Back to Black?

The Impact of Regularizing Migrant Workers

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May 12, 2017
A very hot topic!

*Kicking out immigrants doesn’t raise wages*

The Economist, February 4\textsuperscript{th} 2017

*Lavoro nero, 77 miliardi di PIL sommerso l’anno*

La Stampa, 19 novembre 2016
The paper merges together two streams of the literature:

- Public Economics: Tax evasion, amnesties and auditing
- Labour Economics: Undocumented migrant legalization
Selected related literature

- Almeida e Carneiro (2012)
  - The impact of larger enforcement on labor market

- Snow and Warren (2007)
  - Tax evasion ↔ bayesian updating (expected fine)

  - The impact of legalization on labour market outcomes
The paper

- Evaluation of Italy’s largest legalization process ever
- Data: INPS archives, providing the universe of Italian workers and firms
- Exploiting an innovative identification strategy, based on unexpected change in the auditing policy for undeclared work
The paper

- Evaluation of Italy’s largest legalization process ever
- Data: INPS archives, providing the universe of Italian workers and firms
- Exploiting an innovative identification strategy, based on unexpected change in the auditing policy for undeclared work

- Two levels of analysis:
  - Firm level analysis, on employment and wages
  - Worker level analysis, on the careers of regularized migrants and co-workers (in progress)
Results in a nutshell

- Firm level: a short run employment growth, and no effect after one year
- Firm level: no causal impact on wages

Preliminary findings: higher exposition to regularization slightly increases the separation rate for blue-collar co-workers (no effect for white-collar)
Results in a nutshell

- Firm level: a short run employment growth, and no effect after one year
- Firm level: no causal impact on wages

- Worker level: regularized migrant has an incredibly high survival rate in the economy: 80% after 5 years
- Preliminary findings: higher exposition to regularization slightly increases the separation rate for blue-collar co-workers (no effect for white collar)
Italy’s largest legalization process ever (more than 700k applications). Renewable 2 years work/residence permit to all undocumented migrants whose employers were willing to:

- Declare that they had continuously employed the immigrant for the three months before the legalization law was passed,
- Legally hire the immigrant under a minimum one year contract at a minimum monthly salary (439 euros),
- Pay an amnesty fee (700 euros for all workers).
Why is Italy an interesting case study?

% of Undeclared 2000-2014

Years

% of Undeclared
Why is Italy an interesting case study?

Migrant workers per year

Year | Migrant workers per year
---|---
1995 | 149745
1997 | 223588
1999 | 230191
2001 | 250531
2003 | 316690
2005 | 412092
2007 | 482534
2009 | 745057
2011 | 829719
2013 | 897355
2015 | 910231
2017 | 966015
2019 | 1201022
Why is Italy an interesting case study?

Figure 1: Resident Immigrant trends in Italy, Germany, France.
INPS DM10: firm social security declaration
- Allow identifying the firms that undertake the regularization
Social Security Administrative Data - INPS Archives

- INPS DM10: firm social security declaration
  - Allow identifying the firms that undertake the regularization

- INPS O1M archive
  - Allow the identification of regularized workers, defining as regularized migrants those who have been hired between September and December 2002 (and being not-working in the same firm 3 months before).
  - Nationality, two sources: an INPS provided variable collected from various administrative sources, and when missing place of birth.
Social Security Administrative Data - INPS Archives

- **INPS DM10: firm social security declaration**
  - Allow identifying the firms that undertake the regularization

- **INPS O1M archive**
  - Allow the identification of regularized workers, defining as regularized migrants those who have been hired between September and December 2002 (and being not-working in the same firm 3 months before).
  - Nationality, two sources: an INPS provided variable collected from various administrative sources, and when missing place of birth.

- **Auditing data: INPS VG00 archive**
  - auditing programs since 2000 to detect undeclared workers (and related fines), at the firm level
Around 209,000 regularized workers, in around 96,000 firms

Around 20,000 black firms, that have been regularized
Previous Literature for the Italian case

- Devillanova, Fasani, Frattini (2014)
  - expectation of the regularization ↑ employment probability

- Congia (2007)
  - Only the estimates of the regularized workers

- Anastasia, Gambuzza, Rasera (2005)
  - Focus on the estimation of regularized workers for an Italian region (Veneto)
Institutional Background

Policy time frame

10/01 4/02 5/02 7/02 9/02 10/02

L. 189/2002  
(Bossi Fini)
Institutional Background

Policy time frame

L. 383/2001 10/01
L. 73/2002 4/02 5/02
CIPE 36/2002 7/02
L. 189/2002 (Bossi Fini) 9/02
D.l. 210/2002 10/02
D.l. 195/2002

Di Porto, Martino, Naticchioni
Institutional Background

Policy time frame

- L. 383/2001
  10/01
- L. 73/2002
  4/02 5/02
- CIPE 36/2002
- CIPE 36/2002 (Bossi Fini)
- L. 189/2002
  7/02
- D.l. 195/2002
- D.l. 210/2002
- Hermes 119/2002
- C. 161/2002
  9/02 10/02
Identification Strategy

- Identification problem: firms self select into the amnesty program
Identification Strategy

- Identification problem: firms self select into the amnesty program

→ Auditing “383” \textit{exogenous} with respect to the standard auditing programs, since the main aim was to advertize the upcoming it Bossi-Fini Regularization

- Different distribution by regions → Auditing by regions
- Different distribution by sector → Auditing by sectors
## Identification Strategy

### Relevant characteristics by type of inspection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>Ex 383</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not irregular</td>
<td>39.72</td>
<td>38.18</td>
<td>69.37</td>
<td>46.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not fined</td>
<td>14.49</td>
<td>18.27</td>
<td>15.98</td>
<td>16.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fined</td>
<td>45.80</td>
<td>43.55</td>
<td>14.65</td>
<td>37.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not found</td>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine (median)</td>
<td>2,643</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>1,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fine (mean)</td>
<td>20,219</td>
<td>15,790</td>
<td>3,664</td>
<td>16,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>8,580</td>
<td>7,849</td>
<td>5,513</td>
<td>21,951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Focus on Lombardia
## Identification Strategy

### Sector by type of inspection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>Ex 383</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>21.82</td>
<td>22.05</td>
<td>31.58</td>
<td>24.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructions</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>15.19</td>
<td>3.35</td>
<td>13.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales</td>
<td>19.58</td>
<td>21.23</td>
<td>30.63</td>
<td>22.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food&amp;Tourism</td>
<td>19.69</td>
<td>16.61</td>
<td>12.82</td>
<td>16.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate</td>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionals</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Focus on Lombardia - only sectors counting for ≥ 1%
Identification Strategy

Obs. weighted by no. firms in the cell
Excluding 1st and 99th pct
Identification Strategy

Obs. weighted by prop. of regularized firms
Identification Strategy

Delta inspections 2002-2001

Proportion 383 inspections

Obs. weighted by proportion of emerged firms
The Econometric Model

- Dependent variables: changes in employment and wages at the firm level between May 2002 (four months before the regularization) and:
  - December 2002, for a short term analysis
  - May and September 2003, for a medium run analysis
The Econometric Model

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  - December 2002, for a short term analysis
  - May and September 2003, for a medium run analysis

- Treatment variable: being a regularizing firm
The Econometric Model

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  - December 2002, for a short term analysis
  - May and September 2003, for a medium run analysis

- Treatment variable: being a regularizing firm

- Sample of firms at 2002, using also the year 2001 to control for unobserved heterogeneity: panel estimation

- For this reason we do not consider the “black” firms
\[ y_{i,c,t} = \beta_0 T_{i,c,t} + \beta_1 x_{i,c,t} + \beta_2 \text{insp}_{c,t-1} + \eta_i + \sigma_c \times \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,c,t} \]
The Econometric Model

\[ y_{i,c,t} = \beta_0 T_{i,c,t} + \beta_1 x_{i,c,t} + \beta_2 \text{insp}_{c,t-1} + \eta_i + \sigma_c \times \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,c,t} \]

c = SLL \times \text{sector}

\( x_{i,c} \): age, size of \( c \), North

\( \eta_i \): individual FE

\( \sigma_c \): cell FE

\( \delta_t \): year FE

\( \text{insp}_{c,t-1} \): inspections in \( c \)
The Econometric Model

\[ y_{i,c,t} = \beta_0 T_{i,c,t} + \beta_1 x_{i,c,t} + \beta_2 \text{insp}_{c,t-1} + \eta_i + \sigma_c \times \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,c,t} \]

\[ T_{i,c,t} = \gamma_0 \text{insp}_{383,c,t} + \gamma_1 x_{i,c,t} + \gamma_2 \text{insp}_{c,t-1} + \eta_i + \sigma_c \times \delta_t + \nu_{i,c,t} \]

c = SLL \times \text{sector}

\( x_{i,c} \): age, size of \( c \), North

\( \eta_i \): individual FE

\( \sigma_c \): cell FE

\( \delta_t \): year FE

\( \text{insp}_{c,t-1} \): inspections in \( c \)
### Summary Statistics: outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>1152.94</td>
<td>1129.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>median</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1132.75</td>
<td>1108.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p25</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>830.40</td>
<td>803.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p.75</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1388.00</td>
<td>1366.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Treated</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>7.45</td>
<td>1419.23</td>
<td>1257.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>median</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1435.32</td>
<td>1273.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p25</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1160.98</td>
<td>940.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p.75</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>1673.95</td>
<td>1515.54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary Statistics: instruments and covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>383 inspections</th>
<th>Inspections in t-1</th>
<th>Cell’s dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mean</td>
<td>10.80</td>
<td>26.28</td>
<td>1526.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>median</td>
<td>42.55</td>
<td>70.85</td>
<td>2239.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>min</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>max</td>
<td>432.00</td>
<td>499.00</td>
<td>13917.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables at the LLM-industry 2digit NACE.
Weighted by cell size
## Employment - OLS estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May-Dec ’02</th>
<th>May ’02-May ’03</th>
<th>May ’02-Sep ’03</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>1.48***</td>
<td>1.14***</td>
<td>-.458***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.013)</td>
<td>(.041)</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,054,226</td>
<td>1,875,084</td>
<td>1,874,524</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls included: cells dimension, firm FE, sector×year FE, SLL×year FE, inspections in t-1

Excluding outliers (1º and 99º pctile of the outcome) and largest firms (99º pctile in terms of employment in May 2002)

Errors clustered at firm’s level
### Employment - IV estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May-Dec ’02</th>
<th>May ’02-May ’03</th>
<th>May ’02-Sep ’03</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>2.82***</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>-0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.574)</td>
<td>(.811)</td>
<td>(.825)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,054,226</td>
<td>1,875,084</td>
<td>1,874,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>86.35</td>
<td>89.08</td>
<td>89.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls included: cells dimension, firm FE, sector×year FE, SLL×year FE, inspections in t-1

IV: Inspections ex lege 383 in the cell, and interacted with north

Excluding outliers (1st and 99th pctile of the outcome) and largest firms (99th pctile in terms of employment in May 2002)

Errors clustered at firm’s level

FS instr coeff: 0.0001, Prob treat 0.06, instr sd around 100, the effect is 0.01
Total wages - IV estimates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>May-Dec ‘02</th>
<th>May ’02-May ‘03</th>
<th>May ’02-Sep ‘03</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>732.22</td>
<td>2,248.13</td>
<td>1,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1342.56)</td>
<td>(2162.14)</td>
<td>(2096.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,029,358</td>
<td>1,861,022</td>
<td>1,861,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>80.92</td>
<td>83.49</td>
<td>84.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls included: cell’s dimension, firm FE, sector × year FE, SLL × year FE, inspections in t-1

IV: Inspections ex lege 383 in the cell, and interacted with north
Excluding outliers (1° and 99° pctile of the outcome) and largest firms (99° pctile in terms of employment in May 2002)
Errors clustered at firm’s level
### Employment - Additional specifications

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>2.82***</td>
<td>3.08***</td>
<td>3.31***</td>
<td>3.06**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.574)</td>
<td>(.661)</td>
<td>(.640)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2,054,226</td>
<td>1,797,518</td>
<td>1,789,226</td>
<td>2,058,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KP</td>
<td>86.35</td>
<td>63.31</td>
<td>108.8</td>
<td>27.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1): Baseline specification  
(2): Excluding sectors with no regularizing firms  
(3): Excluding interaction with north  
(4): IV built at province level
Estimates at the LLM level

- We run similar FE and IV regressions aggregating firm level variables at the LLM level (as for the instrument)

- Dependent variables: employment change at the LLM level
- Treatment: number of firms treated at the LLM level
- controls: number of firms, average firm age, industry compos.
Estimates at the LLM level

- We run similar FE and IV regressions aggregating firm level variables at the LLM level (as for the instrument)

- Dependent variables: employment change at the LLM level
- Treatment: number of firms treated at the LLM level
- controls: number of firms, average firm age, industry compos.

- Results are very similar to the firm level ones:
  - Positive employment effect in the short run (similar magnitude)
  - No employment effect after one year
  - No effect on wages
So far, results are disappointing from a policy point of view: effects only on employment in the short run.

Are migrants going back to black?

Is the policy ineffective?
Back to Black?

- So far, results are disappointing from a policy point of view: effects only on employment in the short run
- Are migrants going back to black?
- Is the policy ineffective?
From firms outcomes to individual careers
Back to Black?
Legalized Migrants Survival rate

![Graph showing survival rates for different categories over years](image-url)
Controlling for citizenship, age, sector and province of entry.
Co-Workers Survival rate
Coworkers separations

![Graph showing coworker separations over years]

- **Coworkers**
- **Other workers**
Coworkers earnings

![Graph showing coworker earnings over years]

- **Di Porto, Martino, Naticchioni**
- Back to Black?
- May 12, 2017
The Econometric Model

\[ y_{i,f,t} = \beta_0 T_{i,f,t} + \beta_1 x_{i,f,t} + \eta_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,f,t} \]

- Panel of co-workers, in 2001 and 2002
- \( y_{i,f,t} \): separation from the firm at \( t+1 \); yearly earnings at \( t+1 \)
- \( T_{i,f,t} \): share of legalized workers in the firm
- Controls: work experience, firm size
- Cluster s.e. at the firm level
The Econometric Model

\[ y_{i,f,t} = \beta_0 T_{i,f,t} + \beta_1 x_{i,f,t} + \eta_i + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,f,t} \]

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- \( T_{i,f,t} \): share of legalized workers in the firm
- Controls: work experience, firm size
- Cluster s.e. at the firm level
### FE on Coworkers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Collar</th>
<th></th>
<th>Blue Collar</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Separations</td>
<td>Earnings</td>
<td>Separations</td>
<td>Earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>-0.981</td>
<td>471.023</td>
<td>0.095***</td>
<td>-455.900***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.146)</td>
<td>(581.915)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(135.502)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>188,912</td>
<td>188,912</td>
<td>944,174</td>
<td>944,174</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls included: firm’s size, work experience
Standard error clustered at firm level

0.095*0.12(sd)=0.012 on average the separation rate is 0.41
## FE Coworkers and experience

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White Collar</th>
<th>Blue Collar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Separations</td>
<td>Earnings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treated</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>1010.279*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.135)</td>
<td>(608.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work Exp</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>182.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(120.338)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>-0.372***</td>
<td>-916.949*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(436.111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>188,912</td>
<td>188,912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Controls included: firm’s size, work experience dummy: median

Standard error clustered at firm level
Results

- Firm Level Analysis:
  - Short run causal impact on employment: negative
  - Short run causal impact on wages: non significant
  - Medium/long run causal impact: non significant

- Worker level analysis:
  - Legalized migrants do not go *Back to Black!*
  - Legalized migrant careers are similar to comparable workers
  - Coworkers: We have mixing non causal evidence of separation but the overall effect seems to be very little.
Next steps

- **Mechanisms:**
  - Bargaining power
  - Evidences from 2012
  - Peer effects
  - Complementarities

- **Effects on local labour markets**

- *network* Effects

- Cost-benefit analysis
Grazie!
Distribution of inspections by industry

- Transp.
- Services
- Other
- Tourism
- Trade
- Manif.
- Constr.

Legend:
- 2001
- 2002 (not 383)
- Ex 383
### Entry characteristics

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## Entry characteristics

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| N               | 250,577 | 194,271     | 1,174       |