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The Scarring Effects of the China Shock*

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Abstract

Using rich Italian administrative employer–employee data, this paper examines early career trajectories and finds that the burden of rising import competition falls disproportionately on labour market entrants. Individuals entering in more exposed sectors work fewer weeks, are more likely to work part-time, receive lower overall remuneration, and display a higher probability of moving toward autonomous work and of switching firms. Results also reveal that entrants exposed to higher import competition face a higher risk of injuries, particularly during non-standard hours such as overtime and night shifts. These persistent effects point to lasting scarring, consistent with evidence for cohorts facing adverse entry conditions, suggesting that workers may become trapped in tasks with limited growth and learning opportunities. The findings suggest that firms respond to import competition by reorganizing production toward more flexible arrangements, adjusting along the intensive margin and increasing the use of flexible work schedules, with implications for workplace safety.

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1 Introduction

Since the seminal paper by Autor et al. (2013), a burgeoning literature has studied the multiple effects of China’s accession to the WTO in different countries. Remarkably, while the estimated employment effects of import competition (IC) in the US are quite strong and negative, they are relatively small in labor markets with greater employment protection, leading to quite different results of similar analyses conducted in the US or Europe (Citino and Linarello, 2022; Aghelmaleki et al., 2022). In European countries with stricter employment protection, adjustment to import competition appears to occur less through job loss among incumbent workers and more through reduced transitions into employment, leaving the unemployed and labor market entrants more exposed to the shock (Aghelmaleki et al., 2022). Consistent with this pattern, Dauth et al. (2017) show that employment declines in import-exposed German manufacturing sectors are driven primarily by young entrants and returnees from non-employment rather than by incumbent workers’ direct displacement.

Despite this evidence, most worker-level studies of import competition, following Autor et al. (2014), focus on relatively mature and strongly attached workers and exploit variation in trade exposure based on their initial industry of employment. While this strategy provides a credible source of exogenous variation, it leaves largely unexplored the effects on individuals who were not yet firmly attached to the labor market when the shock unfolded. This omission is particularly relevant in contexts where adjustment occurs mainly through reduced hiring, as the burden of the shock is likely to fall disproportionately on jobseekers and, especially, on labor market entrants (Aghelmaleki et al., 2022; Dauth et al., 2017).

Neglecting these effects on the career prospects of labor market entrants may lead to a distorted assessment of the overall impact of import competition on this particularly vulnerable group, especially in light of the extensive literature documenting the long-term consequences of unfavourable entry conditions on young workers’ careers (see, among others, Oyer, 2006; Kahn, 2010; Genda et al., 2010; Oreopoulos et al., 2012; Brunner and Kuhn, 2014; Schwandt and Von Wachter, 2019; Wachter, 2020; Bentolila et al., 2022). This literature tends to document long-term “scarring” effects of entering the labour market under adverse macroeconomic conditions - typically high unemployment rates - primarily in terms of wage and

career penalties.

In this paper, we adapt the “scarring effects” approach to examine the impact of import competition on the career prospects of labor market entrants. We argue that unfavourable entry conditions may originate not only from fluctuations in the economic cycle but also from structural transformations in international trade, such as the intensification of import competition from low-wage countries. We expect both types of adverse shocks to have pecuniary and employment consequences, as both limit the employment opportunities for labor market entrants. Yet, import competition can be argued to exert stronger cost pressure on firms than economic downturns. As such, the “scarring” effects of import competition may differ from those arising from recessions. Moreover, the findings by Leombruni et al. (2019) on the health effects of entering the labor market during downturns, and the studies documenting the health and safety impacts of import competition (Adda and Fawaz, 2020; McManus and Schaur, 2016; D’Ambrosio et al., 2025; Filomena et al., 2024) lead us to expect that the scarring effects of import competition may also concern broader job quality outcomes such as workplace health and safety.

Our results confirm that joining the labor market during “the China shock” bears similar, although distinct, negative “scarring” effects as joining the labor market during an economic downturn. Individuals accessing the labor market in times of high import competition tend to work fewer weeks, have a higher probability of working part-time, enjoy lower overall remuneration, have a higher probability of moving towards autonomous work, and a higher probability of moving to a different firm, which is driven by movements within the same 6-digit industry. Consistent with this, starting a working career in times of high import competition also predicts lower future attachment to the first employer, as indicated by the lower predicted tenure. Moreover, our results show that entering the labor market during times of high import competition deteriorates workers’ safety conditions, driving a greater injury risk that holds for overall injuries, severe injuries, and nighttime injuries. Remarkably, these effects generally display self-reinforcing dynamics over time.

These findings suggest that workers facing high import competition at entry get entrapped in tasks with limited growth and learning opportunities, as already shown for entrants encountering adverse entry conditions (Leombruni et al., 2019). We attribute these effects to the

more limited accumulation of task-specific human capital among those workers. Starting their career in firms facing severe threats to survival limits their opportunities for skill development, resulting in persistent career scars - a mechanism closely related to the human-capital framework of Gibbons and Waldman (2006b). Brunner and Kuhn (2014) have described similar dynamics for recession entrants in Austria, who are more likely to start their careers in lower-quality firms or occupations, with this initial job assignment causing much of the subsequent long-run wage penalty. Arellano-Bover (2022) shows that individuals entering the labor market during downturns display significantly lower cognitive skills in adulthood, consistent with weaker learning opportunities at the start of their careers.

We identify the above results along with the more established estimates of the “scarring” effects of recessions, showing that the two concern partially different realms. In general, the scarring effects of recessions are larger in magnitude than the effects of import competition with regard to the pecuniary outcomes, but import competition imposes a more significant toll on the workplace safety of labor market entrants. For instance, a higher unemployment rate at entry consistently increases the risk of unemployment and the number of working contracts, which are both unaffected by import competition. In contrast, conditional on the effects of import competition, unemployment is not found to affect injury rates. This suggests that, while recessions reduce the demand for firms’ products, leaving them with limited scope to reorganize production, import competition pushes firms to adapt production to remain competitive through more flexible production schedules and work arrangements, with differentiated impacts on working conditions.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets the theoretical framework for our analysis. 3 introduces our data sources and variable choices. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents our baseline results, while section 6 studies the heterogeneity in our results. Section 8 discusses broader implications of our results and concludes the paper. Additional analyses and robustness checks are provided in Appendix A.

2 Related literature

The case of the “China shock” is one instance of a major competitive shock, allowing to investigate firms’ coping strategies. The seminal contributions by Autor et al. (2013, 2014) have unveiled the substantial welfare implications of China’s access to the WTO on advanced economies, focusing on the losers of trade liberalization. Studying its implications for labor market entrants contributes to enriching the understanding of how trade liberalization reshapes production systems and alters the quality of jobs and working conditions available to workers.

At the firm level, import competition from low-wage countries is very likely to trigger a selection process. Consistent with the standard Melitz-type framework (Melitz, 2003), stronger import competition drives less productive, and potentially less safe, firms out of the market, reallocating production and employment toward more productive firms that are better able to withstand foreign competition. For instance, relatively productive firms can respond to import competition by raising quality, rather than competing on costs, thereby sustaining higher margins. The long-run reallocation of production towards more productive firms could eventually lead, via rent-sharing, to higher wages, safer workplaces, and improved working conditions.¹ Lai et al. (2022) document that greater exposure to import competition drives a compositional shift towards safer occupations, exit of riskier firms, and a reallocation of employment towards safer production structures. Hence, due to firm selection, new entrants may eventually face a smaller but, on average, safer set of potential employers.

Empirical evidence for Europe broadly supports the idea that stronger competitive pressure increases firm exit in more exposed industries (Coucke and Sleuwaegen, 2008; Greenaway et al., 2008). In many cases, large firms appear more vulnerable, likely due to their greater exposure to international markets, whereas smaller firms tend to be relatively more sheltered (Colantone et al., 2015)². However, this pattern is not uniform: evidence from Germany shows that increased exposure to Chinese imports raises plant closures, particularly among older establishments, while larger plants are comparatively less likely to exit (Hauptmann

¹As shown by Hamermesh (1999) and Hwang et al. (1992), if workplace amenities are a normal good, workers are willing to trade part of their wage increase for better working conditions.

²The authors examine a broader set of European countries, including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK

and Schmerer, 2020). At the same time, these forces do not only lead to contraction. Firms may also adapt by engaging in technological upgrading, which helps mitigate exit risks and sustain performance (Bloom, 2011; Rigby et al., 2017), although such adjustments often come with reductions in employment and earnings, especially among younger and lower-paid workers (De Lyon and Pessoa, 2021).

Focusing on Italy, Fiorio et al. (2023)³ find that rising Chinese import penetration modestly increases firm exit probabilities⁴, with heterogeneous effects across firms. Larger firms experience stronger declines in employment, wage bills, and the share of blue-collar workers, as well as higher exit probabilities.⁵ At the worker level, adjustment occurs mainly through mobility rather than employment loss: workers in more exposed sectors are more likely to move across sectors—primarily within manufacturing—and, to a lesser extent, to transition to services, public employment, or self-employment. These transitions often entail a deterioration in job quality and gradual earnings losses, even though total weeks worked remain largely unaffected.

In the shorter run, however, firms trying to adjust to competition may seek to contain production costs by reducing their demand for less-skilled workers (Bloom et al., 2016), requiring greater labour flexibility, and reducing workplace amenities. Competitive pressures can force not only relatively unproductive, but even relatively productive firms to compress production costs, including labor costs. Firms may achieve labor cost reductions by adjusting the intensive or extensive margin.

Adjustments on the extensive margin concern the dismissal of less productive workers or their replacement with labor-saving technologies.⁶ In countries with stringent EPL, a high degree of protection for permanent and regular workers makes it difficult for firms to adjust their headcount, contributing to a dual labor market structure: firms maintain a stable core

³The authors use matched employer-employee administrative data covering the period 2001–2016.

⁴A one-standard-deviation increase in exposure reduces firm survival by about 1.8 percentage points.

⁵The effect of import penetration on firm exit probabilities is similar in absolute terms for both small and large firms. However, since small firms have a lower baseline survival rate, the relative increase in exit risk (expressed as a percentage of the mean) is about 1.1 percentage points larger for large firms. The authors interpret this pattern as reflecting structural characteristics of the Italian production system, where small firms are more flexible, face less stringent labor market regulations, and may operate in specialized niches that make them more resilient to international competition.

⁶Unfortunately, our data do not contain information on firms’ investments, hence we cannot further disentangle these dynamics.

workforce, while relying on temporary work or subcontracted labor that can be easily adapted to changing market conditions (OECD, 2012; Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Boeri, 2011; Cahuc et al., 2016). Consequently, while incumbents' employment is largely insulated from shocks, temporary or subcontracted workers bear the burden of the adjustment. Consistent with this view, Aghelmaleki et al. (2022) show that, in European countries with stricter employment protection, incumbent workers are largely shielded from job losses caused by Chinese import competition, while adjustment occurs primarily along the hiring margin, with unemployed workers and labour market entrants facing greater difficulties in finding employment.

A second way to cope with competitive pressures involves adjusting the intensive margin of labor. Firms facing the erosion of their profit margins may attempt to increase labor productivity, requiring a higher work intensity by the same or similar salary levels, or cutting on non-pecuniary amenities such as training, fringe benefits, or workplace safety.⁷ As a result, firms' demand for overtime and atypical work schedules, such as weekend- or night work, may increase, whereas safety and training investments may decrease (McManus and Schaur, 2016; Filomena et al., 2024; D'Ambrosio et al., 2025; Alvarez et al., 2025). To the extent that firms can exert monopsony power, adjustments along the intensive margin and through non-pecuniary working conditions may affect both vulnerable groups of workers and comparatively protected workers, for whom adjustments on the extensive margin are costly.

As a matter of fact, a rather broad body of evidence suggests that negative trade shocks deteriorate workers' health.⁸ While not arguing for an adjustment on working conditions or occupational injury risk, Autor et al. (2014) show that workers exposed to import competition face larger earning losses and a higher likelihood of receiving Social Security Disability Insurance against physical or mental impairment, especially when they have weak or intermittent labor market attachment. McManus and Schaur (2016) shows that import competition from low-income countries significantly raises workplace injury and illness rates in the US, especially in smaller establishments, suggesting that firms under competitive pressure re-

⁷This kind of adjustment has been discussed for firms coping with increased labor costs associated with minimum wages. See, e.g., (Clemens, 2021).

⁸Blanton and Peksen (2017) analyze panel data for 137 countries (1970–2010) and show that higher levels of economic globalisation are associated with an increased incidence of major industrial accidents, often involving fatalities and severe injuries among workers.

duce safety investments and that workers face higher stress levels. Adda and Fawaz (2020) show that rising import competition from China increases mortality rates and worsens both physical and mental health, particularly among low-skilled manufacturing workers.

Further evidence from mental health studies clarifies the mechanisms underlying these adverse effects. Colantone et al. (2019) show that greater exposure to Chinese imports worsens mental health outcomes, increasing psychological distress and depression, effects primarily driven by labor market adjustments, including lower employment, reduced earnings, and higher job insecurity. The impact is highly heterogeneous: it is stronger for low-skilled, younger, and lower-income individuals, as well as for workers employed in more exposed sectors. Moreover, adverse effects are larger in regions with a higher initial concentration in manufacturing, highlighting the role of local labor market exposure.

In light of these considerations, the Italian case appears particularly interesting. The Italian labour market is characterised by downward wage rigidity and contractual minimum wages set by national collective bargaining agreements. Worker-level studies show limited effects of import competition on employment and earnings for incumbent, labor-market-attached workers (Citino and Linarello, 2022; Fiorio et al., 2023; D’Ambrosio et al., 2025), and positive, though relatively short-lived, effects on workplace injuries (D’Ambrosio et al., 2025). In contrast, Filomena et al. (2024) find that provinces more exposed to import competition experience persistently higher workplace injuries, which they interpret as resulting from increased work intensity and reduced safety investments under stronger competitive pressure. Taken together, these results suggest that the province-level increases in injury rates are driven by compositional effects and that individuals at the beginning of their careers may experience significantly worse effects than incumbents. In a context where wage adjustment is limited, adverse shocks affecting these more vulnerable workers may instead be transmitted through non-pecuniary job attributes, such as workplace safety. Consistent with this mechanism, Leombruni et al. (2019) show that when wages are downward rigid, negative shocks faced by entrants may be transmitted to workplace safety.⁹

⁹Matano et al. (2023) document a reduction in contractual minimum wages following increased imports, but no significant impacts on total wages. See also Leombruni et al. (2013), who show that displaced workers, when wage adjustment is constrained, tend to absorb adverse shocks through deteriorating workplace safety conditions.

Based on the above considerations, the new cohorts of labor market entrants, being among the most vulnerable groups in the labor market and facing limited outside options, will arguably face worse working conditions, well-being, and health when starting their careers in a context of high import competition. Importantly, the literature on the “scarring effects” of recessions suggests that initially bad conditions tend to worsen over time. Entering the labor market during periods of high unemployment bears negative implications for pecuniary and employment outcomes (e.g., Oyer, 2006; Oreopoulos et al., 2012; Schwandt and Von Wachter, 2019), but can also be detrimental for physical and mental health (Maclean, 2013), as well as workplace safety (Leombruni et al., 2019). This is because workers starting their career during recessions are persistently locked into low-quality jobs characterised by higher exposure to hazardous tasks, and they may underreport minor accidents due to weaker bargaining positions within firms (Leombruni et al., 2019). Hence, two related aspects merit further investigation. First, whether the positive association between import competition and workplace injuries observed at the provincial level by Filomena et al. (2024) is driven by new cohorts of labour market entrants. Second, whether the increase in injuries among entrants is both stronger and more persistent than that observed for incumbent workers by D’Ambrosio et al. (2025).

3 Data

This study employs the WHIP-SALUTE administrative dataset, which represents a 1:30 random sample of Italian employees. The dataset links individual employment histories from the Italian Social Security Authority (INPS) with records on workplace injuries collected by the Italian Workers’ Compensation Authority (INAIL). The INPS component provides detailed longitudinal information on each employment spell, including start and end dates, annual weeks worked, and earnings. In addition, the data report contract characteristics - such as part-time or full-time status - and occupational classifications, as well as individual-level demographic information, including age, place of birth, and gender. The dataset further includes firm-level characteristics, such as industry affiliation at the six-digit level, firm location by province, firm size measured by the number of employees, and the years of firm

establishment and closure.

We employ the information contained in the INPS administrative records to study the effects of import competition on employment-related outcomes, and the linked INAIL dataset for the analysis of health outcomes. The INAIL records contain detailed information on workplace injuries resulting in at least three days of work absence. Specifically, these data report the date and time of the injury, the duration of the subsequent leave, and detailed medical descriptions. Taken together, these data allow us to study different adjustment mechanisms to increased import competition. Contract types information from the INPS records, combined with INAIL data on injuries occurring during overtime and nighttime work, enables the analysis of adjustments along the intensive margin of employment. Moreover, the distinction between severe injuries requiring immediate medical care and non-severe injuries makes it possible to account for the potential under-reporting of less severe incidents. Indeed, as documented by previous research, adverse economic conditions-such as heightened exposure to import competition-may reduce workers' bargaining power and lead to selective under-reporting of minor workplace injuries (Boone and Van Ours, 2006; Boone et al., 2011; Leombruni et al., 2019).

Our sample consists of workers whose first job in the manufacturing sector was between 1994 and 2006, allowing for a symmetric observation window of six years before and after China's entry into the WTO.¹⁰ We follow the careers of these workers regardless of whether they remain in manufacturing or not.

We collect data on pecuniary, employment, and safety outcomes at the individual-year level. Safety outcomes capture the total number of workplace injuries experienced by a worker within a given year and distinguish among all injuries, immediate-care injuries, and injuries occurring during non-standard hours (i.e., those taking place between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. or during weekends, classified as nighttime or overtime incidents). Workplace safety outcomes are expressed as rates, obtained by normalizing the number of injuries of every type by exposure, measured in effective weeks worked.

Pecuniary outcomes are constructed by aggregating all employment spells held by an

¹⁰As explained in Section 4, the final entry year is data-driven, as injury records are available only up to 2012.

individual within the year. For these outcomes, we use the natural logarithm, allowing estimated coefficients to be interpreted as percentage changes.

Following Autor et al. (2014), we measure import competition as follows:

$$IP_{j,t}^{ITA} = \frac{M_{ITA,j,t}}{Y_{ITA,j,1994} + M_{ITA,j,1994} - X_{ITA,j,1994}}$$

where the numerator $M_{ITA,j,t}$ measures the level of imports from China in sector j and year t , and the denominator $Y_{j,1994} + M_{j,1994} - X_{j,1994}$ captures domestic absorption in sector j in the pre-shock year 1994, defined as domestic production plus total imports minus exports. Thus, by normalizing contemporaneous Chinese imports by pre-shock domestic absorption, $IP_{j,t}^{ITA}$ captures the intensity of import competition faced by Italian producers in sector j relative to the sector’s initial size. Using a pre-determined denominator mitigates concerns that sectoral adjustment to import shocks mechanically affects the exposure measure.

To construct our import competition measure, we draw on two principal data sources. First, we use the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT 4) for value-added output, which provides a benchmark for domestic output in each industry. This dataset offers a comprehensive view of production activity, enabling us to quantify the scale of national manufacturing prior to the trade shocks. Second, we rely on the UN COMTRADE Database to obtain industry-specific import data, including bilateral flows from China into Italy. By combining these high-resolution measures of domestic production and import volumes, we can compute shifts in import penetration over the relevant time horizon.

The value-added statistics from UNIDO form the baseline for our estimate of the local industry size, while the trade flows extracted from COMTRADE capture the intensification of foreign competition at a disaggregated level. Merging these data with our worker-level administrative records on wages, injuries, and employment spells allows us to assess how increasing import pressures reshape both pecuniary outcomes (e.g. earnings and employment) and non-pecuniary job attributes (e.g. injury rates and work intensity). In particular, we attribute the level of import competition to individual workers through the 4-digit industry in which they were working in the year they entered the labor market. If an individual held multiple jobs in that period, we focus on the position where they earned most of their income.

4 Specification

In our analysis, we employ a specification that is widely adopted in the study of the impact of initial labor market conditions at entry (Wachter, 2020). This approach has been used in studies analyzing the effects of unfavorable entry conditions for college graduates, such as Oyer (2006), Kondo (2007), Kahn (2010), Oreopoulos et al. (2012), Bentolila et al. (2022).

The same empirical framework has also been applied in works focusing on workers with lower or heterogeneous levels of education and on several labor market outcomes (see among others Raaum and Røed, 2006; Genda et al., 2010; Kwon et al., 2010; Brunner and Kuhn, 2014; Leombruni et al., 2019; Schwandt and Von Wachter, 2019; Wachter, 2020).

Our baseline specification is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y_{it} = & \alpha + \sum_{s=1}^S \beta_s \mathbf{I}[Exp_{it} = s] \\
 & + \gamma_0 IP_{ij0} + \sum_{s=1}^S \gamma_s \mathbf{I}[Exp_{it} = s] \times IP_{ij0} \\
 & + \delta_0 UR_{ij0} + \sum_{s=1}^S \delta_s \cdot \mathbf{I}[Exp_{it} = s] \times UR_{ij0} \\
 & + \eta UR_t + \mathbf{X}_i \theta + \tau_l + \rho_p + \varsigma_d + \lambda_t + \varepsilon_{it}
 \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

We consider different labour outcomes as our dependent variable Y_{it} . The vector of dependent variables considered includes different types of injury rates, weekly earnings, and the total number of weeks worked or tenure. We also use as dependent variables the probability of changing industry, measured at different digit levels. Additional dependent variables include contract type (permanent or temporary, part-time or full-time), employment status and the type of work (self-employed or quasi-subordinate).

On the right-hand side, we include the following regressors. Exp_{it} denotes the years of potential labor market experience of individual i , and $\mathbf{I}[Exp_{it} = s]$ are dummy variables for each year of potential labor market experience. IP_{ij0} is the level of import penetration in the four-digit industry of entry in the year of entry, and UR_{ij0} is the unemployment rate in the province and year of entry. The interactions between the dummy variables for each year of potential labor market experience and IP_{ij0} (or UR_{ij0}) are intended to capture the

dynamic effect of the level of import penetration in the four-digit industry of entry (or of the unemployment rate at entry) over years of potential labor market experience.

As in Oreopoulos et al. (2012), some specifications include the contemporaneous unemployment rate UR_t to account for the possible persistence of unemployment during recessions. X_i is a vector of dummy variables for area of birth, gender, age at entry (five-year groups), qualification at entry (apprentice, blue collar, white collar, middle manager, manager), firm size at entry, small-firm at entry, and part-time status at entry. The specification further includes a full set of fixed effects: τ_l for year of labor market entry, ρ_p for province of entry, ς_d for four-digit industry of entry, and λ_t for calendar year. Finally, ε_{it} denotes an idiosyncratic error term.

The goal of our empirical strategy is to identify the dynamic impact of the initial level of import penetration at the four-digit industry level, measured across years of potential labor market experience, with and without controls for contemporaneous unemployment and unemployment at entry. Different from studies on the impact of initial labor market conditions, which exploit variation in unemployment at the state or province level, our main strategy relies on variation at the sectoral level.

In our main specification, we consider a horizon s of up to 6 years of experience for workers having entered the labor market between 1994 and 2006. The last year of entry is data-driven, given that injury data are only up to 2012. In a set of robustness checks, we also study a longer time horizon of 11 years. In this case, we consider workers who entered the labor market between 1994 and 2001.

4.1 Empirical issues

Similar to the analysis of initial labor market conditions, some considerations are in order as to the possible endogeneity of the level of import competition to labor market outcomes. We have identified three main sources of endogeneity possibly affecting the empirical estimates of equation (1).

The first empirical issue arises from the possible negative self-selection of labor market entrants into sectors that are more exposed to import competition. Analyzing the scarring effects of recessions, Schwandt and Von Wachter (2019) have highlighted the risk of negative

selection bias potentially emerging if workers with higher outcome potential sort into periods or areas with lower unemployment. Similarly, in our analysis on import competition, workers with higher labor outcome potential may self-select into sectors with lower import competition and greater career perspectives, while less skilled workers (with lower wages and higher injury risk) may remain in more exposed sectors. In this case, an estimated detrimental effect of import competition on labor market outcomes would be partly attributable to negative selection. Fully correcting for self-selection is beyond the aims of this work, and even documenting its emergence appears worth researching. Negative selection and its self-reinforcing effects are among the factors driving the labor market segmentation observed in many countries with high levels of EPL. Documenting whether workers with lower potential self-select into industries with high levels of import competition contributes to highlighting one of the mechanisms potentially underlying such segmentation.

A second empirical concern is the potential endogeneity of import competition. Import exposure may affect workers' outcomes not only through exogenous increases in the supply of low-cost goods from China, but also through endogenous firm-level characteristics. In particular, low-productivity Italian firms may simultaneously offer poorer working conditions to workers and less opposition to foreign competitors, facilitating greater import penetration. As such, the impact of import competition would be confounded by firms' productivity. We address this concern by following standard practice in the import competition literature (Autor et al., 2013, 2014). We re-estimate all our models using the standard shift-share instrument proposed by (Autor et al., 2014), which uses Chinese export flows to other high-income countries as an instrument for Italy's import competition. This strategy allows us to isolate exogenous variation driven by China's productivity shock, rather than domestic demand-side changes in the Italian labor market.

Third, endogeneity may arise due to a survival bias. As discussed in Section 2, (Lai, 2023; Fiorio et al., 2023; D'Ambrosio et al., 2025), import competition increases the exit of less productive firms, leading to a positive selection of survivors. In turn, low-skilled workers are the most likely to be affected or displaced by foreign competition (Autor et al., 2013; Pierce and Schott, 2016; Acemoglu et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2014). In this context, the survival of more productive workers and more productive firms would imply, through rent-sharing, an

improvement in working conditions, including a reduction in hazardous jobs. In contrast to the effect of workers' assortative matching, such survivor bias should improve the estimates of the labor market outcomes for workers exposed to import competition — unless firms survive by compressing job remuneration and amenities.

5 Results

In this section, we report the estimation results from the full specification in equation 1. We compare the effects, by years of experience, of unemployment conditions at labor market entry with those of import competition at entry. The figures present, in the left panel, the coefficients associated with unemployment at entry interacted with experience dummies, while the right panel reports the corresponding coefficients for import competition at entry. In discussing the magnitude of the effects, we refer to the estimated elasticities, which are reported in Appendix B.

To understand how economic conditions at entry influence employers' labor demand and contract offerings, we begin our analysis by studying the effects on weeks worked and contract typology.

In Figure 5.1, we investigate the impact of import competition at entry and unemployment at entry on weeks worked. For this purpose, we use the logarithm of effective weeks worked, measured on a full-time equivalent basis. Effective weeks are constructed by rescaling actual weeks worked by the individual's part-time employment share. For this outcome, our results suggest that entering the labor market in a sector subject to strong import competition has similar, though less strong effects as entering the labor market during a recession. Both unemployment and import competition at entry are associated with declines in weeks worked, which get larger and larger over time. In terms of magnitudes, one-standard-deviation increase in unemployment rates reduces log worked weeks by 2.76% in the first year, up to 5.60% in the sixth year. In contrast, a one-standard-deviation increase in import penetration reduces them by 0.56% in the first year, up to 1.73% in the sixth year after entry (see also table B.1)¹¹

¹¹In the Appendix, we examine the effects on the probability of receiving unemployment benefits. While

Figure 5.1: **Effective FTE worked weeks**





Figure 5.2: **Probability of full-time employment**



The figure displays the estimated effects of unemployment at labor market entry and import competition at the 4-digit ATECO level on the Logarithm of Effective Weeks Worked measure on full time equivalent basis and on the probability of working full-time. Panel A reports the coefficients on unemployment at labor market entry interacted with years-of-experience dummies, while panel B reports the corresponding coefficients for import competition at entry. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

In Figure 5.2, we report the effects of the unemployment rate and import competition at entry on the probability of full-time employment. The effects of both variables are negative and similar in magnitude. Over a six-year horizon, the probability of full-time employment import competition at entry does not exhibit a significant impact, higher unemployment at entry is, as expected, associated with a higher probability of unemployment benefit receipt, with an effect that increases markedly over time.

decreases by 1% for a one-standard-deviation increase in unemployment at entry, and by 0.7% for the same increase in import competition (see also Table B.2).

Turning to pecuniary outcomes, the picture changes. Figure 5.3 shows that the effects of import penetration and unemployment rates on the log of weekly earnings at entry diverge.¹² The estimated effects of import penetration are insignificant in the first years after entry but start growing in the fourth year, becoming significantly positive from the fifth year on. This implies a moderate increase in wages by 0.61% in six years. Such increase does not offset the reduction in weeks worked noted above. As a result, the effect on annual earnings is negative, as shown in Figure 5.4, and implies a loss in annual earnings by almost 1.2%. In contrast, the effect of unemployment at entry is unambiguously negative on weekly earnings, reducing by 3.80% over 6 years. Combined with the negative impact on weeks worked noted above, this translates into substantial losses in annual earnings, down by 9.25% in the sixth year (Figure 5.4 and Table B.1).

¹²Weekly wages are defined as total earnings divided by effective FTE weeks worked.

Figure 5.3: Effects on log weekly earnings





Figure 5.4: Effects on log annual earnings



The figure displays the estimated effects of unemployment at labor market entry and import competition at the 4-digit ATECO level on the logarithm of weekly earnings and total earnings by years of experience. Panel A reports the coefficients on unemployment at labor market entry interacted with years-of-experience dummies, while panel B reports the corresponding coefficients for import competition at entry. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

We now turn to consider one key aspect of job quality, i.e., workplace safety. Consistent with the negative effect of recessions on work intensity (Boone and Van Ours, 2006), unemployment at entry does not significantly affect injury rates at any level of experience. In contrast, import competition significantly and increasingly raises injury rates since the first year after entry, although it is only marginally significant at the 10% level in the third year (Figure 5.5). Our estimates imply that workers entering the labor market in industries that are very exposed to import competition face an injury risk that is 10.3% higher six years after entry (see Table B.5).

Since workplace injuries may be underreported, particularly among workers with lower bargaining power, we also consider an alternative measure of workplace injuries that focuses on accidents requiring immediate medical treatment and are therefore unlikely to be underreported (Boone and Van Ours, 2006; Boone et al., 2011; Leombruni et al., 2019). The estimated effects for this outcome, labeled as immediate-care injuries, are reported in Figure 5.6. Similarly to the results for all injuries, the effect of unemployment at entry is not statistically different from zero at any level of experience. The dynamic pattern of import competition at entry across years of experience for immediate-care injury rates mirrors that obtained for all injuries, although the estimates are never statistically significant, likely reflecting limited statistical power due to the relatively small number of such events and, as shown later in the paper, the presence of heterogeneous effects across workers with different characteristics.

Figure 5.5: All injuries




Figure 5.6: Immediate-care injuries





Figure 5.7: Overtime and night-shift injuries



The figure displays the estimated effects of unemployment at labor market entry and import competition at the 4-digit ATECO level on workplace injury rate (all injuries), immediate-care injuries, and injuries occurring during nightshifts and overtime hours. Panel A reports the coefficients on unemployment at labor market entry interacted with years-of-experience dummies, while panel B reports the corresponding coefficients for import competition at entry. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

Figure 5.7 focuses on the injury rates computed from accidents occurring during non-standard working hours (overtime and night shifts). As above, the effect of unemployment at entry is statistically insignificant, whereas import competition at entry significantly increases injury rates during non-standard working hours in every year after entry, except for the fourth year. The magnitude of the effect increases with time since entry, reaching its highest levels around the sixth year, corresponding to an increase of about 26.3%. The negative effect of import competition at entry on full-time employment, together with the marked increase in injury rates during non-standard working hours, points to labor demand adjustments along the intensive margin in response to competitive pressure, with firms increasingly relying on more flexible employment arrangements. This interpretation is consistent with Alvarez et al. (2025), who show that firms facing stronger import competition adjust primarily by expanding the use of temporary and non-standard contracts, as a strategy to cope with heightened uncertainty and reduce adjustment costs ¹³.

These findings suggest that the effects of import competition and unemployment rates at entry operate through different channels. Recessions decrease labor demand and workplace intensity, whereas import competition imposes a need for greater efficiency, intensity, and working-time flexibility. In other words, both recessions and import competition decrease the extensive margin of work, but import competition also increases the intensive margin.

One may be tempted to attribute the increase in weekly wages driven by import competition to compensating differentials for greater job disamenities, given that our wage measure includes compensation for overtime, and, potentially, workplace risk. It is difficult to assess whether this is the case, given that wages and job amenities are jointly and endogenously determined. In any case, we note that the estimated increase in injury risk (+10.38%, which is up to 26% for overtime injuries) is in percentage terms much higher than the increase in wages (+0.61%), reflecting an overall deterioration in working conditions.

To assess whether job-to-job transitions may help explain the observed dynamics in labor market outcomes, we also examine the probability of moving to another firm. The estimated

¹³The Authors analyze the effects of trade liberalization driven by the enlargement of the European Economic Community (EEC), which reduced trade barriers among member countries. In this context, increased competitive pressure arises from deeper economic integration within Europe rather than from import competition with low-cost countries such as China.

effects shown in Figure C.1 indicate that workers who enter the labor market under high unemployment and high import competition are similarly more likely to change their jobs, with probabilities that reflect greater job instability over time. Reflecting the findings for the worked weeks, this dynamic is more pronounced for recessions. The probability of changing firm for individuals entering under higher unemployment is 10.5% higher over 6 years, and 2.3% higher for import competition than for workers entering under more favourable conditions (Table B.3). In both cases, this effect appears largely driven by labor mobility within the initial 6-digit ateco industry (C.2). However, entering during a recession also increases the probability to radically change the industry of work — i.e., of moving out of the initial 2-digit industry, while this is not the case for import competition. These findings suggest that unemployment at entry primarily generates mismatch effects, leading workers to search more broadly across both firms and sectors. In contrast, import competition appears to operate as a sector-specific shock, inducing reallocation within narrowly defined industries without triggering substantial mobility across sectors.

Interesting patterns emerge when examining the dynamic effects on the probability of self-employment, as shown in Figure C.3. While unemployment at entry has a positive but declining effect over time, import competition at entry displays an effect that becomes positive, statistically significant, and increases over time. This suggests that self-employment may represent a way out of worsening conditions in exposed industries.

6 Heterogeneity

To shed light on workers' labor market dynamics over the early career, we conduct a heterogeneity analysis by examining differences across occupational qualifications and firm size at entry, as well as across gender and migration status. For brevity, in what follows we only focus on the effects of import competition at entry and we only report the estimates obtained six years after entry, but we also report the estimated effects of unemployment for each category of workers, considering both pecuniary and non-pecuniary variables, as well as job transitions (Tables B.6 - B.10).

First, somewhat unsurprisingly given that import competition mainly affected manufac-

turing, workers entering the labor market as blue-collar workers are more negatively affected by import competition compared to white-collar workers. Specifically, six years after entry, a one standard deviation increase in import competition at entry reduces weeks worked by 2% (Table B.6), with a a modest reduction in the probability of full-time employment, amounting to 0.88% (Table B.7). Weekly wages marginally increase by 0.41%, so that annual earnings decrease by 1.66% (see Table B.6). Blue collars also drive the previous findings about the probability of changing firms and workplace safety. A one-standard-deviation increase in import competition at entry raises the probability of changing firms after six years by 10.8% for blue-collar workers, and decreases it by 6.20% for white collars. The effect of import competition on workplace injuries, both overall and during non-standard time, is also entirely due to blue collars. After six years, a one-standard-deviation increase in import competition at entry raises the probability of all injuries after six years by 10.92% (Table B.10) and that of injuries during non-standard hours by 27.36% (Table B.10), with no appreciable effects for white collars.

The second dimension of heterogeneity that we consider is gender. The results in Table B.6 show that import competition at entry affects women more negatively than men both on weeks worked and annual earnings, with elasticities that are estimated to be between three and five times larger for women than for men. This is largely due to a much larger probability of part-time employment, as implied by the results in Table B.7.

In contrast, men turn out to be much more negatively affected in terms of workplace safety, with consistently larger effect sizes for all injuries, immediate-care injuries and overtime injuries. This suggests that the impact of import competition on women and men is different, with women paying the cost of larger adjustments on the extensive margins and men on the intensive margin.

A third dimension of heterogeneity concerns the comparison between natives and foreigners. Foreign workers experience more detrimental effects on weeks worked, probability of full-time employment, annual earnings, and workplace tenure, and are also much more likely than natives to move to a different job and to self-employment in response to entering the labor market during times of high import competition. We also estimate a higher injury risk for them, despite the much smaller sample size and lower statistical power.

A fourth dimension of heterogeneity that we consider is the firm size at entry. Here, we compare the impact of import competition at entry between small firms (fewer than 15 employees) and larger firms (15 or more employees). Our findings suggest that workers entering the labor market in a small firm are more vulnerable to the impact of import competition than workers starting from a larger firm in terms of a number of outcomes. They suffer larger losses in worked weeks, probability of full-time employment, total earnings, and are more likely to turn self-employed. They are also experiencing a much more detrimental effect of import competition on workplace safety, which is dramatically more marked for immediate-care and overtime injuries than for injuries as a whole. Suggesting that a disproportionate share of the injuries reported in small firms are severe, this result points to the possibility of strategic under-reporting of less severe ones (Boone et al., 2011). Moreover, in the face of such deteriorating conditions, workers starting in small firms turn out to be less likely to change jobs in response to import competition, potentially because of more limited opportunities for job mobility. Hence, both types of firms appear to respond to increased foreign competition by adopting flexible production strategies that rely more on work intensity than on labor quantity, but this adjustment appears stronger for small firms: Arellano-Bover (2022) suggests that entry into large firms fosters skill accumulation, which may act as a resilience factor in the face of the China shock.

7 Robustness checks

7.1 Robustness to the Exclusion of Unemployment at Entry

As a robustness check, we re-estimate our baseline specification excluding the unemployment rate at entry. While the main model includes both import penetration and local labor market (i.e. unemployment rate) conditions at entry, these variables may be correlated because common macroeconomic shocks can simultaneously affect both local unemployment conditions and exposure to import competition. Moreover, higher import competition may itself contribute to increases in local unemployment. Together, these two channels raise concerns of multicollinearity, which may hinder the identification of the separate contribution

of each variable. In addition, including both measures may complicate the interpretation of the estimated effects, as it becomes less clear whether the observed impacts on injury outcomes are driven by trade exposure or by unemployment rate. To address these concerns, we present specifications that omit the unemployment rate at entry, thereby isolating the role of import competition. Figure 7.1 reports the corresponding coefficient plots from three alternative specifications on the three safety outcomes. The first specification (*no controls* in the graph) includes no additional controls (apart from calendar year and year of labor market entry fixed effects). The second (*controls*) adds the full set of individual and job-related controls (area of birth, gender, age at entry, qualification at entry, firm size at entry, small firm at entry, and part-time status at entry). The third (*controls + unempl.in interaction*) corresponds to the specification that additionally includes the unemployment rate at entry interacted with years of experience. The comparison across these specifications shows that the estimated effects are stable and not driven by the inclusion of unemployment conditions at entry.


7.2 Instrumental Variable Estimates

To address potential endogeneity concerns in our baseline specification, we complement the above OLS estimates with an instrumental variable (IV) approach. As discussed in Section 4.1, our measure of import penetration may be correlated with unobserved sector-specific shocks in Italy that simultaneously affect employment and injury outcomes (McManus and Schaur, 2016; Adda and Fawaz, 2020). To overcome this issue, we adopt an IV strategy widely used in the literature (Autor et al., 2013, 2014). Specifically, we instrument Italian import penetration with an analogous measure based on Chinese exports to other high-income countries:

$$IP_{j,t}^{OC} = \frac{M_{j,t}^{OC}}{Y_{j,1994} + M_{j,1994} - X_{j,1994}}$$

The identifying assumption is that growth in Chinese exports across advanced economies is primarily driven by supply-side shocks—e.g., productivity gains and structural reforms in China—rather than by correlated demand or technological shocks in importing countries. Under this assumption, the instrument isolates exogenous variation in import competition

Figure 7.1: Effects of import competition at entry on injury rates by years of experience



The figure displays the estimated effects of import competition at the 4-digit ATECO level at labor market entry on different workplace injury outcomes. Coefficients are reported by years of potential experience. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

faced by Italian industries, allowing us to credibly estimate its causal impact on labor market outcomes. The results of this exercise, including of the heterogeneity analysis, are reported in section B.2 and confirm the main insights. Entering the labor market under high pressure from import competition decreases weeks worked, the probability of full-time employment, and deteriorates workplace safety increasing the probability of getting injured, especially during non-standard times, with only minor compensation in terms of weekly earnings. The effects are stronger for blue-collar workers and those beginning their careers in small firms. Instead, the IV estimates for foreign workers' safety become smaller and less precise, suggest-

ing that the migrants' deterioration in workplace safety identified above is not the response to an exogenous external shock but an intrinsic feature of firms in the most exposed sectors.

8 Discussion and conclusions

Our analysis extends the literature on the labor market consequences of globalization by adopting a scarring-effects perspective. While most studies on the China shock focus on incumbent workers, our approach shifts attention to individuals entering the labor market when import competition intensifies. In labor markets characterized by strong employment protection, such as the Italian one, firms tend to adjust to competitive shocks primarily along the hiring margin rather than through layoffs. The results of the paper show that, in employment-protected economies like Italy, the burden of adjustment may be disproportionately borne by new entrants, who face limited outside options and weaker bargaining power at the start of their careers.

Extending the literature on the scarring effects of recessions, we show that entering the labor market under the pressure of Chinese import competition bears similar cumulative and long-lasting detrimental effects as entering during a recession, but it triggers different adjustment strategies by firms, so that it ends up affecting different outcomes. Whereas recessions typically reduce product demand and lead firms to temporarily scale down output, increased import competition induces firms to adopt cost-compression strategies that rely more heavily on labor intensity, with less severe pecuniary implications but more severe deteriorations in job quality, especially workplace safety.

These findings complement previous results based on worker-level data (D'Ambrosio et al., 2025), showing that the effects of foreign competition on incumbent workers' injuries are present but short-lived. Our results suggest that the burden of the adjustment may be shifted from the incumbents to the entrants. Our findings also contribute to explaining the aggregate regional findings by Filomena et al. (2026), who documented increases in workplace injuries in areas more exposed to import competition. This overall increase may, in light of our findings, be attributed to deteriorating working conditions among newly hired workers.

This adjustment for specific groups of workers seems to occur mainly along the extensive margin—namely, changes in whether and how much individuals work—in response to increased import competition at entry. Foreigners and women experience larger reductions in the probability of full-time employment, in weeks worked, and consequently in annual

earnings following increased import competition. By contrast, natives are primarily affected along the intensive margin, showing a higher likelihood of injuries during non-standard hours. Workers who entered small firms appear to be especially exposed: they experience reductions along the extensive margin, but are also the most affected along the intensive margin, as shown by the increase in injuries during non-standard hours following increased import competition.

In line with models of task assignment and human capital accumulation, where early career positions shape subsequent skill accumulation and mobility (Gibbons and Waldman, 2006a), higher injury rates at the beginning of the career may slow the accumulation of transferable skills in the longer term and thus restrict transitions toward more skill-intensive tasks. This may be especially relevant for workers experiencing interruptions in their job participation due to injury leave. As a result, especially among small firms, workers may remain confined to highly task-specific jobs within their initial sector, reducing their attractiveness to firms operating in other industries.

Our results show that these effects are more severe for workers with less bargaining power. Indeed, for workers who entered small firms, the effect of import competition at entry is not limited to overall injuries but is even stronger for more severe injuries requiring immediate medical care. This pattern suggests the presence of substantial underreporting, likely driven by the greater vulnerability and weaker bargaining power of labor market entrants in smaller firms exposed to import competition.

Other results help contextualize this greater vulnerability of workers entering small firms. As shown above, in response to increased import competition, these workers display a lower probability of changing employers in general, and especially within the same six-digit industry of their initial employer, compared with those entering larger firms. This may signal limited outside options, allowing employers to exercise a degree of monopsonistic power over more vulnerable workers (Manning, 2003). Moreover, entrants in small firms - together with other vulnerable groups such as women and foreigners - when employed in sectors more exposed to import competition, also exhibit a higher probability of transitioning into self-employment.

These findings also carry broader policy implications. The evidence suggests that increased import competition affects working conditions also through adjustments along the

intensive margin that may raise injuries during non-standard hours. This points to the need for stronger monitoring and prevention policies in sectors more exposed to import competition, with particular attention to overtime and irregular working schedules. The stronger effects observed among labor market entrants and in small firms further indicate that targeted support and safety-enhancing measures may be warranted to mitigate the impact of competitive pressure on workplace conditions.

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
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A Additional evidence


Figure A.1: Effects of Labor Market Conditions at Entry on the probability of unemployment (receiving unemployment benefits) by Years of Experience




The figure displays the estimated effects of unemployment at labor market entry and import competition at the 4-digit ATECO level on the probability of receiving unemployment benefit. Panel A reports the coefficients on unemployment at labor market entry interacted with years-of-experience dummies, while panel B reports the corresponding coefficients for import competition at entry. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

Figure A.2: Heterogeneous Effects of Labor Market Conditions at Entry on the Probability of Receiving Unemployment Benefits


(A) Blue- and White-Collar Workers




(B) Men and Women



(C) Natives and Foreign-Born Workers



(D) Firms Below and Above 15 Employees at Entry



The figure reports heterogeneous effects of labor market conditions at entry on the probability of receiving unemployment benefits. Panel A shows estimates separately for blue- and white-collar workers. Panel B reports estimates by gender. Panel C distinguishes between native and foreign-born workers. Panel D compares workers entering firms with fewer than 15 employees and firms with more than 15 employees. Coefficients are interacted with years-of-experience dummies. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

B Tables

Table B.1: Coefficients of main interest on LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES

$var \cdot s =$	1	2	3	4	5	6
Log Effective Weeks Worked :						
UR_entry ·s	-0.00424*** (0.000747)	-0.00484*** (0.000794)	-0.00634*** (0.000821)	-0.00691*** (0.000768)	-0.00840*** (0.000735)	-0.00860*** (0.000768)
IP_entry ·s	-0.00162* (0.000968)	-0.00220** (0.00107)	-0.00330** (0.00145)	-0.00308** (0.00127)	-0.00415*** (0.00122)	-0.00472*** (0.00124)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	3.444	3.444	3.444	3.444	3.444	3.444
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-2.76%	-3.15%	-4.13%	-4.50%	-5.47%	-5.60%
IP	-0.59%	-0.81%	-1.20%	-1.13%	-1.52%	-1.73%
Log Annual Earnings :						
UR_entry ·s	-0.00487*** (0.000827)	-0.00701*** (0.000916)	-0.00971*** (0.00101)	-0.0111*** (0.000963)	-0.0133*** (0.000963)	-0.0142*** (0.000979)
IP_entry ·s	-0.00181 (0.00118)	-0.00185 (0.00131)	-0.00296* (0.00167)	-0.00257* (0.00151)	-0.00296** (0.00143)	-0.00321** (0.00143)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	9.052	9.052	9.052	9.052	9.052	9.052
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-3.17%	-4.57%	-6.33%	-7.23%	-8.66%	-9.25%
IP	-0.66%	-0.67%	-1.08%	-0.94%	-1.08%	-1.17%
Log Weekly Wages :						
UR_entry ·s	-0.00156*** (0.000248)	-0.00268*** (0.000290)	-0.00379*** (0.000361)	-0.00468*** (0.000401)	-0.00535*** (0.000445)	-0.00584*** (0.000449)
IP_entry ·s	-8.35e-05 (0.000474)	0.000283 (0.000527)	0.000189 (0.000677)	0.000525 (0.000554)	0.00115** (0.000579)	0.00166** (0.000645)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	5.649	5.649	5.649	5.649	5.649	5.649
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-1.02%	-1.75%	-2.47%	-3.05%	-3.49%	-3.80%
IP	-0.03%	0.10%	0.07%	0.19%	0.42%	0.61%
St. Dev. UR	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515
St. Dev. IP	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and years of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration at entry and years of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for region of entry and 3-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times sd$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry).

Table B.2: Coefficients of main interest on OTHER LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES

<i>var · s =</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
Full-time Employment :						
UR_entry · s	-7.82e-05 (0.000109)	-0.000146 (0.000148)	-0.000411** (0.000189)	-0.000505** (0.000212)	-0.000933*** (0.000227)	-0.00136*** (0.000254)
IP_entry · s	-0.000642** (0.000300)	-0.000718** (0.000348)	-0.000765** (0.000367)	-0.00128*** (0.000450)	-0.00178*** (0.000503)	-0.00180*** (0.000545)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	0.914	0.914	0.914	0.914	0.914	0.914
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-0.055%	-0.10%	-0.29%	-0.36%	-0.66%	-0.97%
IP	-0.26%	-0.29%	-0.31%	-0.51%	-0.71%	-0.72%
Autonomous Job :						
UR_entry · s	0.000933*** (7.61e-05)	0.000906*** (0.000106)	0.000786*** (0.000129)	0.000672*** (0.000152)	0.000548*** (0.000176)	0.000412** (0.000195)
IP_entry · s	0.000183 (0.000176)	0.000427* (0.000247)	0.000819*** (0.000283)	0.00100*** (0.000358)	0.00130*** (0.000407)	0.00130*** (0.000449)
Observations	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783
Y-Baseline	0.0482	0.0482	0.0482	0.0482	0.0482	0.0482
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	12.61%	12.24%	10.62%	9.08%	7.40%	5.57%
IP	1.39%	3.24%	6.22%	7.60%	9.88%	9.88%
Probability of Unemployment :						
UR_entry · s	0.000780*** (0.000151)	0.00304*** (0.000349)	0.00406*** (0.000357)	0.00500*** (0.000453)	0.00551*** (0.000452)	0.00599*** (0.000486)
IP_entry · s	-0.000367** (0.000157)	-0.000304 (0.000231)	-0.000178 (0.000292)	0.000408 (0.000348)	0.000559 (0.000355)	0.000168 (0.000309)
Observations	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783
Y-Baseline	0.0477	0.0477	0.0477	0.0477	0.0477	0.0477
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	10.65%	41.52%	55.45%	68.29%	75.25%	81.81%
IP	-2.81%	-2.33%	-1.37%	3.13%	4.29%	1.29%
Tenure :						
UR_entry · s	-0.223 (0.302)	0.306 (0.590)	-0.168 (0.802)	-1.081 (0.963)	-2.623** (1.164)	-5.246*** (1.301)
IP_entry · s	0.936*** (0.263)	1.081** (0.420)	0.596 (0.742)	-0.776 (0.980)	-2.686** (1.313)	-2.647 (1.637)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	672.4	672.4	672.4	672.4	672.4	672.4
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-0.21%	0.29%	-0.16%	-1.05%	2.54%	5.08%
IP	0.51%	0.59%	0.32%	-0.42%	-1.46%	-1.44%
St. Dev. UR	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515
St. Dev. IP	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and years of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration at entry and years of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for region of entry and 3-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry), divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100.

Table B.3: Coefficients of main interest on PROBABILITY OF MOVING (1)

<i>vars</i> =	1	2	3	4	5	6
Probability of Changing Firm :						
UR_entry ·s	0.00161*** (0.000318)	0.00345*** (0.000330)	0.00345*** (0.000360)	0.00409*** (0.000365)	0.00450*** (0.000369)	0.00429*** (0.000407)
IP_entry ·s	0.000510 (0.000676)	0.000784 (0.000878)	0.000535 (0.000813)	0.00133 (0.000847)	0.00134* (0.000753)	0.00169** (0.000806)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.266
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	3.94%	8.45%	8.45%	10.02%	11.02%	10.51%
IP	0.70%	1.08%	0.74%	1.83%	1.84%	2.33%
Moving to same 6-digit :						
UR_entry ·s	0.000219 (0.000214)	0.000625*** (0.000221)	0.00112*** (0.000243)	0.00113*** (0.000261)	0.00176*** (0.000276)	0.00152*** (0.000304)
IP_entry ·s	0.000442 (0.000378)	0.000574 (0.000361)	0.000790** (0.000352)	0.00111*** (0.000354)	0.00116*** (0.000342)	0.00151*** (0.000386)
Observations	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784
Y-Baseline	0.0735	0.0735	0.0735	0.0735	0.0735	0.0735
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	1.94%	5.54%	9.93%	10.01%	15.60%	13.47%
IP	2.20%	2.86%	3.93%	5.53%	5.78%	7.52%
Moving to different 2-digit :						
UR_entry ·s	0.00119*** (0.000323)	0.00247*** (0.000307)	0.00187*** (0.000325)	0.00238*** (0.000331)	0.00214*** (0.000325)	0.00219*** (0.000349)
IP_entry ·s	0.000144 (0.000561)	0.000410 (0.000678)	-0.000147 (0.000654)	0.000538 (0.000689)	0.000530 (0.000646)	0.000440 (0.000608)
Observations	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784
Y-Baseline	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	4.26%	8.84%	6.65%	8.51%	7.66%	7.83%
IP	0.29%	0.82%	-0.29%	1.08%	1.06%	0.88%
St. Dev. UR	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515
St. Dev. IP	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and years of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration at entry and years of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for region of entry and 3-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry), divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100.

Table B.4: Coefficients of main interest on PROBABILITY OF MOVING (2)

<i>var · s</i> =	1	2	3	4	5	6
To same 5-digit (different 6-dig) :						
UR_entry · s	-1.16e-06 (7.27e-06)	2.58e-06 (8.05e-06)	8.97e-06 (7.79e-06)	1.77e-05* (1.01e-05)	7.06e-06 (8.49e-06)	5.73e-06 (6.37e-06)
IP_entry · s	-3.26e-08 (4.84e-06)	2.82e-06 (5.44e-06)	1.33e-05* (7.45e-06)	1.27e-05 (8.87e-06)	1.10e-05 (1.19e-05)	8.76e-06* (4.86e-06)
Observations	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784
Y-Baseline	0.000137	0.000137	0.000137	0.000137	0.000137	0.000137
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-5.52%	12.27%	42.65%	84.18%	33.58%	27.26%
IP	-0.09%	7.53%	35.55%	33.92%	29.39%	23.42%
To same 4-digit (different 5-dig) :						
UR_entry · s	1.37e-05 (3.90e-05)	8.65e-05** (4.37e-05)	7.98e-05* (4.26e-05)	0.000105*** (3.86e-05)	3.28e-05 (3.90e-05)	0.000116** (4.85e-05)
IP_entry · s	0.000102 (6.27e-05)	4.59e-06 (4.56e-05)	7.33e-05 (7.06e-05)	4.74e-05 (4.68e-05)	2.24e-06 (6.29e-05)	2.45e-05 (9.64e-05)
Observations	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784
Y-Baseline	0.00290	0.00290	0.00290	0.00290	0.00290	0.00290
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	3.08%	19.44%	17.93%	23.60%	7.36%	26.07%
IP	12.89%	0.58%	9.26%	5.99%	0.28%	3.10%
To same 3-digit (different 4-dig) :						
UR_entry · s	0.000155** (6.70e-05)	0.000233*** (8.05e-05)	0.000247*** (8.19e-05)	0.000252*** (7.34e-05)	0.000309*** (8.56e-05)	0.000243*** (8.20e-05)
IP_entry · s	0.000221* (0.000118)	0.000165 (0.000127)	7.97e-05 (9.92e-05)	8.07e-06 (0.000106)	-6.13e-05 (0.000114)	-2.55e-05 (8.77e-05)
Observations	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784
Y-Baseline	0.00856	0.00856	0.00856	0.00856	0.00856	0.00856
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	11.80%	17.75%	18.82%	19.20%	23.52%	18.50%
IP	9.46%	7.06%	3.41%	0.35%	-2.62%	-1.09%
To same 2-digit (different 3-dig) :						
UR_entry · s	4.25e-05 (7.30e-05)	5.45e-05 (7.12e-05)	4.73e-05 (7.64e-05)	2.43e-05 (7.82e-05)	0.000154* (8.32e-05)	9.07e-05 (8.75e-05)
IP_entry · s	-0.000221** (0.000109)	-0.000140 (0.000115)	-9.34e-05 (0.000135)	-0.000276* (0.000143)	-0.000153 (0.000139)	-0.000142 (0.000118)
Observations	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784
Y-Baseline	0.00946	0.00946	0.00946	0.00946	0.00946	0.00946
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	2.93%	3.76%	3.26%	1.67%	10.61%	6.25%
IP	-8.55%	-5.42%	-3.62%	-10.69%	-5.93%	-5.49%
St. Dev. UR	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515
St. Dev. IP	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and years of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration at entry and years of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for region of entry and 3-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry), divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100.

Table B.5: Coefficients of main interest on INJURY OUTCOMES

<i>var</i> · <i>s</i> =	1	2	3	4	5	6
All Injuries :						
UR_entry · <i>s</i>	0.000139 (0.000588)	4.74e-05 (0.000575)	-0.000167 (0.000600)	0.000172 (0.000627)	0.000940 (0.000636)	0.000780 (0.000688)
IP_entry · <i>s</i>	0.00118** (0.000594)	0.00131** (0.000620)	0.00106* (0.000586)	0.00178** (0.000834)	0.00196*** (0.000638)	0.00229*** (0.000639)
Observations	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849
Y-Baseline	0.0808	0.0808	0.0808	0.0808	0.0808	0.0808
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	1.12%	3.82%	-1.35%	1.38%	7.58%	6.29%
IP	5.35%	5.94%	4.80%	8.07%	8.88%	10.38%
Immediate-care Injuries :						
UR_entry · <i>s</i>	-9.31e-05 (0.000279)	-0.000210 (0.000300)	-0.000120 (0.000293)	-1.62e-05 (0.000271)	9.16e-05 (0.000308)	-6.43e-05 (0.000268)
IP_entry · <i>s</i>	0.000174 (0.000262)	0.000192 (0.000273)	0.000103 (0.000240)	0.000330 (0.000229)	0.000393 (0.000254)	0.000373 (0.000252)
Observations	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849
Y-Baseline	0.00889	0.00889	0.00889	0.00889	0.00889	0.00889
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-6.83%	-15.39%	-8.79%	-1.19%	6.71%	-4.71%
IP	7.17%	7.91%	4.24%	13.59%	16.19%	15.37%
Overtime Injuries :						
UR_entry · <i>s</i>	0.000133 (0.000207)	9.66e-06 (0.000175)	8.12e-05 (0.000203)	-0.000263 (0.000213)	6.38e-05 (0.000166)	-8.42e-05 (0.000207)
IP_entry · <i>s</i>	0.000578** (0.000236)	0.000480* (0.000253)	0.000564** (0.000257)	2.78e-06 (0.000416)	0.000602** (0.000258)	0.000907*** (0.000316)
Observations	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849
Y-Baseline	0.0126	0.0126	0.0126	0.0126	0.0126	0.0126
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	6.88%	0.5%	4.19%	-13.60%	3.30%	-4.36%
IP	16.80%	13.95%	16.39%	0.08%	17.50%	26.37%
St. Dev. UR	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515
St. Dev. IP	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and years of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration at entry and years of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for region of entry and 3-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry), divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100.

B.1 HETEROGENEITY

Table B.6: Heterogeneity Analysis on Labour Outcomes

	(1) Foreigner	(2) Natives	(3) Female	(4) Male	(5) Small*	(6) Large*	(7) Blue-collar*	(8) White-collar*
Panel A - Log Effective Weeks Worked								
UR_entry · s = 6	-0.00818*** (0.00205)	-0.0103*** (0.000803)	-0.0119*** (0.00157)	-0.00719*** (0.000845)	-0.0109*** (0.000917)	-0.00620*** (0.00107)	-0.00926*** (0.000801)	-0.00353** (0.00173)
IP_entry · s = 6	-0.0101*** (0.00228)	-0.00285** (0.00121)	-0.00570*** (0.00174)	-0.00258* (0.00142)	-0.00537*** (0.00201)	-0.00415*** (0.00137)	-0.00575*** (0.00144)	-0.000557 (0.00232)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	3.398	3.459	3.360	3.485	3.382	3.501	3.421	3.603
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-3.95%	-6.97%	-7.58%	-4.74%	-7.45%	-3.84%	-6.08%	-2.20%
IP	-3.68%	-1.03%	-2.34%	-0.87%	-2.02%	-1.46%	-2.02%	-0.25%
Panel B - Log Annual Earnings								
UR_entry · s = 6	-0.00931*** (0.00224)	-0.0194*** (0.00105)	-0.0174*** (0.00194)	-0.0129*** (0.000971)	-0.0176*** (0.00102)	-0.0114*** (0.00143)	-0.0148*** (0.00103)	-0.00957*** (0.00212)
IP_entry · s = 6	-0.00943*** (0.00266)	-0.000686 (0.00133)	-0.00363* (0.00187)	-0.000866 (0.00186)	-0.00498** (0.00227)	-0.00149 (0.00161)	-0.00475*** (0.00152)	0.00321 (0.00351)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	8.995	9.069	8.883	9.133	8.876	9.216	8.973	9.584
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-4.49%	-13.13%	-11.08%	-8.51%	-12.02%	-7.05%	-9.72%	-5.96%
IP	-3.44%	-0.25%	-1.49%	-0.29%	-1.88%	-0.52%	-1.67%	1.45%
Panel C - Log Weekly Wages								
UR_entry · s = 6	-0.00145* (0.000838)	-0.00916*** (0.000480)	-0.00598*** (0.000757)	-0.00580*** (0.000448)	-0.00724*** (0.000453)	-0.00526*** (0.000632)	-0.00579*** (0.000480)	-0.00627*** (0.000943)
IP_entry · s = 6	0.00151 (0.00103)	0.00203*** (0.000724)	0.00206** (0.000802)	0.00197** (0.000893)	0.000576 (0.000862)	0.00276*** (0.000853)	0.00116** (0.000590)	0.00389** (0.00198)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	5.649	5.648	5.559	5.692	5.537	5.754	5.595	6.010
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-0.70%	-6.20%	-3.81%	-3.83%	-4.95%	-3.26%	-3.80%	-3.90%
IP	0.55%	0.74%	0.85%	0.67%	0.22%	0.97%	0.41%	1.76%
St. Dev. UR	4.822	6.766	6.366	6.597	6.834	6.187	6.566	6.225
St. Dev. IP	3.646	3.627	4.103	3.380	3.769	3.517	3.507	4.529

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration (4-digit) at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for Province of entry and 4-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes for variables in log form are computed as $\beta \times \text{SD}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry). For variables not in log form, this product is divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100. (*) Refers to categories at entry.

Table B.7: Heterogeneity Analysis on Other Labour Outcomes (1)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Foreigner	Natives	Female	Male	Small*	Large*	Blue-collar*	White-collar*
Panel A - Probability of Full-time Employment								
UR_entry · s = 6	-0.000754 (0.00117)	-0.00114*** (0.000247)	-0.00157*** (0.000551)	-0.00117*** (0.000231)	-0.00271*** (0.000393)	-0.000123 (0.000287)	-0.00122*** (0.000272)	-0.00261*** (0.000706)
IP_entry · s = 6	-0.00593*** (0.00129)	-0.000603 (0.000453)	-0.00214** (0.000915)	-0.000295 (0.000478)	-0.00279*** (0.000907)	-0.000810* (0.000448)	-0.00229*** (0.000616)	0.000296 (0.000871)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	0.899	0.919	0.833	0.954	0.882	0.945	0.916	0.898
St. Dev. UR	4.822	6.766	6.366	6.597	6.834	6.187	6.566	6.225
St. Dev. IP	3.646	3.627	4.103	3.380	3.769	3.517	3.507	4.529
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-0.40%	-0.84%	-0.01%	-0.81%	-2.09%	-0.02%	-0.87%	-1.81%
IP	-2.40%	-0.23%	-1.05%	-0.10%	-1.19%	-0.30%	-0.88%	0.15%
Panel B - Autonomous Job								
UR_entry · s = 6	0.00554*** (0.000800)	0.00101*** (0.000214)	0.00119*** (0.000280)	4.03e-05 (0.000236)	0.000619** (0.000293)	-0.000387* (0.000214)	0.000156 (0.000205)	0.00284*** (0.000520)
IP_entry · s = 6	0.00461*** (0.00106)	-9.66e-05 (0.000400)	0.00161*** (0.000547)	0.00142** (0.000613)	0.00194*** (0.000651)	0.000499 (0.000425)	0.00145*** (0.000486)	0.000529 (0.000647)
Observations	133,769	406,014	177,141	362,641	264,615	275,168	474,666	63,523
Y-Baseline	0.0567	0.0454	0.0320	0.0561	0.0587	0.0381	0.0493	0.0400
St. Dev. UR	4.877	6.783	6.419	6.603	6.851	6.205	6.588	6.236
St. Dev. IP	3.650	3.657	4.123	3.406	3.802	3.529	3.539	4.511
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	47.65%	15.09%	23.87%	0.47%	7.22%	-6.30%	2.08%	44.28%
IP	29.68%	-0.78%	20.74%	8.62%	12.57%	4.62%	10.41%	5.97%

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration (4-digit) at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for Province of entry and 4-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry)(*) Refers to categories at entry.

Table B.8: Heterogeneity Analysis on Other Labour Outcomes (2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Foreigner	Natives	Female	Male	Small*	Large*	Blue-collar*	White-collar*
Panel A - Unemployment								
UR_entry ·s = 6	0.00480*** (0.000681)	0.00674*** (0.000566)	0.00919*** (0.000935)	0.00448*** (0.000316)	0.00551*** (0.000343)	0.00645*** (0.000849)	0.00617*** (0.000523)	0.00434*** (0.000537)
IP_entry ·s = 6	-0.000500 (0.000677)	0.000270 (0.000364)	0.000301 (0.000547)	-0.000478 (0.000352)	-0.000773** (0.000347)	0.00113** (0.000547)	0.000130 (0.000375)	0.000285 (0.000485)
Observations	133,769	406,014	177,141	362,641	264,615	275,168	474,666	63,523
Y-Baseline	0.0525	0.0461	0.0648	0.0394	0.0440	0.0513	0.0509	0.0253
St. Dev. UR	4.877	6.783	6.419	6.603	6.851	6.205	6.588	6.236
St. Dev. IP	3.650	3.657	4.123	3.406	3.802	3.529	3.539	4.511
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	44.60%	99.17%	91.03%	75.07%	85.79%	78.01%	79.86%	106.97%
IP	-3.47%	2.14%	1.91%	-4.13%	-6.68%	7.77%	0.90%	5.08%
Panel B - Tenure								
UR_entry ·s = 6	-17.00*** (1.794)	-6.170*** (1.466)	-10.62*** (2.720)	-2.819*** (1.027)	-4.192*** (0.893)	-3.973* (2.414)	-5.290*** (1.360)	-4.685** (2.142)
IP_entry ·s = 6	-11.63*** (3.201)	0.649 (1.566)	-3.245 (2.156)	-2.384 (2.107)	-2.959 (1.999)	-2.122 (1.904)	-3.173* (1.763)	-0.0953 (2.177)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	625.3	685.8	672.1	670.2	614.2	724.3	650.2	819
St. Dev. UR	4.822	6.766	6.366	6.597	6.834	6.187	6.566	6.225
St. Dev. IP	3.646	3.627	4.103	3.380	3.769	3.517	3.507	4.529
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-13.10%	-6.08%	-10.05%	-2.77%	-4.66%	-3.39%	-5.34%	-3.56%
IP	-6.78%	0.34%	-1.98%	-1.20%	-1.82%	-1.03%	-1.71%	-0.05%

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration (4-digit) at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for Province of entry and 4-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry), divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100. (*) Refers to categories at entry.

Table B.9: Heterogeneity Analysis on Probability of Moving

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Foreigner	Natives	Female	Male	Small*	Large*	Blue-collar*	White-collar*
Panel A - Probability of Changing Firm								
UR_entry · s = 6	0.00234** (0.00115)	0.00596*** (0.000425)	0.00563*** (0.000674)	0.00364*** (0.000483)	0.00518*** (0.000543)	0.00268*** (0.000609)	0.00462*** (0.000435)	0.00167* (0.000954)
IP_entry · s = 6	0.00382** (0.00159)	0.000827 (0.000743)	0.00157 (0.00118)	0.00133 (0.000962)	0.00138 (0.00111)	0.00195** (0.000965)	0.00268*** (0.000963)	-0.00234* (0.00121)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	0.286	0.260	0.261	0.269	0.286	0.248	0.280	0.168
St. Dev. UR	4.822	6.766	6.366	6.597	6.834	6.187	6.566	6.225
St. Dev. IP	3.646	3.627	4.103	3.380	3.769	3.517	3.507	4.529
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	3.95%	15.50%	13.70%	8.92%	12.40%	6.69%	10.80%	6.20%
IP	4.87%	1.15%	2.47%	1.67%	1.82%	2.77%	3.36%	-6.31%
Panel B - Probability of Moving within 6-digit sector								
UR_entry · s = 6	0.00241*** (0.000881)	0.00182*** (0.000329)	0.00170*** (0.000468)	0.00163*** (0.000330)	0.00250*** (0.000346)	8.24e-05 (0.000503)	0.00157*** (0.000328)	0.000965* (0.000569)
IP_entry · s = 6	0.00172* (0.000948)	0.00141*** (0.000355)	0.00199*** (0.000579)	0.00108** (0.000458)	0.000803 (0.000524)	0.00223*** (0.000489)	0.00192*** (0.000466)	-1.44e-05 (0.000348)
Observations	118,127	367,655	158,129	327,655	234,089	251,695	426,862	57,562
Y-Baseline	0.0764	0.0727	0.0830	0.0691	0.0777	0.0698	0.0793	0.0331
St. Dev. UR	4.793	6.721	6.271	6.581	6.782	6.167	6.525	6.192
St. Dev. IP	3.643	3.622	4.114	3.368	3.768	3.509	3.498	4.539
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	15.12%	16.83%	12.84%	15.52%	21.82%	0.73%	12.92%	18.06%
IP	8.20%	7.02%	9.87%	5.26%	3.89%	11.21%	8.47%	-0.20%

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration (4-digit) at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for Province of entry and 4-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry), divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100. (*) Refers to categories at entry.

Table B.10: Heterogeneity Analysis on Injury Rates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Foreigner	Natives	Female	Male	Small*	Large*	Blue-collar*	White-collar*
Panel A - All Injuries								
UR_entry ·s = 6	-0.000461 (0.00103)	0.00154* (0.000792)	0.000522 (0.000822)	0.000961 (0.000925)	0.000170 (0.000858)	0.00139 (0.00110)	0.000873 (0.000766)	-0.000186 (0.000557)
IP_entry ·s = 6	0.00265** (0.00122)	0.00207*** (0.000741)	0.000709 (0.000858)	0.00293*** (0.000841)	0.00245*** (0.000943)	0.00215*** (0.000770)	0.00282*** (0.000781)	-7.02e-05 (0.000284)
Observations	125,280	381,569	166,375	340,473	246,090	260,758	445,618	59,754
Y-Baseline	0.103	0.0737	0.0373	0.102	0.0780	0.0838	0.0904	0.0129
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-2.16%	14.14%	8.91%	6.21%	1.49%	10.26%	6.33%	-8.96%
IP	9.39%	10.19%	7.79%	9.71%	11.83%	9.03%	10.94%	-2.46%
Panel B - Immediate-care Injuries								
UR_entry ·s = 6	-0.000199 (0.000472)	-8.08e-05 (0.000310)	0.000370 (0.000292)	-0.000282 (0.000379)	0.000412 (0.000298)	-0.000664 (0.000593)	-6.38e-05 (0.000299)	-8.03e-05 (8.85e-05)
IP_entry ·s = 6	0.000815 (0.000660)	0.000239 (0.000272)	0.000305 (0.000239)	0.000350 (0.000406)	0.000903** (0.000376)	-0.000172 (0.000340)	0.000452 (0.000309)	-3.95e-06 (2.61e-05)
Observations	125,280	381,569	166,375	340,473	246,090	260,758	445,618	59,754
Y-Baseline	0.0131	0.00753	0.00336	0.0116	0.0102	0.00767	0.00997	0.00107
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-7.32%	-7.26%	70.07%	-16.02%	27.60%	-53.56%	-4.20%	-46.64%
IP	22.68%	11.51%	37.49%	10.20%	33.34%	-7.88%	15.90%	-1.67%
Panel C - Overtime Injuries								
UR_entry ·s = 6	-7.78e-05 (0.000493)	8.28e-06 (0.000236)	0.000196 (0.000213)	-0.000198 (0.000275)	-0.000384* (0.000200)	0.000243 (0.000346)	-0.000104 (0.000229)	9.17e-07 (0.000128)
IP_entry ·s = 6	0.000759 (0.000722)	0.000928*** (0.000345)	0.000514* (0.000284)	0.00116** (0.000485)	0.000964** (0.000416)	0.000855* (0.000443)	0.00110*** (0.000387)	2.57e-05 (4.59e-05)
Observations	125,280	381,569	166,375	340,473	246,090	260,758	445,618	59,754
Y-Baseline	0.0195	0.0103	0.00721	0.0152	0.00927	0.0157	0.0141	0.00164
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-1.92%	0.54%	17.30%	-8.59%	-28.33%	9.58%	-4.84%	0.35%
IP	14.20%	32.67%	29.25%	25.12%	39.20%	19.11%	27.36%	7.10%
St. Dev. UR	4.821	6.766	6.364	6.597	6.834	6.186	6.565	6.224
St. Dev. IP	3.647	3.625	4.101	3.379	3.768	3.516	3.506	4.530

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration (4-digit) at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for Province of entry and 4-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry), divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100. (*) Refers to categories at entry.

B.2 Robustness IV

Table B.11: Coefficients of main interest on LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES (IV)

<i>var · s =</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
Log Effective Weeks Worked :						
UR_entry · s	-0.00422*** (0.000746)	-0.00484*** (0.000795)	-0.00634*** (0.000821)	-0.00690*** (0.000768)	-0.00840*** (0.000735)	-0.00860*** (0.000770)
IP_entry · s	-0.000632 (0.00110)	-0.00174 (0.00115)	-0.00273** (0.00136)	-0.00250** (0.00122)	-0.00410*** (0.00122)	-0.00452*** (0.00140)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	3.444	3.444	3.444	3.444	3.444	3.444
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-2.75%	-3.15%	-4.13%	-4.49%	-5.47%	-5.60%
IP	-0.23%	-0.64%	-1.00%	-0.92%	-1.50%	-1.66%
Log Annual Earnings :						
UR_entry · s	-0.00484*** (0.000826)	-0.00700*** (0.000917)	-0.00970*** (0.00101)	-0.0111*** (0.000964)	-0.0133*** (0.000965)	-0.0142*** (0.000982)
IP_entry · s	-0.000614 (0.00133)	-0.00126 (0.00141)	-0.00224 (0.00159)	-0.00215 (0.00146)	-0.00322** (0.00151)	-0.00325* (0.00170)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	9.052	9.052	9.052	9.052	9.052	9.052
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-3.15%	-4.56%	-6.32%	-7.23%	-8.67%	-9.25%
IP	-0.22%	-0.46%	-0.82%	-0.79%	-1.18%	-1.19 %
Log Weekly Wages :						
UR_entry · s	-0.00155*** (0.000248)	-0.00268*** (0.000290)	-0.00379*** (0.000362)	-0.00468*** (0.000401)	-0.00536*** (0.000446)	-0.00584*** (0.000450)
IP_entry · s	7.23e-05 (0.000543)	0.000351 (0.000547)	0.000234 (0.000676)	0.000335 (0.000609)	0.000811 (0.000647)	0.00134* (0.000740)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	5.649	5.649	5.649	5.649	5.649	5.649
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-1.01%	-1.75%	-2.47%	-3.05%	-3.49%	-3.81 %
IP	0.03%	0.13%	0.09%	0.12%	0.30%	0.49%
St. Dev. UR	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515
St. Dev. IP	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and years of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration at entry and years of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for region of entry and 3-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry).

Table B.12: Coefficients of main interest on OTHER LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES (IV)

<i>var · s =</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
Full-time Employment :						
UR_entry · s	-7.69e-05 (0.000109)	-0.000143 (0.000147)	-0.000412** (0.000188)	-0.000503** (0.000211)	-0.000928*** (0.000227)	-0.00135*** (0.000254)
IP_entry · s	-0.000526* (0.000298)	-0.000478 (0.000369)	-0.000608 (0.000390)	-0.000983** (0.000484)	-0.00128*** (0.000486)	-0.00137** (0.000546)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	0.914	0.914	0.914	0.914	0.914	0.914
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-0.05%	-0.10%	-0.29%	-0.36%	-0.66%	-0.96%
IP	-0.21%	-0.19%	-0.24%	-0.39%	-0.51%	-0.55%
Autonomous Job :						
UR_entry · s	0.000934*** (7.62e-05)	0.000905*** (0.000106)	0.000784*** (0.000129)	0.000668*** (0.000152)	0.000545*** (0.000176)	0.000408** (0.000195)
IP_entry · s	0.000217 (0.000178)	0.000341 (0.000237)	0.000606** (0.000261)	0.000658* (0.000339)	0.000953** (0.000389)	0.000830** (0.000398)
Observations	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783
Y-Baseline	0.0482	0.0482	0.0482	0.0482	0.0482	0.0482
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	12.62%	12.24%	10.59%	9.03%	7.37%	5.51%
IP	1.65%	2.59%	4.61%	5.00%	7.25%	6.31%
Probability of Unemployment :						
UR_entry · s	0.000773*** (0.000151)	0.00303*** (0.000348)	0.00405*** (0.000357)	0.00500*** (0.000453)	0.00551*** (0.000452)	0.00599*** (0.000487)
IP_entry · s	-0.000708*** (0.000182)	-0.000663*** (0.000252)	-0.000444 (0.000294)	0.000408 (0.000380)	0.000772* (0.000415)	0.000510 (0.000387)
Observations	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783	539,783
Y-Baseline	0.0477	0.0477	0.0477	0.0477	0.0477	0.0477
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	10.55%	41.39%	55.32%	68.24%	75.17%	81.83%
IP	-5.43%	-5.09%	-3.41%	3.13%	5.93%	3.91%
Tenure :						
UR_entry · s	-0.219 (0.302)	0.313 (0.589)	-0.163 (0.801)	-1.067 (0.962)	-2.615** (1.164)	-5.250*** (1.301)
IP_entry · s	1.194*** (0.292)	1.545*** (0.442)	1.057 (0.752)	0.210 (0.919)	-2.009 (1.312)	-2.548 (1.697)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	672.4	672.4	672.4	672.4	672.4	672.4
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-0.21%	0.30%	-0.16%	-1.03%	-2.53%	-5.09%
IP	0.65%	0.84%	0.58%	0.11%	-1.09%	-1.39%
St. Dev. UR	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515
St. Dev. IP	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and years of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration at entry and years of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for region of entry and 3-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry) divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100.

Table B.13: Coefficients of main interest on PROBABILITY OF MOVING (IV)

<i>vars</i> =	1	2	3	4	5	6
Probability of Changing Firm :						
UR_entry ·s	0.00160*** (0.000317)	0.00344*** (0.000332)	0.00345*** (0.000361)	0.00409*** (0.000366)	0.00450*** (0.000369)	0.00429*** (0.000408)
IP_entry ·s	-0.000201 (0.000660)	0.000574 (0.000796)	0.000468 (0.000777)	0.00135 (0.000863)	0.00134* (0.000722)	0.00172** (0.000838)
Observations	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317	507,317
Y-Baseline	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.266	0.266
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	3.92%	8.43%	8.46%	10.01%	11.02%	10.51%
IP	-0.28%	0.79%	0.64%	1.86%	1.85%	2.37%
Moving to same 6-digit :						
UR_entry ·s	0.000213 (0.000214)	0.000622*** (0.000222)	0.00112*** (0.000242)	0.00113*** (0.000261)	0.00176*** (0.000276)	0.00152*** (0.000304)
IP_entry ·s	0.000101 (0.000394)	0.000381 (0.000324)	0.000702** (0.000332)	0.00104*** (0.000344)	0.000775** (0.000357)	0.00122*** (0.000367)
Observations	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784
Y-Baseline	0.0735	0.0735	0.0735	0.0735	0.0735	0.0735
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	1.89%	5.51%	9.93%	10.02%	15.60%	13.47%
IP	0.50%	1.90%	3.50%	5.18%	3.86%	6.08%
Moving to different 2-digit :						
UR_entry ·s	0.00118*** (0.000323)	0.00247*** (0.000308)	0.00186*** (0.000325)	0.00238*** (0.000332)	0.00215*** (0.000326)	0.00219*** (0.000350)
IP_entry ·s	-0.000183 (0.000626)	0.000266 (0.000666)	-0.000332 (0.000662)	0.000474 (0.000753)	0.000651 (0.000663)	0.000339 (0.000670)
Observations	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784	485,784
Y-Baseline	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182	0.182
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	4.22%	8.84%	6.66%	8.52%	7.70%	7.83%
IP	-0.37%	0.53%	-0.67%	0.95%	1.31%	0.68%
St. Dev. UR	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515
St. Dev. IP	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and years of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration at entry and years of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for region of entry and 3-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry) divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100.

Table B.14: Coefficients of main interest on INJURY OUTCOMES (IV)

<i>var · s =</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6
All injuries :						
UR_entry · s	0.000155 (0.000587)	4.94e-05 (0.000574)	-0.000148 (0.000599)	0.000177 (0.000625)	0.000947 (0.000636)	0.000782 (0.000688)
IP_entry · s	0.00196** (0.000834)	0.00144** (0.000649)	0.00199*** (0.000704)	0.00205** (0.000802)	0.00225*** (0.000695)	0.00233*** (0.000681)
Observations	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849
Y-Baseline	0.0808	0.0808	0.0808	0.0808	0.0808	0.0808
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	1.25%	0.40%	-1.19%	1.43%	7.64%	6.31%
IP	8.89%	6.53%	9.03%	9.30%	10.20%	10.57%
Immediate-care Injuries :						
UR_entry · s	-8.73e-05 (0.000277)	-0.000212 (0.000300)	-0.000114 (0.000293)	-1.45e-05 (0.000271)	9.36e-05 (0.000307)	-6.36e-05 (0.000268)
IP_entry · s	0.000465 (0.000354)	0.000113 (0.000307)	0.000405 (0.000345)	0.000424 (0.000263)	0.000497* (0.000294)	0.000406 (0.000276)
Observations	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849
Y-Baseline	0.00889	0.00889	0.00889	0.00889	0.00889	0.00889
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	-6.40%	-15.53%	-8.35%	-1.06%	6.86%	-4.66%
IP	19.15%	4.66%	16.70%	17.47%	20.48%	16.73%
Overtime Injuries :						
UR_entry · s	0.000134 (0.000207)	1.23e-05 (0.000175)	8.82e-05 (0.000203)	-0.000258 (0.000212)	6.69e-05 (0.000166)	-8.27e-05 (0.000207)
IP_entry · s	0.000663** (0.000265)	0.000635** (0.000291)	0.000934*** (0.000321)	0.000313 (0.000408)	0.000811*** (0.000301)	0.00105*** (0.000347)
Observations	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849	506,849
Y-Baseline	0.0126	0.0126	0.0126	0.0126	0.0126	0.0126
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change						
UR	6.93%	0.64%	4.56%	-13.34%	3.46%	-4.27%
IP	19.28%	18.45%	27.17%	9.10%	23.59%	30.51%
St. Dev. UR	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515	6.515
St. Dev. IP	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663	3.663

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and years of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration at entry and years of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for region of entry and 3-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry) divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100.

Table B.15: Heterogeneity Analysis on Labour Outcomes (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Foreigner	Natives	Female	Male	Small*	Large*	Blue-collar*	White-collar*
Panel A - Log Effective Weeks Worked								
UR_entry · s = 6	-0.00821*** (0.00206)	-0.0104*** (0.000805)	-0.0119*** (0.00158)	-0.00719*** (0.000846)	-0.0108*** (0.000918)	-0.00621*** (0.00108)	-0.00927*** (0.000803)	-0.00351** (0.00173)
IP_entry · s = 6	-0.00806*** (0.00246)	-0.00344** (0.00140)	-0.00566*** (0.00186)	-0.00252 (0.00164)	-0.00437** (0.00206)	-0.00475*** (0.00171)	-0.00582*** (0.00168)	0.000465 (0.00229)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	3.398	3.459	3.360	3.485	3.382	3.501	3.421	3.603
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-3.96%	-7.04%	-7.57%	-4.74%	-7.38%	-3.84%	-6.09%	-2.19%
IP	-2.94%	-1.25%	-2.32%	-0.85%	-1.65%	-1.67%	-2.04%	0.21%
Panel B - Log Annual Earnings								
UR_entry · s = 6	-0.00933*** (0.00226)	-0.0195*** (0.00105)	-0.0174*** (0.00194)	-0.0129*** (0.000973)	-0.0176*** (0.00102)	-0.0114*** (0.00143)	-0.0148*** (0.00103)	-0.00954*** (0.00212)
IP_entry · s = 6	-0.00648** (0.00283)	-0.00199 (0.00169)	-0.00457** (0.00215)	-0.000606 (0.00214)	-0.00452* (0.00244)	-0.00212 (0.00197)	-0.00502*** (0.00183)	0.00392 (0.00371)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	8.995	9.069	8.883	9.133	8.876	9.216	8.973	9.584
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-4.50%	-13.19%	-11.08%	-8.51%	-12.03%	-7.05%	-9.72%	-5.94%
IP	-2.36%	-0.72%	-1.87%	-0.20%	-1.70%	-0.75%	-1.76%	1.78%
Panel C - Log Weekly Wages								
UR_entry · s = 6	-0.00144* (0.000838)	-0.00917*** (0.000481)	-0.00598*** (0.000758)	-0.00580*** (0.000448)	-0.00725*** (0.000453)	-0.00526*** (0.000632)	-0.00580*** (0.000481)	-0.00627*** (0.000944)
IP_entry · s = 6	0.00191* (0.00114)	0.00139* (0.000824)	0.00113 (0.000882)	0.00201** (0.00100)	-0.000181 (0.00100)	0.00279*** (0.000966)	0.000862 (0.000665)	0.00352 (0.00217)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	5.649	5.648	5.559	5.692	5.537	5.754	5.595	6.010
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-0.69%	-6.20%	-3.81%	-3.83%	-4.96%	-3.25%	-3.81%	-3.90%
IP	0.70%	0.50%	0.46%	0.68%	-0.07%	0.98%	0.30%	1.59%
St. Dev. UR	4.822	6.766	6.366	6.597	6.834	6.187	6.566	6.225
St. Dev. IP	3.646	3.627	4.103	3.380	3.769	3.517	3.507	4.529

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration (4-digit) at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for Province of entry and 4-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes for variables in log form are computed as $\beta \times \text{SD}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry). For variables not in log form, this product is divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100. (*) Refers to categories at entry.

Table B.16: Heterogeneity Analysis on Other Labour Outcomes (1) (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Foreigner	Natives	Female	Male	Small*	Large*	Blue-collar*	White-collar*
Panel A - Probability of Full-time Employment								
UR_entry ·s = 6	-0.000761 (0.00117)	-0.00114*** (0.000247)	-0.00157*** (0.000550)	-0.00117*** (0.000231)	-0.00269*** (0.000392)	-0.000129 (0.000287)	-0.00121*** (0.000271)	-0.00261*** (0.000705)
IP_entry ·s = 6	-0.00500*** (0.00135)	-0.000439 (0.000501)	-0.00178* (0.00105)	-1.26e-05 (0.000456)	-0.00158* (0.000815)	-0.00117** (0.000550)	-0.00175*** (0.000625)	0.000279 (0.000925)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	0.899	0.919	0.833	0.954	0.882	0.945	0.916	0.898
St. Dev. UR	4.822	6.766	6.366	6.597	6.834	6.187	6.566	6.225
St. Dev. IP	3.646	3.627	4.103	3.380	3.769	3.517	3.507	4.529
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-0.41%	-0.84%	-1.20%	-0.81%	-2.08%	-0.08%	-0.87%	-1.81%
IP	-2.03%	-0.17%	-0.88%	-0.00%	-0.68%	-0.44%	-0.67%	0.14%
Panel B - Autonomous Job								
UR_entry ·s = 6	0.00555*** (0.000804)	0.00101*** (0.000214)	0.00118*** (0.000280)	3.51e-05 (0.000236)	0.000606** (0.000293)	-0.000385* (0.000214)	0.000150 (0.000205)	0.00285*** (0.000520)
IP_entry ·s = 6	0.00287*** (0.000915)	7.15e-05 (0.000423)	0.00116** (0.000517)	0.000953* (0.000575)	0.000926 (0.000577)	0.000687 (0.000474)	0.000879** (0.000418)	0.000652 (0.000410)
Observations	133,769	406,014	177,141	362,641	264,615	275,168	474,666	63,523
Y-Baseline	0.0567	0.0454	0.0320	0.0561	0.0587	0.0381	0.0493	0.0400
St. Dev. UR	4.877	6.783	6.419	6.603	6.851	6.205	6.588	6.236
St. Dev. IP	3.650	3.657	4.123	3.406	3.802	3.529	3.539	4.511
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	47.71%	15.09%	23.70%	0.41%	7.08%	-6.27%	2.00%	44.43%
IP	18.47%	0.58%	14.95%	5.79%	5.99%	6.37%	6.31%	7.36%

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration (4-digit) at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for Province of entry and 4-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry)(*) Refers to categories at entry.

Table B.17: Heterogeneity Analysis on Other Labour Outcomes (2) (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Foreigner	Natives	Female	Male	Small*	Large*	Blue-collar*	White-collar*
Panel A - Unemployment								
UR_entry · s = 6	0.00479*** (0.000684)	0.00674*** (0.000566)	0.00919*** (0.000936)	0.00448*** (0.000316)	0.00551*** (0.000342)	0.00645*** (0.000850)	0.00617*** (0.000524)	0.00434*** (0.000537)
IP_entry · s = 6	0.00104 (0.000851)	0.000300 (0.000408)	0.000395 (0.000612)	0.000100 (0.000452)	-0.000712* (0.000417)	0.00172** (0.000669)	0.000628 (0.000471)	7.31e-05 (0.000500)
Observations	133,769	406,014	177,141	362,641	264,615	275,168	474,666	63,523
Y-Baseline	0.0525	0.0461	0.0648	0.0394	0.0440	0.0513	0.0509	0.0253
St. Dev. UR	4.877	6.783	6.419	6.603	6.851	6.205	6.588	6.236
St. Dev. IP	3.650	3.657	4.123	3.406	3.802	3.529	3.539	4.511
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	44.51%	99.20%	91.05%	75.13%	85.78%	77.94%	79.93%	106.96%
IP	7.23%	2.38%	2.51%	0.86%	-6.15%	11.83%	4.37%	1.30%
Panel B - Tenure								
UR_entry · s = 6	-12.15*** (2.270)	-6.030*** (1.376)	-10.63*** (2.720)	-2.827*** (1.027)	-4.167*** (0.895)	-3.997* (2.416)	-5.298*** (1.360)	-4.673** (2.143)
IP_entry · s = 6	-7.444** (2.993)	-0.966 (1.762)	-2.803 (2.125)	-2.869 (2.351)	-0.965 (1.708)	-3.977* (2.316)	-3.348* (1.850)	0.785 (2.251)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	625.3	685.8	672.1	670.2	614.2	724.3	650.2	819
St. Dev. UR	4.822	6.766	6.366	6.597	6.834	6.187	6.566	6.225
St. Dev. IP	3.646	3.627	4.103	3.380	3.769	3.517	3.507	4.529
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-9.37%	-5.95%	-10.08%	-2.78%	-4.64%	-3.41%	-5.35%	-3.55%
IP	-4.34%	-0.51%	-1.71%	-1.45%	-0.59%	-1.93%	-1.81%	0.43%

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration (4-digit) at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for Province of entry and 4-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry), divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100. (*) Refers to categories at entry.

Table B.18: Heterogeneity Analysis on Probability of Moving (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Foreigner	Natives	Female	Male	Small*	Large*	Blue-collar*	White-collar*
Panel A - Probability of Changing Firm								
UR_entry ·s = 6	0.00234** (0.00115)	0.00238 (0.00146)	0.00462*** (0.000436)	0.00167* (0.000954)	0.00250*** (0.000544)	7.76e-05 (0.000503)	0.00462*** (0.000436)	0.00167* (0.000954)
IP_entry ·s = 6	0.00241 (0.00159)	0.00140* (0.000829)	0.00136 (0.00130)	0.00156 (0.000977)	0.00111 (0.00113)	0.00234** (0.00106)	0.00284*** (0.000991)	-0.00249* (0.00129)
Observations	125,400	381,917	166,649	340,667	246,329	260,987	446,045	59,795
Y-Baseline	0.286	0.260	0.261	0.269	0.286	0.248	0.280	0.168
St. Dev. UR	4.822	6.766	6.366	6.597	6.834	6.187	6.566	6.225
St. Dev. IP	3.646	3.627	4.103	3.380	3.769	3.517	3.507	4.529
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	3.94%	6.19%	11.27%	4.09%	5.98%	0.19%	10.84%	6.19%
IP	3.07%	1.95%	2.14%	1.96%	1.46%	3.32%	3.56%	-6.71%
Panel B - Probability of Moving within 6-digit sector								
UR_entry ·s = 6	0.00241*** (0.000880)	0.00181*** (0.000329)	0.00170*** (0.000468)	0.00162*** (0.000330)	0.00250*** (0.000346)	7.76e-05 (0.000503)	0.00157*** (0.000328)	0.000966* (0.000569)
IP_entry ·s = 6	0.000871 (0.000903)	0.00130*** (0.000384)	0.00182*** (0.000627)	0.000721 (0.000444)	0.000520 (0.000480)	0.00193*** (0.000518)	0.00163*** (0.000446)	-0.000104 (0.000338)
Observations	118,127	367,655	158,129	327,655	234,089	251,695	426,862	57,562
Y-Baseline	0.0764	0.0727	0.0830	0.0691	0.0777	0.0698	0.0793	0.0331
St. Dev. UR	4.793	6.721	6.271	6.581	6.782	6.167	6.525	6.192
St. Dev. IP	3.643	3.622	4.114	3.368	3.768	3.509	3.498	4.539
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	15.11%	16.73%	12.85%	15.43%	21.83%	0.68%	12.93%	18.06%
IP	4.15%	6.48%	9.03%	3.51%	2.52%	9.71%	7.19%	-1.43%

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration (4-digit) at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for Province of entry and 4-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry), divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100. (*) Refers to categories at entry.


Table B.19: Heterogeneity Analysis on Injury Rates (IV)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Foreigner	Natives	Female	Male	Small*	Large*	Blue-collar*	White-collar*
Panel A - All Injuries								
UR_entry ·s = 6	-0.000462 (0.00103)	0.00154* (0.000792)	0.000525 (0.000822)	0.000961 (0.000924)	0.000170 (0.000858)	0.00139 (0.00110)	0.000875 (0.000765)	-0.000188 (0.000556)
IP_entry ·s = 6	0.00196 (0.00158)	0.00237*** (0.000738)	0.000600 (0.000814)	0.00297*** (0.000980)	0.00232** (0.000993)	0.00233*** (0.000873)	0.00288*** (0.000843)	-8.19e-05 (0.000341)
Observations	125,280	381,569	166,375	340,473	246,090	260,758	445,618	59,754
Y-Baseline	0.103	0.0737	0.0373	0.102	0.0780	0.0838	0.0904	0.0129
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-2.16%	14.14%	8.96%	6.21%	1.49%	10.27%	6.35%	-9.06%
IP	6.94%	11.66%	6.60%	9.83%	11.21%	9.78%	11.16%	-2.88%
Panel B - Immediate-care Injuries								
UR_entry ·s = 6	-0.000195 (0.000470)	-8.15e-05 (0.000310)	0.000371 (0.000291)	-0.000281 (0.000379)	0.000410 (0.000298)	-0.000660 (0.000592)	-6.31e-05 (0.000299)	-8.06e-05 (8.84e-05)
IP_entry ·s = 6	0.00121 (0.000772)	0.000193 (0.000285)	0.000368 (0.000277)	0.000373 (0.000429)	0.000736* (0.000404)	9.67e-05 (0.000370)	0.000407 (0.000300)	0.000418 (0.000311)
Observations	125,280	381,569	166,375	340,473	246,090	260,758	445,618	59,754
Y-Baseline	0.0131	0.00753	0.00336	0.0116	0.0102	0.00767	0.00997	0.00107
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-7.17%	-7.32%	70.34%	-15.97%	27.45%	-53.23%	-4.15%	-46.84%
IP	33.69%	9.29%	44.93%	10.86%	27.16%	4.43%	14.32%	176.86%
Panel C - Overtime Injuries								
UR_entry ·s = 6	-8.13e-05 (0.000493)	9.28e-06 (0.000236)	0.000195 (0.000213)	-0.000194 (0.000275)	-0.000383* (0.000200)	0.000245 (0.000347)	-0.000103 (0.000229)	1.06e-06 (0.000128)
IP_entry ·s = 6	0.00112 (0.000892)	0.00101*** (0.000353)	0.000481 (0.000308)	0.00139*** (0.000526)	0.00106** (0.000462)	0.00102** (0.000463)	0.00128*** (0.000427)	0.000962 (0.000742)
Observations	125,280	381,569	166,375	340,473	246,090	260,758	445,618	59,754
Y-Baseline	0.0195	0.0103	0.00721	0.0152	0.00927	0.0157	0.0141	0.00164
Effect of one St.Dev. on % change								
UR	-2.01%	0.61%	17.21%	-8.42%	-28.24%	9.65%	-4.79%	0.40%
IP	20.96%	35.57%	27.35%	30.90%	43.07%	22.85%	31.85%	265.86%
St. Dev. UR	4.821	6.766	6.364	6.597	6.834	6.186	6.565	6.224
St. Dev. IP	3.647	3.625	4.101	3.379	3.768	3.516	3.506	4.530

Notes: The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interactions between (i) unemployment at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience and (ii) import penetration (4-digit) at entry and the sixth year of labor market experience. All specifications include a full set of controls (year-of-entry fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, region of birth, five-year entry cohort, gender, and qualification at entry) as well as fixed effects for Province of entry and 4-digit sector of entry. Standard errors are clustered at the year-of-first-job $\times$ 4-digit sector level. Percentage changes are computed as $\beta \times \text{sd}$ of unemployment at entry (or import penetration at entry), divided by the baseline value of the outcome and multiplied by 100. (*) Refers to categories at entry.


C Heterogeneity: dynamic effects

Figure C.1: Effects of labor market conditions at entry on the probability of changing firm




The figure displays the estimated effects of unemployment at labor market entry and import competition at the 4-digit ATECO level on the probability of changing firm. Panel A reports the coefficients on unemployment at labor market entry interacted with years-of-experience dummies, while panel B reports the corresponding coefficients for import competition at entry. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

Figure C.2: Effects of labor market conditions at entry on the probability of moving to a company in the same 6 digit ATECO sector



The figure displays the estimated effects of unemployment at labor market entry and import competition at the 4-digit ATECO level on the probability of moving to a company in the same 6 digit ATECO sector. Panel A reports the coefficients on unemployment at labor market entry interacted with years-of-experience dummies, while panel B reports the corresponding coefficients for import competition at entry. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.


Figure C.3: Effects of labor market conditions at entry on self-employment probability.




The figure displays the estimated effects of unemployment at labor market entry and import competition at the 4-digit ATECO level on the self-employment probability. Panel A reports the coefficients on unemployment at labor market entry interacted with years-of-experience dummies, while panel B reports the corresponding coefficients for import competition at entry. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

Figure C.4: Heterogeneous Effects of Labor Market Conditions at Entry on the Logarithm of Effective Weeks Worked


(A) Blue and White-Collars Workers at Entry




(B) Men and Women



(C) Natives and Foreign-Born Workers




(D) Firms Below and Above 15 Employees at Entry




The figure reports heterogeneous effects of labor market conditions at entry on log of weeks worked. Panel A shows estimates by occupational qualification at entry. Panel B reports estimates separately for men and women. Panel C distinguishes between native and foreign-born workers. Panel D compares workers entering firms with fewer than 15 employees and firms with more than 15 employees. Coefficients are interacted with years-of-experience dummies. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

Figure C.5: Heterogeneous Effects of Labor Market Conditions at Entry on the Probability of Changing Firm


(A) Blue- and White-Collar Workers at Entry




(B) Men and Women



(C) Natives and Foreign-Born Workers




(D) Firms Below and Above 15 Employees at Entry




The figure reports heterogeneous effects of labor market conditions at entry on the probability of changing firm. Panel A shows estimates by occupational qualification at entry. Panel B reports estimates separately for men and women. Panel C distinguishes between native and foreign-born workers. Panel D compares workers entering firms with fewer than 15 employees and firms with more than 15 employees. Coefficients are interacted with years-of-experience dummies. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

Figure C.6: Heterogeneous Effects of Labor Market Conditions at Entry on the Probability of Moving to a Firm in the Same 6-Digit ATECO Sector


(A) Blue- and White-Collar Workers at Entry




(B) Men and Women



(C) Natives and Foreign-Born Workers




(D) Firms Below and Above 15 Employees at Entry




The figure reports heterogeneous effects of labor market conditions at entry on the probability of moving to a firm within the same 6-digit ATECO sector. Panel A shows estimates by occupational qualification at entry. Panel B reports estimates separately for men and women. Panel C distinguishes between native and foreign-born workers. Panel D compares workers entering firms with fewer than 15 employees and firms with more than 15 employees. Coefficients are interacted with years-of-experience dummies. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

Figure C.7: Heterogeneous Effects of Labor Market Conditions at Entry on the Injury Rate (All Injuries)


(A) Blue- and White-Collar Workers at Entry




(B) Men and Women



(C) Natives and Foreign-Born Workers




(D) Firms Below and Above 15 Employees at Entry




The figure reports heterogeneous effects of labor market conditions at entry on the injury rate (all injuries). Panel A shows estimates by occupational qualification at entry. Panel B reports estimates separately for men and women. Panel C distinguishes between native and foreign-born workers. Panel D compares workers entering firms with fewer than 15 employees and firms with more than 15 employees. Coefficients are interacted with years-of-experience dummies. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

Figure C.8: Heterogeneous Effects of Labor Market Conditions at Entry on the Injury Rate (Immediate Care Injuries)


(A) Blue- and White-Collar Workers at Entry




(B) Men and Women



(C) Natives and Foreign-Born Workers




(D) Firms Below and Above 15 Employees at Entry




The figure reports heterogeneous effects of labor market conditions at entry on the injury rate (immediate care injuries). Panel A shows estimates by occupational qualification at entry. Panel B reports estimates separately for men and women. Panel C distinguishes between native and foreign-born workers. Panel D compares workers entering firms with fewer than 15 employees and firms with more than 15 employees. Coefficients are interacted with years-of-experience dummies. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

Figure C.9: Heterogeneous Effects of Labor Market Conditions at Entry on Injury Rates in Non-Standard Working Hours


(A) Blue- and White-Collar Workers at Entry




(B) Men and Women



(C) Natives and Foreign-Born Workers




(D) Firms Below and Above 15 Employees at Entry




The figure reports heterogeneous effects of labor market conditions at entry on injury rates occurring during non-standard working hours, including overtime and night-shift work. Panel A shows estimates by occupational qualification at entry. Panel B reports estimates separately for men and women. Panel C distinguishes between native and foreign-born workers. Panel D compares workers entering firms with fewer than 15 employees and firms with more than 15 employees. Coefficients are interacted with years-of-experience dummies. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.

Figure C.10: Heterogeneous Effects of Labor Market Conditions at Entry on Log Weekly Wages


(A) Blue- and White-Collar Workers at Entry




(B) Men and Women



(C) Natives and Foreign-Born Workers



(D) Firms Below and Above 15 Employees at Entry



The figure reports heterogeneous effects of labor market conditions at entry on log weekly wages. Panel A shows estimates by occupational qualification at entry. Panel B reports estimates separately for men and women. Panel C distinguishes between native and foreign-born workers. Panel D compares workers entering firms with fewer than 15 employees and firms with more than 15 employees. Coefficients are interacted with years-of-experience dummies. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered by cohort of entry and sector at the 4-digit ATECO level.