0,11	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 6 months	0,14	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 9 months	0,17	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 12 months	0,17	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 18 months	0,19	0,01	0,00
	Days worked	61,90	4,37	0,00
	Probability of being with an open ended contract	0,11	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being working at least 9 months	0,11	0,01	0,00

**Table 4. Average treatment effects on the treated (ATTS): participants vs signed up by the PES but not to the Youth Guarantee**


		ATT	Std.Err.	z P>z
Unemployed with previous work experience	Probability of being hired within 3 months	0,20	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 6 months	0,19	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 9 months	0,16	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 12 months	0,15	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 18 months	0,14	0,01	0,00
	Days worked	67,22	3,07	0,00
	Probability of being with an open ended contract	0,11	0,01	0,00
	Probability of being working at least 9 months	0,13	0,01	0,00
First time jobseers	Probability of being hired within 3 months	0,10	0,02	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 6 months	0,11	0,02	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 9 months	0,13	0,02	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 12 months	0,14	0,02	0,00
	Probability of being hired within 18 months	0,12	0,02	0,00
	Days worked	47,37	7,85	0,00
	Probability of being with an open ended contract	0,09	0,02	0,00
	Probability of being working at least 9 months	0,09	0,02	0,00

Finally, we use an outcome variable which takes into account the persistence of the Youth Guarantee’s effect on young people careers. In particular, Graphs 5 and 6 show the probability of being employed<sup>9</sup> for the participants and the corresponding counterfactual probability, estimated on the basis of the employment outcomes of similar subjects who only registered online for the Programme. The difference is positive and statistically significant from the first to the eighteenth month after the online registration, confirming that participation in the Youth Guarantee guarantees greater employment opportunities even after the conclusion of the actions financed by the Programme itself.


<sup>9</sup> A young is considered employed if he/she is working at least 5 days as an employee.



**Graph 5. Employment probability of first time jobseekers: participants vs registered online for the programme**




**Graph 6. Employment probability of unemployed with previous work experience: participants vs registered online for the programme**




The difference in the probability of being employed is also confirmed by Graph 7 and 8, in which the comparison is made with non participants signed up by the PES but not to the programme. A greater effect on first time jobseekers compared to unemployed with previous work experience is confirmed by both comparisons.

**Graph 7. Employment probability of first time jobseekers: participants vs signed up by the PES**



**Graph 8. Employment probability of unemployed with previous work experience: participants vs signed up by the PES**



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## APPENDIX

**Tab. A.1 Assessing balance improvements after covariates matching between participants and non participants previously registered online for the programme. First time jobseekers**

	Standardized differences		Variance ratio	
	Raw	Matched	Raw	Matched
Month of registration	0,07	0,02	1,05	1,09
Year of registration	0,32	0,15	1,22	1,33
Age	-0,30	-0,07	0,94	0,95
% females	-0,01	0,01	1,00	1,00
% native	0,46	0,00	0,53	1,01
% living in crisis areas	0,06	0,00	1,14	1,01
Days worked in the last year	0,03	0,02	0,58	1,06
Number of registration by the PES	-0,16	0,00	0,23	1,00

**Tab. A.2 Assessing balance improvements after covariates matching between participants and non participants previously registered online for the programme. Unemployed with previous work experiences**

	Standardized differences		Variance ratio	
	Raw	Matched	Raw	Matched
Month of registration	0,07	0,01	1,05	1,03
Year of registration	0,30	0,00	0,91	1,00
Age	-0,13	-0,02	0,98	1,09
% females	-0,03	-0,01	1,00	1,00
% native	0,08	0,00	0,80	1,01
% living in crisis areas	0,12	0,02	1,31	1,04
Days worked in the last year	-0,01	0,03	0,92	1,12
Number of registration by the PES	0,06	0,05	1,29	1,26

**Tab. A.3 Assessing balance improvements after covariates matching between participants and non participants signed up by the PES . First time jobseekers**

	Standardized differences		Variance ratio	
	Raw	Matched	Raw	Matched
Month of registration	0,07	0,02	1,05	1,09
Year of registration	0,32	0,15	1,22	1,33
Age	-0,30	-0,07	0,94	0,95
% females	-0,01	0,01	1,00	1,00
% native	0,46	0,00	0,53	1,01
% living in crisis areas	0,06	0,00	1,14	1,01
Days worked in the last year	0,03	0,02	0,58	1,06
Number of registration by the PES	-0,16	0,00	0,23	1,00

**Tab. A.4 Assessing balance improvements after covariates matching between participants and non participants signed up by the PES. Unemployed with previous work experiences**

	Standardized differences		Variance ratio	
	Raw	Matched	Raw	Matched
Month of registration	-0,16	-0,03	1,03	1,06
Year of registration	0,37	0,16	1,51	1,78
Age	-0,41	-0,01	0,87	0,96
% females	0,03	0,00	1,00	1,00
% native	0,47	0,00	0,41	1,00
% living in crisis areas	0,02	0,00	1,04	1,00
Days worked in the last year	-0,79	-0,03	0,85	0,98
Number of registration by the PES	-0,61	0,00	0,29	1,04